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LOCAL ENERGY
Garrick B. Pursley∗
Hannah J. Wiseman∗∗
ABSTRACT
At a point in the future that is no longer remote, renewable energy will be a
necessity. The construction of large renewable energy farms is central to a
transition away from fossil fuels, but distributed renewable energy
technologies—wind turbines in backyards and solar panels on roofs—are
immediately essential as well.
Widespread deployment of distributed
renewable technologies requires rapid innovation led by renewable energy
pioneers—individuals who act as market leaders and prove to their neighbors
that these new energy devices are safe and worthy of use. Existing law and the
very structure of governmental authority over energy is ill-suited to this energy
transition and stifles the efforts of these pioneers. Public bodies must therefore
embark upon a substantial overhaul of what we call land-energy rules—legal
requirements governing the construction and physical location of renewable
technology. This Article assesses the relative institutional capacities of
different levels of government to determine which will best ensure that landenergy rules enable a drive toward distributed renewable energy and
concludes that the powers of municipal governments must be unleashed.
Innovation will occur from the ground up, and municipalities must actively
work to enable the next great energy transition in this country: a move toward
energy produced from the sun, the wind, the earth’s internal heat, and other
renewable sources.
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INTRODUCTION
The strength of a nation lies in its power—increasingly, not just its political
power, but its access to energy. Without abundant energy, economies do not
move,1 progress slows, and inspiration stagnates. By these measures,
American power is lagging behind the world,2 and in many respects, we are
moving backward. The antiquated American energy infrastructure needs
1 Benjamin S. Warr et al., Increase Supplies, Increase Efficiency: Evidence of Causality Between the
Quantity and Quality of Energy Consumption and Economic Growth 16–17 (INSEAD Soc. Innovation Ctr.,
Working Paper No. 2009/22/EPS/ISIC, 2009), available at http://knowledge.insead.edu/doc.cfm?cd=41726.
2 Keith Bradsher, A High-Speed Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2010, at B1 (“Other countries aren’t
waiting,” explained President Obama, discussing clean energy and high-speed rail developments. “They want
those jobs. China wants those jobs. Germany wants those jobs. They are going after them hard, making the
investments required.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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massive revision to establish a system powered substantially by renewable
resources. We know that the fossil fuels on which the current system depends
will be much more difficult to extract in the future;3 we know that dependence
on foreign fossil fuel sources creates international relations problems and
national security risks;4 and we increasingly accept the reality of the negative
environmental impacts of extracting fossil fuels and converting them into
power.5 There is broad public support for some kind of governmental response
to these problems, but that general sentiment for change is not tied to concrete
policy initiatives;6 thousands of small, technical regulatory questions must be
addressed to bring about the large alterations of the national energy
infrastructure required for salutary policy initiatives. But those inquiries
cannot be fruitfully pursued until we have answered the more fundamental
question of how the current, dysfunctional allocation of energy policy-making
authority may be corrected. Against the conventional wisdom that the national
scope of the energy problem requires a primarily centralized solution from the
federal government, this Article argues that local governments—cities and
towns—have one of the most significant roles to play in the transition to
renewable energy, particularly in the near term as distributed renewable
technologies are deployed. It concludes that municipalities working above a
federal regulatory floor are best positioned to foster, through regulation, much
of the innovation that will be necessary for this transition.
One critical regulatory role that local governments are well positioned to
play in the short-term transition to renewables is facilitating the development
and adoption of distributed renewable technologies that generate electricity

3

See infra notes 77–101 and accompanying text.
See U.S. Energy Facts, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?
page=us_energy_home#tab2 (last updated Nov. 22, 2010) (explaining that the United States relies on net
imports for twenty-four percent of its energy).
5 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS
REPORT 30 (Abdelkader Allali et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf; infra note 63 and accompanying text; see also Henry Fountain, U.S. Says BP Well
Is Finally ‘Dead,’ N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2010, at A14 (reporting that BP’s failed oil well in the Gulf of
Mexico released approximately 205 million gallons of oil into the Gulf).
6 See Michael K. Heiman & Barry D. Solomon, Power to the People: Electric Utility Restructuring and
the Commitment to Renewable Energy, 94 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 94, 107 (2004) (noting that
“over half of Americans claim they are willing to pay a premium for ‘green power,’” but arguing that market
and regulatory failures have made that choice impracticable for most consumers); Anthony Leiserowitz,
Climate Change Risk Perception and Policy Preferences: The Role of Affect, Imagery, and Values, 77
CLIMATIC CHANGE 45, 46 (2006) (“Since the year 2000, numerous public opinion polls demonstrate that large
majorities of Americans are aware of global warming (92%) . . . and already view climate change as a
somewhat to very serious problem (76%).”).
4
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close to the point of use—paradigmatically the backyard wind turbine and the
rooftop solar panel;7 this Article focuses on this role. Accordingly, the Article
analyzes legal requirements governing the construction and physical location
of distributed renewable devices—what we call land-energy rules. Beyond the
distributed scale, renewable energy devices like solar panels and wind turbines
may be installed in large “farms” that function like existing fossil-fuel-burning
power plants in the sense that they generate large quantities of electricity in a
single location and then send it over transmission lines to distant consumers.8
Establishing these large facilities requires overcoming economic and
regulatory complexities, however; renewable farms are costly, require
integration into large-scale transmission grids, and may occupy territory that
overlaps the borders of several states.9 Distributed renewables, we argue, are
just as essential10 as large-scale installations to establishing a stable nationwide
energy infrastructure powered substantially by renewable resources, but the
distributed generation piece of the energy policy puzzle has been largely
ignored by legal scholars.11 This is harmful because distributed renewable
energy projects face serious impediments that require immediate attention:
consumer uncertainty about their effectiveness and practicality, the need for
innovation to make existing technologies effective under a variety of
geographic and sociopolitical conditions, and adverse local land use rules.12
Local governments have a crucial role in overcoming regulatory barriers to

7 See RYAN FIRESTONE & CHRIS MARNAY, ERNEST ORLANDO LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB.,
DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES FOR CARBON EMISSIONS MITIGATION (2007), available at http://eetd.lbl.
gov/ea/emp/reports/62871.pdf; WADE CAN., 2010 GUIDE TO DECENTRALIZED ENERGY IN CANADA (2010),
available at http://wadecanada.ca/doc_index/2010-Guide-to-DE-in-Canada.pdf.
8 See PAUL BREEZE, POWER GENERATION TECHNOLOGIES 186–87, 198 (2005) (describing large solar
plants); id. at 162–63 (describing wind farms).
9 See, e.g., Heiman & Solomon, supra note 6, at 100–08; Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Electric Power
Transmission Line Siting Authority, 39 ENVTL. L. 1015 (2009).
10 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE SMART GRID (2009), available at http://www.oe.energy.gov/
DocumentsandMedia/DOE_SG_Book_Single_Pages%281%29.pdf (noting that distributed generation, as part
of an “islanding” system, can allow communities to generate power even when there is no power available
from a utility); Hermann Scheer, Solar City: Reconnecting Energy Generation and Use to the Technical and
Social Logic of Solar Energy, in URBAN ENERGY TRANSITION: FROM FOSSIL FUELS TO RENEWABLE POWER 1,
21 (Peter Droege ed., 2008) (arguing that “specific decentralized technologies . . . offer the optimum solution”
because they help ameliorate our “outdated dependency on [existing energy] infrastructure”); see also Sara C.
Bronin, Solar Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1224 (2009) (“[W]e cannot depend on large
installations . . . . [because] end users of large installations include only those people who live within the area
that can be reached by transmission lines.”).
11 But see Bronin, supra note 10. But see generally Sara C. Bronin, Curbing Energy Sprawl with
Microgrids, 43 CONN. L. REV. 547 (2010) (arguing for small-scale generation).
12 See Heiman & Solomon, supra note 6, at 99; infra notes 136–44, 224–33, and accompanying text.
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distributed renewables, and thus, in the larger transformation of the energy
system.
Traditional theoretical treatments of environmental regulation suggest a
centralized, federal solution to the problems facing distributed renewables.
Subnational regulation is problematic, the argument goes, because it generates
negative externalities and may create interjurisdictional “races to the
bottom.”13 While these arguments carry important truths, regulatory scholars
increasingly recognize the benefits of decentralizing policy-making authority
in certain areas.14
Devolving policy-making authority to subnational
governments promises regulatory experimentation and the efficiencies
generated by regulatory competition among jurisdictions. It also leverages a
greater number of institutional resources (including, importantly, localized
expertise and experience) and allocates policy-making authority to officials
most familiar with distinctly regional or local harms.15 Full devolvement to
local authorities would not be effective, however, and we do not propose that
here. An important counterweight to the enhanced local authority that we
advocate will be the establishment of federal regulatory standards that
constitute a mandatory minimum or “floor” to ameliorate the negative
consequences of regulatory competition.16
The emerging academic consensus recognizes the potential benefits of state
and local regulatory autonomy and therefore favors cooperative regimes that
allocate regulatory authority among several levels of government. Indeed, this
“cooperative federalism” approach is reflected in several major federal
environmental protection statutes.17 But the cooperative federalism literature
tends toward generalization; it focuses on how the federal and state
governments should share regulatory power. Local governments are typically

13 See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1210–11 (1977). Races to the bottom
involve states competing to attract industry by loosening regulation, thus dragging other competing states
toward increasingly lax environmental protections. See id. at 1211–12.
14 See, e.g., infra note 297.
15 See James E. Krier, Commentary, The Irrational National Air Quality Standards: Macro- and MicroMistakes, 22 UCLA L. REV. 323, 326–28 (1974); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition:
Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1210, 1236–42 (1992).
16 On this idea of federal regulatory floors, see generally William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation:
Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1565–66 (2007).
17 See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1102–
03 (2009).
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ignored or discussed only as an afterthought, and we argue that this must
change.
State governments are increasingly important environmental regulators in
practice. In the shadow of federal inaction on climate change,18 state
governments have responded to public demand for climate change initiatives in
a number of ways—by enacting renewable portfolio standards (financial
incentives to promote the adoption of renewable energy technology) and other
energy efficiency programs. Some states have been far more aggressive than
others, as one should expect from a system designed to foster experimentation
and regulatory competition.19 Yet as Table 1 demonstrates, local governments,
too, have entered the sustainability arena with differing degrees of
enthusiasm.20 The result of these early cooperative regulation experiments is a
patchwork of measures implemented by a multitude of institutions, but one that
lacks the coherent macro-strategy for cooperative regulation that is needed to
accomplish the dramatic infrastructural overhaul that will move the American
energy system toward sustainability.21
With both the potential benefits of state and local government participation
and the need for a broad strategy to shape and discipline a cooperative policymaking regime in mind, this Article reassesses central positions in the
environmental federalism literature with an eye to the particular challenges
facing distributed renewables. We propose that the distributed renewable
energy macro-strategy should include a large role for local governments. We
argue that local government institutions are best situated to manage and
encourage the use of distributed renewables if empowered to operate above a
federal regulatory “floor” of minimum standards. There are, however, few
one-size-fits-all answers in our increasingly complex regulatory world; the
optimal allocation of regulatory power among levels of government may
18 Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What Is Motivating State and Local
Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does This Say About Federalism and Environmental
Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015, 1021 (2006); Stephen Lacey, Prospects Fading for U.S. Climate Legislation in
2010, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD (Jan. 14, 2010), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/
2010/01/prospects-mixed-for-clean-energy-legislation-in-2010; cf. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (United States not a ratifier).
19 See PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE & PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, CLIMATE CHANGE 101:
STATE ACTION (2006), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/101_States.pdf; Carlson, supra
note 17, at 1098–99; Engel, supra note 18, at 1016–20; infra notes 184–207 and accompanying text.
20 See infra Table 1; see also, e.g., JOHN BAILEY, INST. FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE, LESSONS FROM THE
PIONEERS: TACKLING GLOBAL WARMING AT THE LOCAL LEVEL (2007), available at http://www.newrules.org/
sites/newrules.org/files/images/pioneers.pdf.
21 See Heiman & Solomon, supra note 6, at 95–97.
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therefore vary from one regulatory subject to another—including among
different subjects of environmental and energy regulation.22 We seek a
realistic solution, and formulating one requires careful analysis of existing law
and institutions to determine which modifications will both promote
substantive policy goals and be plausibly implemented in light of institutional
realities. We provide that analysis here.
In the first Part of this Article, we give a brief history of major American
energy transitions. In Part I.B, we describe the current state of America’s
energy infrastructure and argue that the next great energy transition will
involve a move toward electricity generation by renewables, including
distributed renewables. In Part I.C, we identify similarities between the
circumstances of earlier transitions and those surrounding current efforts to
promote renewable energy. We identify two important factors involved in past
infrastructural changes23 that we argue may be significant drivers of the
transition to distributed renewable energy in a well-structured regulatory
regime.
First, we discuss the critical role of energy “pioneers” or
“entrepreneurs” whose critical initial successes have often required favorable
action by local governments or even informal sub-local actors like
neighborhoods. The second factor is technological innovation in the
application of distributed renewables, which is also promoted when differing
regulatory and physical environs encourage experimentation.
In Part II, we directly confront the question of regulatory strategy. We
argue in Part II.A that the strategy for allocating regulatory authority over
distributed renewables should focus on encouraging technological innovation
and the efforts of energy entrepreneurs; in Part II.B, we analyze the relative
capacities of the federal, state, and local governments to do those things. We
conclude that federal leadership in the form of minimum standards and funding
is necessary, but local governments rather than the states are the best potential
partners for the federal government in pursuing the shift to distributed
renewable energy; indeed, we conclude that laws precluding state interference
with local efforts may be necessary. Local governments have traditional
authority over land use rules, the modification of which is essential to the
success of the renewable energy transition; they have the best access to
information about the local geographic, economic, demographic, and social

22

See William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108 (2005).
An accurate identification of causes would require careful empirical analysis of these past events,
which we do not attempt in this Article.
23
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conditions that determine which distributed renewable technologies or mix of
technologies will be effective in a particular place; and they are the most
receptive forums for the appeals of renewables pioneers seeking the initial
regulatory victories that will push the legal and social spheres toward change.
The policy variation likely to result from conferring local government
authority over distributed renewables also has the potential to spur
technological innovation as distributed renewable energy device makers are
forced to adapt to thousands of different local regulatory environments.
I. INNOVATION
Innovation in energy moves at the pace of an ancient steam engine running
on the last bits of coal. Unlike new energy-consuming gadgets that appear on
the market at a dizzying pace, energy production—the source for all of these
appliances and personal electronic devices—is tied to a lumbering
infrastructural system that has only changed within discrete periods of history.
This Part describes important energy transitions that have occurred within the
past two centuries in the United States and, building on observations from
these past transitions, addresses two factors that will be necessary for the next
great transition to renewables: first, innovation by renewables pioneers, and
second, new land-energy rules—rules that dictate, direct, or constrain the
construction and location of distributed technologies—to enable such
innovation.
A. Past Energy Innovations
In addition to the advent of the steam engine24 and the move from steam
engines to electricity in the industrial sector, one of the first major energy
transitions in the United States occurred in the last half of the nineteenth
century when Americans began to make the infrastructural leap from portable
lighting devices like whale oil lamps and tallow candles to gas lights and
electricity.25 In 1817, Washington Hall in Philadelphia glowed with 2,000 wax
candles to light a late-night ball in celebration of George Washington’s
birthday;26 by 1836, the city had established gas lighting in homes,27 and by the
24

See, e.g., FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2d ed. 2006)
(explaining the significance of the steam engine to the industrial revolution).
25 LOUIS STOTZ & ALEXANDER JAMISON, HISTORY OF THE GAS INDUSTRY 6 (1938) (“During the first four
decades of the nineteenth century, sperm oil and candles were the only illuminants used by the average city
dwelling family.”).
26 Id. at 7.
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late 1800s, this innovation was sufficiently affordable to out-compete portable
oil lamps and candles.28 Eventually, electricity—electrons produced by a
magnet spinning near a wire29—began to power incandescent light bulbs in the
homes of adventurous consumers, and small companies offered electric service
in several major East Coast cities by the 1880s.30 Gas lighting remained
competitive during this transition,31 but consumers increasingly bought the
industry slogan that “[i]f it is not electric—it is not modern,”32 thus slowly
forcing gas companies out of the lighting business.
This transition was uniquely local in several respects. First, it was an
innovative grassroots movement that only later became a large industry; it was
inspired by individuals and grew within cities. Creative entrepreneurs began to
use gas-lit lamps and then attempted to persuade other citizens to adopt this
new technology.33 Once a sufficient number of consumers believed in this
“brilliant novelty,”34 the next phase of the transition required tearing up streets
and constructing pipes35 to transport gas to homes and factories—and
eventually, wires for delivery of electricity. The move from candles to
gaslights to electricity therefore also relied upon the second uniquely local
driver of energy transitions: favorable local land policy (and sometimes, in
those days, a hearty dose of corruption).36 Entrepreneurs organized small
27

Id. at 9.
Id. at 7–8 (explaining that “[f]rom 1875 to 1885, and thereafter, the use of candles practically
disappeared,” as candles were replaced with kerosene lamps and then gas light systems).
29 STEVEN W. BLUME, ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM BASICS FOR THE NONELECTRICAL PROFESSIONAL 14
(2007) (explaining that “if one takes a coil of wire and puts it next to a moving or rotating magnet, a
measurable voltage will be produced in that coil”—a simpler description of Faraday’s Law, which represents
“how electric generators produce electricity”).
30 STOTZ & JAMISON, supra note 25, at 111–12 (explaining that by 1890, “the electric light had already
begun to find popular favor and was beginning to make a big dent in the gas lighting business”); Robert L.
Bradley, Jr., The Origins and Development of Electric Power Regulation, in THE END OF A NATURAL
MONOPOLY 43, 44 tbl.1 (Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H. Cole eds., 2003) (showing electric service available
in nine major cities between 1881 and 1890).
31
STOTZ & JAMISON, supra note 25, at 117 (“[B]y 1914 there were 50 million incandescent gas mantle
lamps in use . . . .”).
32 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
33 George T. Brown, The Gas Light Company of Baltimore: A Study of Natural Monopoly 5, 9–12 (Johns
Hopkins Univ. Stud. in Hist. & Pol. Sci., Ser. 54, No. 2, 1936) (describing individuals’ experiments with gas
lighting in America and their publicization of their products through newspaper advertisements and
demonstrations).
34 Id. at 10 (quoting FED. GAZETTE & BALT. DAILY ADVERTISER, Mar. 11, 1802).
35 Bradley, supra note 30, at 54 (explaining the “tearing up [of] the streets” required for new gas mains
and the above-ground poles and wires required for the new electricity (internal quotation marks omitted)).
36 See, e.g., id. at 48 (discussing early studies that advocated for state regulation of electricity, partially
on the basis that the regulation would be “above ‘big city political machines’”).
28
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corporations37 and then lobbied city councils to pass ordinances that allowed
for the installation of infrastructure.38 These efforts eventually resulted in the
establishment of local service companies that provided electricity to a small
group of residents within close geographic proximity to the physical plant. In
Chicago in 1907, about forty-five firms had franchises to sell electricity to the
city’s residents,39 and some cities even had competing electric franchises along
one street.40
A second important innovation that occurred at both the state and national
levels, however, quickly reversed this local trend. Nikola Tesla introduced
new technology in the late 1800s that allowed for the efficient transmission of
electricity over long distances.41 Samuel Insull—the great pioneer of electric
delivery systems—then expanded his campaign to centralize energy,42 and this
model has dominated since. Under the centralized model of energy provision,
large power plants send electricity over thousands of miles of transmission
lines to a broad customer base.43
More than a century later, humans are now experiencing a new wave of
energy innovation44 as we slowly move toward renewable technologies. This
transition will again be uniquely local. Like the move from candles to
gaslights to electricity, the transition to renewable energy will depend on local
factors: energetic entrepreneurs, willing investors, and supportive municipal
land use regulation. Individual residents will need to experiment with
renewable devices installed on their property by emerging “green” start-up

37 Brown, supra note 33, at 14 (describing how Rembrandt Peale, the father of the Gas Light Company of
Baltimore, persuaded the editor of the Federal Gazette & Baltimore Daily Advertiser along with another
“small group of men” to form the company).
38 Id. at 15 (describing how Peale and the other investors persuaded the Baltimore City Council to pass
an ordinance authorizing the laying of pipes on city property).
39 Bradley, supra note 30, at 73 n.4.
40 JOHN BAUER & PETER COSTELLO, PUBLIC ORGANIZATION OF ELECTRIC POWER 16 (1949).
41
See Bradley, supra note 30, at 44; see also JILL JONNES, EMPIRES OF LIGHT 93–94 (2003) (describing
how Tesla had his first “electrical epiphany” of alternating current in 1882, began developing a prototype of an
AC induction motor in 1883, and had installed arc lighting on “certain major streets” and “a few factories” by
1886).
42 JONNES, supra note 41, at 46–47.
43 Electric Power Industry Overview 2007, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/
electricity/page/prim2/toc2.html (last visited May 1, 2011) (“[Two hundred ten] large . . . investor-owned
electric utilities . . . own more than 38 percent of the Nation’s generating capacity and serve about 71 percent
of ultimate consumers.”).
44 See JEREMY RIFKIN, THE HYDROGEN ECONOMY 4, 9 (2002) (arguing that a “profound change is about
to occur in the way we use energy” and defining the change as a move away from fossil fuels and toward
“inexhaustible” hydrogen-powered fuel cells).
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companies, and these pioneers will need to publicize their successes. If a
critical mass of solar panels appears on neighborhood roofs and thousands of
wind turbines spin in backyards, perhaps consumers, city-by-city and town-bytown, will begin to believe that “if it’s not renewable, it’s not modern.”45
Although previous transitions involved largely independent local efforts to
augment the efforts of energy pioneers, the modern regulatory and
infrastructural landscape requires federal–local cooperation to spur the efforts
of pioneers and technological innovators in the transition to renewables.
Indeed, the federal government is already providing direct funding to some
cities—bypassing the states—to implement limited distributed renewable
programs.46 The federal government purposefully has chosen to partner with
cities because it believes that “cities have an important role to play as
champions of progressive energy efficiency and renewable energy efforts.”47
In other energy areas, the federal government has funded entrepreneurs
directly. The Department of Energy, for example, has offered a ten million
dollar prize to the first entity that develops a more energy efficient lightbulb
that meets that competition’s high standards.48
Beyond innovation and federal–local partnerships to enable innovation, the
adoption of distributed renewables will also be a distinctly local movement
because it will partially reverse the consolidation and centralization of energy
production that swallowed up the first local electric plants. The future of
energy may meet the past as homes and businesses become new energy
producers.
A successful transition to distributed renewable energy, however, will also
require policymakers to recognize that America recently attempted a great
push toward innovation in this field and failed. The mistakes of the past must
not be repeated. In the 1970s, when severe fuel shortages reminded America
of its heavy reliance on foreign fuels, policymakers rushed to the drawing

45

See supra note 32 and accompanying text (describing the similar phrase used by the electric industry).
U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Solar America Cities Special Projects, SOLAR AM. COMMUNITIES (Feb. 15,
2011), http://www.solaramericacities.energy.gov/about/special_projects (describing the Solar America Cities
program, which has already “launched partnerships with 25 large U.S. cities to develop comprehensive, citywide approaches to accelerating solar energy adoption” and additional projects launched in 2009).
47 U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Frequently Asked Questions, SOLAR AM. COMMUNITIES (Dec. 30, 2010),
http://www.solaramericacities.energy.gov/about/frequently_asked_questions/#6.
48 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, BRIGHT TOMORROW LIGHTING COMPETITION (L PRIZE™) 1 (2009), available
at http://www.lightingprize.org/pdfs/LPrize-Revision1.pdf.
46
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boards to solve America’s energy problem.49 One solution during this time
was to encourage increased reliance upon nonrenewable American fuels.
Congress proposed three bills between 1974 and 1980 attempting to force
utilities to use coal (an abundant American resource), instead of oil or natural
gas, and two of the three bills passed.50 But federal agencies also started to
think about energy production more creatively, and they pumped out mustardyellow manuals on the siting and installation of renewable energy sources.51
Congress, in turn, passed aggressive measures to persuade Americans to buy
and use these novel technologies.52 Enterprising individuals (motivated by
generous federal incentives) hired technicians to install solar panels on their
homes or geothermal heating systems in their basements.53 By 1978, a
bureaucratic director was sufficiently optimistic to predict that “with
aggressive Federal support, there are realistic circumstances in which smallscale energy systems could compete favorably with conventional energy
sources in many residential, commercial, and industrial applications by the end
of the next decade.”54 A “high solar energy scenario” developed by a
committee of the federally commissioned National Research Panel in 1979
imagined that a federal policy would “require, after 1990, adoption of solar
energy for all new buildings . . . for which it is applicable,”55 and President

49 See IGOR I. KAVASS & DORIS M. BIEBER, ENERGY AND CONGRESS: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS AND REPORTS 1974–1978, at i–iv (1980) (describing 1974 as the year “when the
concern about oil and other energy sources began to intensify in the United States Congress”).
50 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., ENERGY POLICY 66–67 (2d ed. 1981).
51 See, e.g., ALAN S. MILLER ET AL., ENVTL. LAW INST., LEGAL BARRIERS TO SOLAR HEATING &
COOLING OF BUILDINGS: SOLAR ACCESS AND LAND USE: STATE OF THE LAW, 1977 (1977) (prepared for the
Energy Research and Development Administration and highlighting the opportunities for solar energy and the
legal barriers that will likely need to change).
52 See, e.g., Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, sec. 101(a), § 44C(b)(2)(A), 92 Stat. 3174,
3175 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 25D (2006)) (providing a “residential energy” tax credit of thirty
percent of expenditures on a renewable energy system (up to $2,000)); ALTERNATIVE ENERGY: THE FEDERAL
ROLE § 3.05, at 3–11 (Linda Elizabeth Buck & Lee M. Goodwin eds., 1982) (showing federal direct assistance
for “solar energy systems,” which ranged from $5,000 to $10,000 for residential owners, $2,500 per dwelling
unit for multifamily residential buildings, and $100,000 per building for agricultural or commercial buildings).
53 See, e.g., Danny S. Parker, Very Low Energy Homes in the United States: Perspectives on
Performance from Measured Data, 41 ENERGY & BUILDINGS 512, 512–13 (2009).
54 Russell W. Peterson, Foreword to OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, NTIS ORDER #PB-283770,
APPLICATION OF SOLAR TECHNOLOGY TO TODAY’S ENERGY NEEDS, at iii (1978).
55 SOLAR RES. GRP., SUPPLY & DELIVERY PANEL OF THE COMM. ON NUCLEAR & ALT. ENERGY SYS., THE
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SUPPORTING PAPER 6: DOMESTIC POTENTIAL OF SOLAR AND OTHER RENEWABLE
ENERGY SOURCES 10 (1979).
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Carter officially aimed to produce twenty percent of America’s energy using
solar technology by the year 2000.56
Prices for the familiar energy sources like gasoline and heating oil,
however, eventually began to stabilize, and the popular fixation on energy
independence and sustainability vanished nearly as quickly as the long lines at
the gas pumps.57 Historically, federal support for solar and wind peaked
between 1980 and 1984 and then sharply declined, leveling off at a low degree
of financial support before 1990 and only occasionally increasing through
2000.58 Whether for financial reasons or a lack of innovation, American
“installed capacity of renewable power has remained far below levels analysts
believed would be in place by the early 21st century.”59 For example, by 2009,
less than one percent of America’s energy came from solar and wind sources.60
America’s renewable energy development has also lagged behind that of many
other countries.61 And this failure is not for lack of effort; as Donald Klass
observes, “An integrated, large-scale, renewable energy industry has not been
realized in modern times despite the major expenditures made to develop and
scale-up renewable energy technologies.”62
The brief and relatively uninfluential fervor for a new system of energy in
the 1970s did not return to America until the rise of a new concern in recent
years: the warming of the earth’s surface temperature.63 Although the
56

Alan S. Miller, Energy Policy from Nixon to Clinton: From Grand Provider to Market Facilitator, 25
ENVTL. L. 715, 717 (1995) (citing Springfield, Illinois Remarks to Lincoln Land Community College Students
and Local Residents, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1862, 1864 (Sept. 22, 1980)); see also Preface to LEGAL ASPECTS OF
SOLAR ENERGY, at vii (John H. Minan & William H. Lawrence eds., 1981) (“The federal government has
established as a goal that by the year 2000, 20 percent of the nation’s energy will be from the sun.”).
57 RIFKIN, supra note 44, at 4 (“The gasoline flowed and it was cheaper than ever [following the
embargo]. The world got back to business as usual.”).
58 Peter H. Kobos et al., Technological Learning and Renewable Energy Costs: Implications for US
Renewable Energy Policy, 34 ENERGY POL’Y 1645, 1646 (2006).
59 Id. at 1645.
60
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2009, at 8 fig.1.2 (2009),
available at http://www.eia.gov/FTPROOT/multifuel/038409.pdf.
61 Kobos et al., supra note 58, at 1646 (describing Europe’s and Japan’s relative success with growth in
renewables).
62 Donald L. Klass, A Critical Assessment of Renewable Energy Usage in the USA, 31 ENERGY POL’Y
353, 353 (2003).
63 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established by the United Nations
Environmental Program and the World Meteorological Organization “to provide the world with a clear
scientific view on the current state of climate change.” Organization, IPCC, http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/
organization.htm (last visited May 1, 2011). It published its first report warning of warming in 1990. See
IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IPCC 1990 AND 1992 ASSESSMENTS 47 (1992), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/far/IPCC_1990_and_1992_Assessments/English/ipcc-90-92-assessments-full-

PURSLEY&WISEMAN GALLEYSFINAL

890

6/10/2011 11:11 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60

magnitude of the problem and the accuracy of risk calculations remain
uncertain, a consortium of scientists from around the world has warned that we
are heading down a path with potentially significant consequences—from
rising seas, more severe storms, and longer droughts to higher extinction rates
for animal and plant species.64 Coupled with the growing menace of climate
change is America’s unhealthy dependence on foreign sources for more than a
quarter of the energy that it consumes.65 Federal, state, and local policymakers
have thus returned to the arguments of the 1970s, calling for fresh ways of
producing, using, and thinking about energy. The “new” renewables’ current
piece of the pie is stunningly low, but it is slowly growing.66 At the large
scale, states are encouraging the construction of solar and wind farms.67 At the
small scale, individual consumers are also moving toward renewables.68 In
2006, individuals purchased “about 7,000 small wind turbines,” for example.69
By 2008, small wind turbine sales had increased to 10,500 units.70 As America
makes a second attempt to deploy a critical mass of distributed renewable
systems of energy production, we must ask how we can ensure that as this
movement rises, history will not repeat itself. We must identify the factors that
report.pdf. Its most recent report concludes: “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal . . . .” IPCC,
supra note 5, at 30.
64 For a detailed discussion of these potential impacts, see IPCC, supra note 5, at 46–50.
65 U.S. Energy Facts, supra note 4 (“In 2008, net imported energy (imports minus exports) accounted for
26% of all energy consumed.”).
66 Wind power accounted for about 0.05% and solar power comprised a trivial 0.09% of Americans’ total
energy consumption in 2008. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, RENEWABLE ENERGY TRENDS IN
CONSUMPTION AND ELECTRICITY 2008, at 8 tbl.1.2 (2010), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/solar.
renewables/page/trends/trends.pdf. In 2008 (all in units of quadrillion British thermal units, or Btus)
Americans consumed 83.532 units of fossil fuels, 0.113 units of electricity net imports, 8.427 units of nuclear
electric power, and 7.367 units of renewable energy. Id. Of the renewable energy component, the non-solar
and wind components included 3.852 units of biomass, 2.512 units were conventional hydroelectric energy,
and 0.360 units of geothermal energy. Id. Robert Gross and his co-authors define the “new” renewables as
including technologies “such as solar, modern biomass and wind power,” and they use this term to contrast the
new renewables with “old” renewables with more negative environmental effects, such as “large hydroelectric
schemes and the use of traditional biomass and agricultural waste in developing countries.” Robert Gross et
al., Progress in Renewable Energy, 29 ENV’T INT’L 105, 106 (2003).
67 See, e.g., Texas Renewable Portfolio Standard, STATE ENERGY CONSERVATION OFFICE, http://www.
seco.cpa.state.tx.us/re_rps-portfolio.htm (last visited May 1, 2011) (describing Texas’s construction
requirements).
68 See Miller, supra note 56, at 727.
69 Kristina Shevory, Homespun Electricity, from the Wind, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2007, at F1.
70 RON STIMMEL, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, AWEA SMALL WIND TURBINE GLOBAL MARKET STUDY 3
(2009), available at http://www.windtamerturbines.com/pdf/09_AWEA_Small_Wind_Global_Market_
Study.pdf; cf. RON STIMMEL, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, AWEA SMALL WIND TURBINE GLOBAL MARKET
STUDY 3 tbl.1 (2010), available at http://www.awea.org/documents/2010_AWEA_Small_Wind_Turbine_
Global_Market_Study.pdf (indicating that turbine sales have since declined slightly to 9,800 units sold in
2009).
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will lead to real, sustained innovation in the sector of our economy that drives
all other sectors.
B. The Need for a New Energy Transition
Before describing the innovations that will be necessary to spur a move
toward distributed renewables and identifying the land-energy policies that
currently apply to these innovations, this section will briefly explain why an
energy transition to renewables—and particularly to distributed renewables
such as wind turbines in backyards and solar panels on the roofs of homes—is
essential.
1. Why Renewables?
At a point in the future that is no longer unimaginably remote, renewable
energy will be necessary to human survival. Humans require energy for our
every endeavor. But our vision remains locked to the near horizon. We
prioritize the development of new technologies to scour our shales, coalbeds,
and ocean floors for the last molecules of fuel,71 searching for resources that,
while vital to our current energy infrastructure, are ultimately unsustainable.
Meanwhile, other nations forge ahead with massive leaps toward a future
basket of plenty by developing efficient public transportation, commercially
viable hydrogen fuel cells, advanced solar technologies, and domestic wind
turbine manufacturing.72 Many small towns in Germany and Austria are now
entirely “energy autonomous” or on track to meet that goal, producing much of
their power from the sun and wind;73 some municipalities in the United States,
on the other hand, continue to build coal-fired power plants, which provide

71 James W. Bunger et al., Hubbert Revisited—5: Is Oil Shale America’s Answer to Peak-Oil Challenge?,
OIL & GAS J., Aug. 9, 2004, at 16, 20 (discussing how Shell Oil is investing in a Colorado project, wherein it
applies subsurface heaters to shales to convert kerogen to oil and gas); see also ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S.
DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2009, at 35–37 (2009), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/
oiaf/aeo/pdf/0383(2009).pdf (discussing how producing more offshore resources “will require considerable
time, in addition to financial investment” but predicting continued offshore development).
72 Jonathan Adams, Japan Leads the Race for a Hydrogen Fuel-Cell Car, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb.
1, 2010, at 11; Keith Bradsher, China Leading Race to Make Clean Energy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2010, at A1
(“China vaulted past competitors . . . last year to become the world’s largest maker of wind turbines . . . .”).
73 Scheer, supra note 10, at 21 (describing the “large number of small towns or counties . . . which are
striving to achieve or even have already achieved 100% energy autonomy” using solar and biofuels).
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short-term fixes74 and create long-term environmental and human health
problems.75
America is running out of some fuels, and our willingness to accept the
environmental and health-based consequences of extracting the unconventional
sources of these fuels may be declining. The United States relies on fossil
fuels for the bulk of its energy,76 yet oil and natural gas are becoming more
difficult to obtain, forcing us to expand unconventional modes of production.77
Domestic coal, although offering a more substantial cushion than oil and gas,
will be abundant for perhaps as few as 150 years longer.78 Estimates of the
point at which the costs of extraction will exceed the benefits of extracting
these remaining nonrenewable sources vary widely.79 Perhaps humans will
choose to prioritize activities like mining huge blocks of shale and blasting
them with heat to force out the last few drops of oil80 over investing heavily in
sustainable technologies. But at some point, the most creative extraction
74 Peter Bacqué & Rex Springston, Should a Coal-Fired Power Plant Be Built in Surry? Yes: It’s Good
for the Economy, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, May 17, 2009, at A8 (describing a then-proposed 750- to
1,500-megawatt coal-fired power plant in Surry County, Virginia).
75 See, e.g., Shaila Dewan, Ash Flood in Tennessee Is Found to Be Larger than Initial Estimates, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 27, 2008, at A10 (describing a massive coal ash spill at a coal-fired power plant).
76 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 66, at 8 tbl.1.2 (showing that petroleum accounts for about 37% of
total U.S. energy consumption, coal for 22%, and natural gas for 24%). Nuclear power, which is also
nonrenewable, accounts for about 8% of annual U.S. energy consumption. Id.; Nonrenewable Energy Sources,
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=nonrenewable_home (last
visited May 1, 2011) (defining the mined uranium ore used in nuclear power production as a “nonrenewable
fuel”).
77 Shahriar Shafiee & Erkan Topal, An Econometrics View of Worldwide Fossil Fuel Consumption and
the Role of U.S., 36 ENERGY POL’Y 775, 780–81 (2008) (concluding, based on Energy Information
Administration and British Petroleum data, that “if the world continues to consume oil and gas at 2006 rates,
the reserves of oil and gas will last a further 40 and 70 years, respectively”); see also ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2010, at 58 (2010), available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/pdf/0484(2010).pdf (“Worldwide, the reserves-to-production ratio [of natural
gas] is estimated at 60 years.”); Ben Casselman & Russell Gold, Drilling Tactic Unleashes a Trove of Natural
Gas—And a Backlash, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2010, at A1 (noting that “[t]oday, the industry estimates that 90%
of all new gas wells are fractured” in reference to a method of unconventional natural gas extraction called
hydraulic fracturing); Natural Gas Supply, NATURALGAS.ORG, http://www.naturalgas.org/business/
supply.asp (last visited May 1, 2011) (noting that the Potential Gas Committee has estimated total future
available domestic natural gas to “equal about 100 years of supply”).
78 How Much Coal Is Left, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?
page=coal_reserves (last updated Feb. 19, 2010) (observing that if coal consumption increases at the projected
growth rate, “U.S. recoverable coal reserves would be exhausted in about 146 years if no new reserves are
added”). But see id. (explaining that without this assumed growth rate, “the U.S. recoverable coal reserves
represent enough coal to last 234 years”).
79 Shahriar & Topal, supra note 77, at 776.
80 J.O. Jaber & S.D. Probert, Environmental-Impact Assessment for the Proposed Oil-Shale Integrated
Tri-Generation Plant, 62 APPLIED ENERGY 169, 171–72 (1999).
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techniques may prove to be more difficult, expensive, and environmentally
unpalatable than the renewable alternatives, and the exact number of years
remaining for easy acquisition of nonrenewable fuels does not matter. The
plain fact is that most of the energy sources upon which we currently rely—
unlike renewable fuels—cannot be “regenerated on a human time scale.”81
Even enthusiasts for relatively clean-burning fossil fuels like natural gas have
begun to recognize the inevitable “march towards sustainable renewable
energy sources[;]”82 they now stress the importance of natural gas as a filler to
be relied upon during the slow transition to renewables and, more generally, to
a sustainable energy system.83
Renewables are not only valuable in the long term as fossil fuels become
increasingly scarce. They are overwhelmingly abundant, and once the
infrastructure is in place to capture them, they offer an immediate partial84
answer to concerns about energy shortages and reliance upon foreign fuel
sources. Some optimistically calculate that the energy from the sun that hits
the earth’s land and waters is about “three thousand times more than the
present power needs of the whole world.”85 The potential for onshore wind

81 Alicia Valero et al., Inventory of the Exergy Resources on Earth Including Its Mineral Capital, 35
ENERGY 989, 989 (2010).
82 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY ET AL., MODERN SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (2009),
available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/oil-gas/publications/EPreports/Shale_Gas_Primer_2009.
pdf. The Ground Water Protection Council is a consortium of state regulators that has advocated, in some
regulatory areas, against heightened federal regulation of new gas drilling techniques. Id. at ES-3 (“State
regulation of the environmental practices related to shale gas development, usually with federal oversight, can
more effectively address the regional and state-specific character of the activities, compared to one-size-fits-all
regulation at the federal level.”); Ground Water Protection Council, Resolution 03-5, Requesting Legislative
Clarification of the Definition of “Underground Injection” in the Safe Drinking Water Act, available at
http://www.gwpc.org/advocacy/documents/resolutions/RES-03-5.htm (last visited May 1, 2011) (asserting that
the Council “supported and continues to support USEPA’s position that hydraulic fracturing is not
underground injection under the [federal] SDWA [Safe Drinking Water Act]”). We describe the Council as an
“enthusiast” for natural gas because it argues in one document that natural gas is an “attractive energy source”
that is “efficient and clean burning,” and that “shale gas . . . will be vital to meeting future energy demand.”
Scott Kell, Foreword to U.S. DEPT OF ENERGY ET AL., supra.
83 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY ET AL., supra note 82, at 6.
84 See generally ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., THE POWER TO REDUCE CO EMISSIONS (2007),
2
available at http://my.epri.com/portal/server.pt?Abstract_id=000000000001015461 (discussing the energy
“PRISM”—a concept that explains that a mix of measures, such as energy efficiency, carbon capture and
storage, nuclear power, and others, including renewables, will likely be required to meet carbon reduction
goals); id. at 2–5 (arguing that there is no one “silver bullet” to achieve carbon reduction goals).
85 Valero et al., supra note 81, at 992 (citing Jan T. Szargut, Anthropogenic and Natural Exergy Losses
(Exergy Balance of the Earth’s Surface and Atmosphere), 28 ENERGY 1047 (2003)). This estimate is based on
an estimate of the sun’s exergy. Exergy is a form of energy measurement that equalizes all fuels, thus allowing
for easier comparison. Id. at 989. It is “a measure of [an energy form’s] usefulness or quality or potential to
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energy is, by some estimates, similarly large. Taking into account land uses
that compete with turbines needed to capture the energy from wind, total wind
resources well exceed “world demand for electricity,”86 according to some
studies. At the domestic level, estimates suggest that there may be sufficient
solar radiation and wind in the United States to fulfill all of America’s energy
needs.87 And one study concludes that solar energy systems could cover the
electricity portion of America’s energy needs using only about 0.6% of the
total land area of the United States.88
Renewables, although a “nondepletable” source of energy characterized by
relatively benign environmental effects,89 do have flaws.
The built
infrastructure necessary to capture renewable resources does not currently
exist,90 and humans may not be willing or able to make the tradeoffs that
would be necessary to develop this capacity. The sheer quantities of materials

cause change.” Alexandros Gasparatos et al., A Critical Review of Reductionist Approaches for Assessing the
Progress Towards Sustainability, 28 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 286, 295–96 (2008).
86 BREEZE, supra note 8, at 153; see also Cristina L. Archer & Mark Z. Jacobson, Evaluation of Global
Wind Power, 110 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. D12110, 1 (2005), available at http://www.stanford.edu/group/efmh/
winds/2004jd005462.pdf (“Even if only ~20% of [the ‘global wind power generated at locations with mean
annual wind speeds  6.9 m/s [meters per second] . . . for the year 2000’] could be captured, it could satisfy
100% of the world’s energy demand for all purposes.”); Gross et al., supra note 66, at 106 tbl.1 & n.a
(concluding that wind produces 20,000 to 40,000 terawatt-hours of useful energy output annually—assuming
that the wind was captured “using known technologies and allowing for physical constraints”). Global net
generation of electricity in 2007 was 18.8 trillion kilowatt-hours, which is equal to 18,800 terawatt-hours.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 77, at 4.
87 In 2008, America consumed about 99.4 quadrillion Btus of energy. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note
60, at 13 tbl.1.5. United States wind energy potential is an estimated 10,000 billion kilowatt-hours annually.
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, WIND POWERING AMERICA: CLEAN ENERGY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2004), available
at http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/pdfs/wpa/35873_21century.pdf. This is equal to 34.12 quadrillion
Btus of energy, or approximately one-third of total annual U.S. energy use. Vasilis Fthenakis and his coauthors estimate that solar energy could “satisfy 90% of the total energy needs of the US by 2100.” Vasilis
Fthenakis et al., The Technical, Geographical, and Economic Feasibility for Solar Energy to Supply the
Energy Needs of the US, 37 ENERGY POL’Y 387, 396 (2009). This assumes that distributed photovoltaics,
photovoltaic-compressed air energy storage, and concentrating solar power all would be deployed, with “about
90% of the solar production” occurring in the Southwest, id. at 397, and it is “contingent on a national
commitment to a renewable-energy-based electricity production and distribution system,” id. But see F. E.
Trainer, Can Renewable Energy Sources Sustain Affluent Society?, 23 ENERGY POL’Y 1009, 1023 (1995)
(concluding, based on costs, that “it is highly unlikely that renewable energy sources could sustain present rich
world per capita levels of energy use”).
88 Paul Denholm & Robert M. Margolis, Land-Use Requirements and the Per-Capita Solar Footprint for
Photovoltaic Generation in the United States, 36 ENERGY POL’Y 3531, 3539 (2008). This assumes that the
efficiency of photovoltaic modules is 13.5%. Id. at 3534.
89 Gary W. Frey & Deborah M. Linke, Hydropower as a Renewable and Sustainable Energy Resource
Meeting Global Energy Challenges in a Reasonable Way, 30 ENERGY POL’Y 1261, 1262 (2002).
90 See, e.g., Fthenakis et al., supra note 87, at 389–91.
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needed, from steel to silicon and rare metals,91 as well as the land required for
the infrastructure, inevitably create costs.92 Renewables are also not as easily
interchangeable, storable, and transportable as some nonrenewable fuels.93
When the sun is behind clouds or the wind dies down, an energy-consuming
source must rely upon a back-up stored energy source or traditional fuels that
are burned to generate electricity, which then flows through the grid.94
Despite these limitations, renewables have fewer negative impacts on
human health, security, and the environment than do traditional fuels. A
European Commission study, for example, attempted to identify all of the
relevant externalities of energy production, focusing on and quantifying
“environmental impacts,” “global warming impacts,” “accidents” (“rare
unwanted events in contrast to normal operation”), and “energy security”
(“unforeseen changes in availability and prices of energy carriers”).95 Beneath
these categories, in turn, researchers considered the effects of energy
production on “health, crops, building materials, forests, and ecosystems,”
among other things.96 The results suggest that renewable sources of electricity
may have lower externality costs than nonrenewables, with the exception of
nuclear power in some European countries.97 Many other factors, of course,
must be considered before concluding that renewables are the ideal energy
solution. New technologies, for instance, are costly, and those costs fall

91 See Trainer, supra note 87, at 1018 (estimating that a tripling of “world steel, glass, and concrete
production” could be required if renewable energy supplied global power needs); Katie Howell, Imported
Minerals, Metals Fuel U.S. Shift to Homegrown Power, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/
gwire/2009/06/09/09greenwire-imported-minerals-metals-fuel-us-shift-to-home-57275.html.
92 Fulvio Ardente et al., Life Cycle Assessment of a Solar Thermal Collector, 30 RENEWABLE ENERGY
1031, 1052 (2005) (discussing “direct emissions of metals” that occur when solar collectors are cut and welded
and “indirect emissions” from the “production of raw materials” that go into the solar panels, but observing
that “wastes are very low” from solar panel production); Craig K.R. Willis et al., Bats Are Not Birds and Other
Problems with Sovacool’s (2009) Analysis of Animal Fatalities Due to Electricity Generation, 38 ENERGY
POL’Y 2067, 2067 (2010) (“[I]t is bats that face the most widespread and worrisome species-level conservation
consequences from wind turbines.”).
93 Michael J. Economides & David A. Wood, The State of Natural Gas, 1 J. NAT. GAS SCI. &
ENGINEERING 1, 2 (2009).
94 See Benjamin K. Sovacool, The Intermittency of Wind, Solar, and Renewable Electricity Generators:
Technical Barrier or Rhetorical Excuse?, 17 UTIL. POL’Y 288, 289 (2009) (describing the intermittency issues
of renewables).
95 EUROPEAN COMM’N, EXTERNE: EXTERNALITIES OF ENERGY 13–14 (Peter Bickel & Rainer Friedrich
eds., 2005), available at http://www.externe.info/brussels/methup05a.pdf.
96 Id. at 51, 53.
97 Results of ExternE (Figures of the National Implementation Phase), EXTERNE, http://www.externe.
info (last visited Nov. 10, 2010); see also BREEZE, supra note 8, at 15 (summarizing the ExternE results).
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disproportionately on low-income energy users.98 The broader point is that
renewables offer great promise and should not be dismissed as merely a minor
contribution to an overwhelming energy challenge.
One could fill several volumes in attempting to pinpoint the optimal energy
package for the short term as the United States responds to the need for a
sustainable energy profile with a substantial renewables component. It is clear,
however, that the ideal short-term energy profile would include a mix of
renewable and nonrenewable sources that would prevent electricity rates from
skyrocketing; provide a reliable, uninterrupted source of power; lower
America’s dependence on foreign energy resources; and reduce the current
negative externalities of energy production. Here, we simply argue that
renewable energy should become a reliable and substantial piece of America’s
total energy mix within several decades and should be a dominant part of the
mix in the far future. The ultimate goal for the percentage of U.S. energy to be
provided by renewables in the near term is not essential to our discussion,
although state governments have suggested what a realistic percentage might
be. Approximately thirty-three states have specified deadlines by which
renewable or alternative energy must comprise a percentage of the state’s
electricity package,99 ranging from eight percent in Pennsylvania100 to as high
as thirty-three percent in California.101 Some cities have aimed even higher;
98 See, e.g., Joseph P. Tomain, “Steel in the Ground”: Greening the Grid with the iUtility, 39 ENVTL. L.
931, 959 (2009) (describing low-income consumers as “price-sensitive to energy costs”).
99 See Donald S. McCauley et al., Renewable Portfolio Standards, in CAPTURING THE POWER OF
ELECTRIC RESTRUCTURING 175, 184–87 (Joey Lee Miranda ed., 2009).
100 U.S. Dep’t of Energy, States with Renewable Portfolio Standards, ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE
ENERGY, http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/states/maps/renewable_portfolio_states.cfm#chart (last updated June 16,
2009). Pennsylvania has an Alternative Energy Portfolio Standards Act. See 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 1648.1–1648.8 (West 2010). The Act requires that “at least 8% of the electric energy sold by an electric
distribution company or electric generation supplier to retail electric customers . . . in the 15th year after the
effective date of this subsection is sold from Tier 1 alternative energy resources.” Id. § 1648.3; see also id.
§ 1648.2 (defining “alternative energy source” and “Tier I alternative energy source”). Tier I alternative
energy sources include “solar photovoltaic and solar thermal energy,” “wind power,” “low-impact
hydropower,” “geothermal energy,” “biologically derived methane gas,” “fuel cells,” “biomass energy”
(“organic material from a plant that is grown for the purpose of being used to produce electricity” and “any
solid, nonhazardous cellulosic waste material that is segregated from other waste materials, such as waste
pallets . . . landscape or . . . tree trimmings . . . and other crop by-products or residues”), and “methane gas
emitting from abandoned or working coal mines.” Id. § 1648.2.
101 See California Renewables Portfolio Standard, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/
PUC/energy/Renewables/index.htm (last visited May 1, 2011). Maine has a higher renewable percentage; by
2017, forty percent of Maine’s electricity must be from renewable sources. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35A, § 3210(3) (2010) (requiring that providers’ portfolios consist of eligible renewables); id. § 3210-C (setting a
goal for an incremental increase in the portfolio requirement, resulting in a 10% increase by 2017); 65-407-311
ME. CODE R. § 3 (LexisNexis 2010) (same). But Maine includes hydropower in its definition of renewable
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San Jose, for example, endeavors to “[r]eceive 100 percent of [its] electrical
power from clean renewable sources” by 2025.102 Keeping this range of
visions in mind, subsection 2 will explain why distributed renewables are an
important piece of the near-term renewables goal.
2. Why Distributed Renewables?
Renewable energy exists at two scales. There are “farms,” which are large,
concentrated arrays of generating units that produce mass quantities of power,
and “gardens,” in the form of smaller, distributed systems. At the large scale,
rows of space-age mirrors and solar parabolic troughs dot the southwestern
landscape,103 and wind turbines tower over the plains.104 At the smaller scale,
homes and businesses place solar panels on roofs, tap into geothermal
resources in the subsurface, or install a wind turbine in a parking lot or
backyard.
At the distributed scale, renewables fit an energy production model that has
existed for thousands of years; energy is consumed close to its source.105 This
localized system enabled by distributed renewable technology offers unique
opportunities for sustained local economic empowerment in even the smallest
Homes, businesses, and factories become long-term
communities.106
generators of power and income. A distributed renewable structure that is
placed on a lot can, with the proper transmission and distribution infrastructure
and electricity metering policy, generate much of its own power and sell some
back to the grid.107 A group in Japan has captured this concept in a phrase that
sources, and with hydro, it already meets this requirement. Therefore, the standard will not likely lead to much
growth in the wind and solar sectors. McCauley et al., supra note 99, at 188.
102 CITY OF SAN JOSE, 2009–2010 CLEAN TECH LEGISLATIVE AGENDA 2 (2009), available at http://www.
sanjoseca.gov/mayor/goals/environment/SANJOSECLEANTECHAGENDA2009.pdf.
103 See, e.g., BREEZE, supra note 8, at 201 (describing the nine solar trough farms built in California in the
1980s and 1990s); Matthew L. Wald, What’s So Bad About Big?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2007, at H1 (describing
a solar power plant with “six rows of mirrors, each nearly a quarter-mile long”).
104 A Leader in Texas Wind Power, LOWER COLO. RIVER ASS’N, http://www.lcra.org/energy/power/
renewable_energy/windpower.html (last updated Nov. 12, 2010) (explaining that “[w]ide open West Texas,
where the winds whip across the plains, and the Gulf Coast region, are ideal locations for wind power projects,
also called wind farms,” and describing the farms that have been built).
105 See, e.g., Bernadette Del Chiaro & Rachel Gibson, Government’s Role in Creating a Vibrant Solar
Power Market in California, 36 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 347, 354 (2006).
106 RIFKIN, supra note 44, at 241 (“Were all individuals and communities in the world to become the
producers of their own energy, the result would be a dramatic shift in the configuration of power: no longer
from the top down but from the bottom up.”).
107 See, e.g., Jeffrey Gangemi, Selling Power Back to the Grid, BUS. WEEK (July 6, 2006), http://www.
businessweek.com/smallbiz/content/jul2006/sb20060706_167332.htm (discussing how a homeowner’s
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plays on the negatively phrased “Not in My Back Yard” or “NIMBY” land use
ideology, defining the movement toward distributed renewables as “Energy In
My Yard”—EIMY.108
Construction of additional renewable production facilities—both large and
small scale—is necessary for proper growth of renewable energy capacity, and
policies governing both scales will need to change. This Article, however,
focuses on distributed renewables because they offer several distinct benefits
over large projects. Large renewable projects, apart from the challenges of
financing and antiquated state energy regulation,109 face the extremely high
barrier of the siting process. Droves of individual landowners, environmental
groups, and other organized lobbies have voiced their concerns over the
aesthetic and environmental impacts of tall wind turbines and acres of solar
arrays,110 and a push to build more and larger farms will only heighten these
concerns.111
“rooftop solar power generation system pays him an extra $3,000 per year on top of producing all the energy
he needs to power his New Jersey home for free”). See generally Bronin, supra note 11, at 547 (arguing for
greater emphasis on “microgrids,” or “small-scale distributed generation between neighbors of energy derived
from sources such as solar collectors, wind power systems, microturbines, geothermal wells, and fuel cells”).
108 Hiroaki Niitsuma & Toshiko Nakata, EIMY (Energy In My Yard)—A Concept for Practical Usage of
Renewable Energy from Local Sources, 32 GEOTHERMICS 767, 768 (2003).
109 See Kenneth Westrick et al., The Top 10 Least Exploited and Developed U.S. States, 6 N. AM. WIND
POWER 18, 23 (2009) (describing state programs like renewable portfolio standards (which, by requiring a
percentage or specific quantity of the state’s electricity to come from renewable sources, make wind energy
more profitable), grid interconnection policies, and corporate tax incentives as important factors in wind
energy development, but observing that ten states with high wind energy potential lack such policies).
110 NAT’L COMM’N ON ENERGY POLICY, SITING CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE 2 (2006), available
at http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Siting Critical Energy Infrastructure_448851db5fa7d.pdf (“The
headlines are replete with examples of new, supposedly advanced facilities that continue to run into local
opposition.”); Alain Nadai & Dan van der Horst, Editorial, Wind Power Planning, Landscapes and Publics, 27
LAND USE POL’Y 181, 181 (2010) (“[P]rotests . . . have resulted in the delay and even abandonment of
proposed wind farms and other renewable energy facilities . . . .”); Felicity Barringer, Environmentalists in a
Clash of Goals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2009, at A17 (describing some environmental groups’ opposition to
solar and wind projects in places like the Mojave Desert and the Nantucket Sound).
111
Further, as often occurs with actions that will affect state coffers, politicians are already fighting over
who will pay for and receive the transmission that will connect renewable farms to consumers, meaning that
those areas with the highest renewable potential may not be prioritized for development. See Matthew L.
Wald, Debate on Clean Energy Leads to a Regional Battle over Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2009, at A13
(explaining that “[a]n influential coalition of East Coast governors and power companies fears that building
wind and solar sites in the Midwest would cause their region to miss out on jobs and other economic benefits”
and that the “[t]he East Coast advocates may have won a crucial first round” in the passage of a climate bill
with transmission on clean energy provisions in the House, but observing that “a wind machine in North
Dakota would produce more energy than the same machine in some Eastern states”). New regional
governance processes that bring together local, state, and federal institutions to address the myriad issues
posed by renewable farms will need to emerge, and some already have. See, e.g., W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N &
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, WESTERN RENEWABLE ENERGY ZONES—PHASE 1 REPORT 2 (2009), available at
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Small-scale renewables on rooftops, parking garages, factories, and in
yards, on the other hand, are an immediate and substantial step toward
increasing renewable energy capacity. A homeowner or business in an area
with adequate enabling regulations for small-scale renewable electricity
generation can have a system up and running in several months.112 Distributed
generation systems may also attract less political attention than wind and solar
farms. Small-scale projects, often initiated by cities, are less likely to draw in
the organized landowners and special interest groups that tend to successfully
block higher profile, large-scale systems.113 Indeed, some surveys have shown
that the public holds a more favorable attitude toward small-scale
renewables,114 although there are still strong local zoning battles over their
placement.115
A final benefit of distributed generation is that it could quickly reduce
America’s dependence on fossil fuels. Small-scale renewable generation
systems, individually considered, generate relatively low quantities of
electricity, but their contribution could be large in the aggregate. Electrical
utilities face a unique challenge due to the characteristics of their product.
Electricity cannot yet be effectively and economically stored in large
quantities,116 but it must be instantaneously available when demanded.117
Many power plants therefore exist only to meet consumer demand for
electricity when demand exceeds the normal base load. These plants power up

http://www.westgov.org/wga/publicat/WREZ09.pdf. But there is much more work to be done in this area.
The regional governance issues posed by solar farms are an immediate problem and, though beyond the scope
of this Article, are the subject of a separate, forthcoming piece. See Hannah Wiseman, Expanding Regional
Renewable Governance, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (arguing that because utility-scale
renewable technology must be placed in the areas of strongest wind and sunlight—ignoring existing
jurisdictional lines on the ground—each renewable development may cross multiple jurisdictional lines and
lead to regulatory commons and anticommons challenges).
112 See, e.g., N.Y. STATE ENERGY RESEARCH & DEV. AUTH., A DETAILED GUIDE TO INSTALLING A SOLAR
ELECTRIC SYSTEM, http://www.powernaturally.org/publications/consumermanual2-final.pdf (last visited Feb.
17, 2011) (showing that a typical photovoltaic system is “fully operational” within nineteen to twenty weeks).
113 See supra note 110.
114 A study in the United Kingdom concluded that “the public are generally more comfortable with the use
of small-scale technologies in their locale.” Jonathan Burton & Klaus Hubacek, Is Small Beautiful? A
Multicriteria Assessment of Small-Scale Energy Technology Applications in Local Governments, 35 ENERGY
POL’Y 6402, 6407 (2007).
115 See Abby Goodnough, Turning to Windmills, but Resistance Lingers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2009, at
A25; supra note 109.
116 Joseph P. Tomain, The Past and Future of Electricity Regulation, 32 ENVTL. L. 435, 454 (2002).
117 See Paul Denholm & Robert M. Margolis, Evaluating the Limits of Solar Photovoltaics (PV) in
Traditional Electric Power Systems, 35 ENERGY POL’Y 2852, 2853 (2007).
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during times of “peak” electricity demand118 such as hot summer days when air
conditioners run at maximum capacity. Outside of the peak periods, these
“peaker” plants sit idle or operate at low levels as spinning reserves.119 This is
where renewables, including distributed renewables, show one of their greatest
strengths. By providing the additional electricity needed during peak times,120
distributed renewables may have a disproportionately large effect on clean
energy production121 and could reduce the need for fossil-fuel-burning peaking
plants.122
Distributed renewables, considered collectively, offer several unique
advantages over centralized utilities. They can be built and deployed quickly,
they may not face as much consumer or political opposition, and they reduce
the need for fossil-fuel-fired energy. Much effort will be required, however, to
move these promising technologies to a point of greater prominence within the
energy system.
C. Requirements for Widespread Deployment of Distributed Renewables
This section addresses two connected components that will be required to
move toward a world with more distributed renewables that are applied in a
118

Id.
Susan Kelly & Elise Caplan, Time for a Day 1.5 Market: A Proposal to Reform RTO-Run Centralized
Wholesale Electricity Markets, 29 ENERGY L.J. 491, 509 n.76 (2008).
120 Cf. BREEZE, supra note 8, at 200 (explaining that “[i]t can, therefore, be argued that solar power is best
deployed for peak power generation,” but if utilities begin to better manage and even out consumer demand,
peak demand level may decline, and the “marginal value of the solar output may fall”).
121 Denhlom & Margolis, supra note 117, at 2584 (explaining how during a particular week investigated,
“PV generation provides significant benefits by reducing demand during peak periods”); id. at 2583–84
(showing a strong correlation between electricity demand and solar photovoltaic electricity generation in Texas
in the summer); Sovacool, supra note 94, at 294 (explaining that an installed PV array in California reduced by
half “the number of natural gas ‘peakers’ needed to ensure reserve capacity”); see also CHRISTY HERIG, NAT’L
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., USING PHOTOVOLTAICS TO PRESERVE CALIFORNIA’S ELECTRICITY CAPACITY
RESERVES 2 (2001), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy01osti/31179.pdf (providing the data on the
reduced peak load in California described by Sovacool); id. at 4 fig. (“The correlation between PV output and
load demand is normally high.”); Jad Mouawad, The Newest Hybrid Model, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2010, at B1
(explaining that a large array of solar panels at a Florida utility’s gas-fired power plant will “provide extra
power when it is most needed: when the summer sun is shining, Floridians are cranking up their airconditioning and electricity demand is at its highest”).
122 See David Hodas, Imagining the Unimaginable: Reducing U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Forty
Percent, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 271, 289 (2008) (explaining that under Florida’s proposed combination of
“energy efficiency and renewable sources” policies, “[s]ummer peak demand would be reduced by 20,480
MW (the equivalent of roughly forty new 500 MW coal-fired power plants)”); Vance Little, Note, Using the
Commerce Clause to Short-Circuit States’ Ability to Pass Power Costs onto Neighbors, 2008 U. ILL. J.L.
TECH. & POL’Y 149, 154–55 (“[N]etwork designers have come to rely on smaller natural gas or diesel plants
for shorter peaks in load at various times throughout the day . . . .”).
119
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greater variety of contexts. First, innovative entrepreneurs will need to install
distributed generation and actively promote it within their communities.
Second, in order to allow renewables “pioneers” or “entrepreneurs” to embark
upon their projects, municipal governments must be free to enact all local land
use regulations and standards, including building codes and zoning, necessary
to encourage and ensure relatively predictable regulation of the installation of
renewables. We will refer to these as land-energy rules.
1. Energy Entrepreneurs
Distributed renewable generation so far remains an intriguing anomaly in a
primarily centralized system of nonrenewable energy production,123 and it will
stay that way if innovative homeowners and renters—the entrepreneurial
pioneers of the renewable energy world—do not take an active role in
installing and using it. In a world increasingly dominated by corporations and
powerful special interests, this claim may sound far-fetched, but distributed
renewables are indeed dependent upon individuals, not just groups with larger
stakes in the issue. Corporations produce the technology, but the success of
any distributed renewable business wholly depends upon individuals’
willingness to install the technology and to persuade others of its usefulness.
The entrepreneurs required here are individual residents and businesses who
are willing to place small infrastructure on their property. The effort will not
succeed without individual effort, which, in the aggregate, makes the
manufacturing of distributed renewable technology economically feasible.
Further, entrepreneurs must operate within conducive regulatory contexts.
The transition toward distributed renewables is like the introduction of any
other new technology, but it has more significant implications due to the
infrastructural investment required. It requires enthusiastic inventors of the
product to experiment with and perfect the technology and for the users of the
product to demonstrate by doing. In the case of distributed renewables, much
of the product perfection is already occurring.124 A partnership between
Edinburgh, Scotland, and Michigan has introduced a roof wind turbine to

123

See supra text accompanying note 60.
See, e.g., John Casey, Technology Smooths the Way for Home Wind-Power Turbines, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 15, 2008, at F3 (quoting the President of the New York State Energy Research and Development
Authority, who observed that “the technology has improved, and the cost per project is coming down” and that
“[t]urbines for farms and residential applications are seeing much more activity” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
124
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America,125 for example, and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory has
developed high-efficiency, thin-film solar cells, which are more affordable
than traditional cells and can be placed on “roof shingles, windows, [and]
siding.”126 But still more progress can be made in solar and wind technologies
if consumers begin to demand more and better technologies and operate them
in a variety of physical environments and regulatory contexts. The immediate
work that is needed, the “product” that must be advertised so to speak, is the
entire package—the proof that a solar panel or wind turbine, as installed, can
fulfill a family’s or business’s energy needs.
As we will describe in more detail below, the eccentric businessman
Rembrandt Peale initially succeeded in persuading Baltimore to switch to gas
lighting not by inventing a gas lamp (others had already done that127), but by
installing it in a museum, advertising the innovation, and proving to local
citizens that it worked.128 Gas lighting later expanded in part due to local laws
enabling infrastructural change. Similarly, when air conditioners were first
introduced to cities around the mid-1900s, an informal survey conducted by
Fortune magazine suggested that the most effective advertising for this new
technology—the proof that it worked and was worth purchasing and
installing—came from the “advertisements” of neighbors.129 Fortune chose
the air conditioner to satisfy its curiosity about effective marketing techniques
because this relatively novel technology was, in 1954, “climbing up the
acceptance curve from the luxury to the necessity category.”130 The air
conditioner (like today’s solar panels and wind turbines) was also “highly
visible, and thus provide[d] a convenient index of how people are influenced
by one another.”131 Fortune toured Philadelphia neighborhoods to locate the
areas that tended to have more air conditioners.132 Once it identified these
neighborhoods,133 it noticed that the number of air conditioners differed
125

Anne Eisenberg, Wind Blows, and the Electric Meter Spins Backward, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2009, at

BU4.
126
Press Release, Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab., Record Makes Thin-Film Solar Cell Competitive with
Silicon Efficiency (Mar. 24, 2008), available at http://www.nrel.gov/news/press/2008/574.html.
127 David Melville and Dr. Charles Kugler patented gas lighting in America. Brown, supra note 33, at
11–12.
128 See infra notes 143–50 and accompanying text.
129 William H. Whyte, Jr., The Web of Word of Mouth, FORTUNE, Nov. 1954, at 140, 140; see also BILL
BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED AMERICA IS TEARING US APART 191 (2008)
(discussing the Fortune article).
130 Whyte, supra note 129, at 140.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 142.
133 Id.
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substantially block-by-block, and the blocks with the most air conditioners
were those with house walls along the alleyways—the socially frequented
portions of the neighborhood where children played and mothers watched for
their safety.134 Fortune concluded that once a social group coalesced, all that
was necessary to cause air conditioners to spread like wildfire along a block
was the “catalytic influence of a leader,” such as a mother with a recently
installed air conditioner who would trumpet her happy experiences with the
technology to the group, which would then pass on the experience through
word of mouth.135 While the new technology to be promoted is no longer gas
lighting or the air conditioner, the same sort of demonstrated and individually
advertised application of a new technology will be required to convince large
numbers of individuals to adopt distributed renewables.
The switch to a new source of electricity, however, has broader
implications than most technology transitions. The introduction of new
renewable energy devices sparks individuals’ fear of the unknown in every
aspect of their lives.136 They may worry that the heat will stop working on the
coldest day of the winter or the smart phone will not charge just when a crucial
message must be conveyed. The switch to renewables also requires a higher
up-front commitment, both mentally and financially. The financial layout for a
renewable-energy-generating device is in some cases one-quarter to one-half as
large as the purchase of a modest $100,000 home,137 which is the largest
investment that a typical individual will ever make.138 And it requires, in many
respects, a spirited adherence to social do-goodedness.139 With high up-front
134

Id. at 143.
Id.
136 See William H. Lawrence & John H. Minan, Product Standards and Solar Energy, in LEGAL ASPECTS
OF SOLAR ENERGY, supra note 56, at 153, 160 (“The novelty of the equipment [used in solar projects] leaves
many consumers with fears about its performance reliability.”).
137 See Del Chiaro & Gibson, supra note 105, at 364 (“[A] typical 2.5 kW [solar power] system—a size
that typically would be expected to generate at least half of the home’s electricity needs—is estimated to cost
approximately $20,000.”); Shevory, supra note 69 (indicating that residential turbines “cost between $12,000
and $55,000”).
138 See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 9 (2001) (describing how a home is
often an individual’s only asset aside from retirement assets).
139 See R. Cooke et al., Alternative Energy Technologies in Buildings: Stakeholder Perceptions, 32
RENEWABLE ENERGY 2320, 2325–26 (2007). One respondent in a survey of alternative energy stakeholders in
the United Kingdom explained: “From the clients [sic] point of view we ask them to consider renewables in
the long term to save money and save the planet.” Id. at 2325. “[T]he main reasons for using [alternative
energy technologies] in building projects are perceived to be (a) long-term economic benefits, (b) the
availability of subsidies, (c) image benefits, (d) the desire to reduce environmental impacts and (e) corporate
social responsibility (CSR).” Id. at 2325–26; see also id. at 2326 fig.1.
135
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costs, many renewables do not pay off, in terms of the energy savings
exceeding the costs of purchasing and construction, for at least a decade.140 In
a highly mobile society,141 those who invest are unlikely to stay long enough to
see this payoff. Finally, the transition to distributed renewable technology
requires consumers to overcome negative perceptions of the product. As one
respondent in a series of alternative-energy-focused interviews in the United
Kingdom stated, clients “need to be convinced that these systems will work
and will not have to be replaced with expensive traditional replacements after
occupancy.”142
In past large energy transitions from candles to gas lighting and electricity
and then to centralized energy production, these many barriers to energy
innovation were breached. And, interestingly, these surges forward were
influenced by individual, charismatic entrepreneurs aided by local government
policies. Baltimore, for example—one of the first American cities to receive
gas light service—was the home of Rembrandt Peale,143 an eccentric museum
owner who displayed various paintings, stuffed fishes, and animals to the
public.144 As historians tell the story, Peale enhanced his collection after his
father funded a successful expedition to unearth the first mammoth skeleton
found in the United States, and Peale discovered in displaying this
archaeological attraction that “catering to the public curiosity” could be a
profitable business venture.145 As a new curiosity, he decided to purchase a
gas-making machine for his museum and to produce light, thus introducing a
novelty to the public and at the same time attempting to condition the public to
a new form of energy, which he hoped would be a successful business
venture146:

140 See Del Chiaro & Gibson, supra note 105, at 364 (“Over a 30-year time period [in California], the
average benefit in terms of cumulative cash flow is approximately $4,500 and ‘simple payback’ (the time it
takes for an investment to ‘pay for itself’) can be expected within ten to twelve years.”).
141 Between 1995 and 2000, nearly half (49.5%) of the U.S. population aged five and over moved. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, MIGRATION AND GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY IN METROPOLITAN AND NONMETROPOLITAN
AMERICA: 1995 TO 2000, at 2 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-9.pdf.
142 Cooke et al., supra note 139, at 2325.
143 STOTZ & JAMISON, supra note 25, at 13.
144 See id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 14.
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GAS LIGHTS
WITHOUT OIL, TALLOW, WICKS OR SMOKE
It is not necessary to invite attention to the gas lights by which my
salon of paintings is now illuminated; those who have seen the ring
beset with gems of light are sufficiently disposed to spread their
reputation; the purpose of this notice is merely to say that the
Museum will be illuminated every evening until the public curiosity
147
shall be gratified.

A day earlier, Peale had similarly dangled a temptation before his audiences,
explaining,
Yesterday evening, for the first time, the citizens who attended at
the Baltimore Museum were gratified by seeing one of the Rooms
lighted by means of CARBURETTED HYDROGEN GAS. . . . We are
much pleased to find that the illumination by GAS will be continued
every evening for some time . . . that each citizen may have an
opportunity of being convinced how much superior it is to every
148
other kind of artificial light.

In installing the gaslight system and publishing these advertisements, Peale
was doing exactly what today’s pioneers of solar and wind energy must do.
That is, they must lead by example, applying the new and novel energy system
and proving to the public that it works—ensuring that the “public curiosity” is
not only “gratified,” but that the new form of energy production becomes an
accepted part of modern society. And the laws must allow these entrepreneurs
to follow this course.
The road to centralized electricity production—another great energy
transition of the last two centuries enabled in part by local policies—was paved
by another particularly enterprising individual, Samuel Insull.149 This was not
an easy route; Insull encountered “inertia which . . . could be overcome best by
individual initiative and persistent effort. The new energy had to fight its way
against [e]ntrenched interests” like gas lighting.150 “The people were already
served with light, heat, and power, according to then-prevailing standards.
Only enthusiasts had a glimpse of the future position of the new energy.”151
Insull embarked upon a campaign to persuade America and its governing
147
148
149
150
151

Brown, supra note 33, at 14 (quoting FED. GAZETTE & BALT. DAILY ADVERTISER, June 13, 1816).
Id. (quoting FED. GAZETTE & BALT. DAILY ADVERTISER, June 12, 1816).
See Bradley, supra note 30, at 46 (describing Insull’s support of centralized energy production).
BAUER & COSTELLO, supra note 40, at 14.
Id.
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institutions, however, that centralized energy producers regulated as natural
monopolies would form an ideal system of electricity provision, arguing that
“[t]he best service at the lowest possible price can only be obtained . . . by
exclusive control of a given territory being placed in the hands of one
undertaking.”152 By 1933, approximately twenty-two companies ran the bulk
of the American electric industry.153 The transition to centralized energy
surely was driven in part by the invention of improved transmission
technology.154 However, the efforts of entrepreneurial individuals like Peale
were important as well.
Once individuals pave the way to a new form of energy production or
delivery, proving that the new technology is effective and convenient, a larger
economy must form around this new innovation to ensure that it is available to
the public, and laws must be revised to allow for its widespread dispersal. To
achieve these goals, the initial individual efforts must expand to collective
endeavors. Others have recognized this need for group action in advocating
for sweeping changes in the energy system. In a 1949 book arguing for the
formation of local public leagues to provide electricity, for example, the
director of the American Public Utilities Bureau argued that in the “first step”
necessary for this type of change—“legislative action by the city council”—
individuals were needed:
[O]fficial leadership is necessary, and usually depends upon the
mayor and prominent members of the council. Ordinarily such
persons will be reluctant to initiate the proposal and to “stick out their
necks,” unless there is substantial support or pressure. If there is a
vigorous local league with a large membership, official leadership
155
will emerge and legislative action is likely to follow.

Indeed, this movement toward a larger group to advocate for new energy
technologies and their associated infrastructure emerged during the transitions
to gas lighting and later to centralized electricity. Rembrandt Peale persuaded
a group of investors to form the Gas Light Company of Baltimore,156 and three
152 Bradley, supra note 30, at 46 (second alteration in original) (quoting Samuel Insull, President’s
Address (June 7, 1898), in NATIONAL ELECTRIC LIGHT ASSOCIATION: TWENTY-FIRST CONVENTION 14, 27
(Samuel Insull ed., 1898)).
153 BAUER & COSTELLO, supra note 40, at 22 (citing U.S. FED. POWER COMM’N, NATIONAL POWER
SURVEY, POWER SERIES NO. 2, PRINCIPAL ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES (1936)).
154 See supra text accompanying note 41.
155 BAUER & COSTELLO, supra note 40, at 244–45.
156 Brown, supra note 33, at 14 (“By Friday, June 14, 1816 a small group of men, convinced by the
demonstration at the Museum, had banded themselves into the Gas Light Company of Baltimore . . . .”).

PURSLEY&WISEMAN GALLEYSFINAL

2011]

6/10/2011 11:11 AM

LOCAL ENERGY

907

days after the company formed, the Baltimore City Council passed an
ordinance to “provide for the more effectually lighting the streets, squares,
lanes and alleys of the city of Baltimore” using carburetted hydrogen gas, and
to empower Peale’s new companies to lay pipes throughout the city for this
purpose.157 Without local government laws enabling the infrastructure
necessary to technological change, these energy transitions might never have
occurred.
In the modern energy transition to renewables, before groups rally around
this relatively new form of energy—thus enabling substantial investment and
stronger lobbying power—the renewables pioneers must pave the way for a
new industry oriented around this energy form. And to do this, the pioneers
will need amenable land energy rules in addition to monetary incentives and a
general spirit of adventurousness and desire for social change. Unfortunately,
these rules in their current form are wholly inadequate.
2. Existing Local Land-Energy Rules
Individual entrepreneurs will not be able to install wind turbines and solar
panels without zoning laws and building codes that allow these devices, yet in
many regions, such felicitous land-energy rules do not exist. This was starkly
illustrated in 2009 when the planning board of Bourne, Massachusetts, twice
blocked a homeowner’s attempts to install a backyard wind turbine, and the
superior court affirmed the board’s decisions.158 The need to enable (or, in
some cases, command159) local governments to reshape land use laws to
accommodate distributed renewables—to create land-energy rules, in other
words—was well documented during the failed push toward renewables in the
1970s, and the literature generated useful suggestions for improvement. In
1977, for example, the federal Energy Research and Development
Administration suggested legal solutions to enable the solar heating and
cooling of buildings in many contexts, from ensuring that buildings have
adequate access to sunlight160 to encouraging the installation of solar

157 Id. at 15 (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining that the ordinance was passed on Monday,
June 17, 1816).
158 Goodnough, supra note 115.
159 WILLIAM A. THOMAS ET AL., OVERCOMING LEGAL UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT USE OF SOLAR ENERGY
SYSTEMS 12 (1978) (suggesting that “[f]ailure by state or local governments to protect skyspace will
discourage solar energy use” and concluding that “Constitutional Protection of unobstructed solar skyspace” is
therefore critical (emphasis omitted)).
160 Miller, supra note 51, at 39–40.
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technology on mobile homes.161 The following year, the American Bar
Foundation attempted to identify possible “legislative remedies” at the federal,
state, and local levels to reduce “legal barriers to the use of solar energy
systems,”162 including building code and zoning-related barriers.163 In 1981,
law professors from San Diego and Villanova edited a book that offered an
even more comprehensive view of the “legal issues in solar heating and
cooling and in solar photovoltaics,” and they attempted to resolve some of
these issues,164 suggesting model ordinances for solar rights165 and improved
technology standards and building codes for solar installation.166 Other recent
legal scholarship has proposed structures for local laws to enable the use of
renewables, such as regulations or landowner agreements that create access to
sunlight.167 In Part II, this Article will make proposals for necessary renewable
energy rules from a broader perspective; it will describe and defend the
governance level at which land-energy rules must be written and revisited. We
hope that this will inspire further discussion about specific rules that should be
implemented.
To set the stage for our approach to fostering the transition to distributed
renewables, the following sub-subsection provides a sampling of the landenergy laws that have been implemented to date—some of which reflect the
suggestions of the literature from the 1970s through today. Because solar
access laws, which are a key part of land-energy rules, have been thoroughly
discussed in the literature,168 it will focus on the zoning and building codes that
address distributed renewables. It will work from the top down, investigating
some of the federal, state, and local efforts that have directly impacted the
development, content, and application of land-energy rules.

161

Id. at 165–70.
THOMAS ET AL., supra note 159, at 1.
163 Id. at 16, 19–27.
164 Preface to LEGAL ASPECTS OF SOLAR ENERGY, supra note 56, at xiii.
165 Melvin M. Eisenstadt & Albet E. Utton, Access to Sunlight: A Legislative Approach, in LEGAL
ASPECTS OF SOLAR ENERGY, supra note 56, at 45, 51–64.
166 Lawrence & Minan, supra note 136, at 168–75.
167 See generally Sara C. Bronin, Modern Lights, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 881 (2009).
168 See, e.g., supra notes 11, 167.
162
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a. Federal Land-Energy Policy
Most federal policy that has encouraged (or frustrated) renewables
innovation has focused on finance.169 Generally, the government has provided
financial incentives for energy technologies and fuels; while these economic
policies do not fall within the land-energy realm, they have strongly influenced
renewables innovation and thus merit brief discussion. Many federal financial
incentives have negatively influenced renewables innovation by encouraging a
continued reliance upon nonrenewable technologies and fuels. By 1981, the
U.S. government had already “expended approximately $217.4 billion to
stimulate the production of nuclear, oil, coal, and other energy sources.”170
But beginning in 1978, incentives directed at renewable energy technology
began to compete with the public money flowing to fossil fuels with the
passage of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA)171 and the
Energy Tax Act.172 PURPA required utilities to buy power generated by small
qualifying facilities at the amount that it would have cost the utility to generate
or purchase the power from another source;173 this forced utilities to treat small
electricity generators, including renewables, as equal market players.174 The
Energy Tax Act, in turn, provided a tax credit for expenditures on residential
solar, wind, and geothermal energy.175 These incentives have continued to
flow over the years and have, in some cases, expanded.176 As of 2010, several
incentives specifically directed toward distributed generation remain active.

169 See Ronald H. Rosenberg, Diversifying America’s Energy Future: The Future of Renewable Wind
Power, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 505, 532 (2008) (noting that, as a result of a lack of national control over private
investment in electricity production, the government’s provision of financial incentives is critical to the
development of renewables).
170 John H. Minan & William H. Lawrence, State and Federal Tax Incentives to Promote Solar Use, in
LEGAL ASPECTS OF SOLAR ENERGY, supra note 56, at 69, 69.
171 See McCauley et al., supra note 99, at 177 (describing the development of PURPA as a response to oil
embargoes).
172 Minan & Lawrence, supra note 170, at 69.
173
McCauley et al., supra note 99, at 177.
174 See id. (discussing how new contracts based on expected avoidance costs created a constant revenue
stream for qualified facilities, which include small renewables).
175 Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, sec. 101(a), § 44C(a)(2), (b)(2), 92 Stat. 3174, 3175
(repealed 1990).
176 See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, POLICIES TO PROMOTE NON-HYDRO RENEWABLE
ENERGY IN THE UNITED STATES AND SELECTED COUNTRIES 7 (2005) (discussing extensions of the Energy
Policy Act’s tax credit and the concomitant increase in the number of renewable technologies covered). The
Energy Policy Act of 1992, for example, provided a production tax credit for wind energy and biomass plants.
Id. “The incentive expired in 1999” but has been consistently renewed and remains in place today. Id.; cf.
I.R.C. § 45(d) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (showing the continuation of a production tax credit for electricity from
renewables).
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The Tax Code provides a thirty-percent credit for the cost of expenditures by
individuals on qualified residential solar, small wind, fuel cell, and geothermal
technologies,177 as well as for the tax basis of a business’s renewable energy
property.178 The 2009 federal stimulus package converted these business tax
credits for renewable technology to grants, provided the renewable property
was placed in service or construction began in 2009 or 2010.179 The federal
government has also funded research, development, demonstration, and
deployment efforts to expand and improve renewable energy and, since the
1980s, has shared the costs of these efforts with industry partners.180 The
results include “higher efficiency” solar panels, heating systems, and
architectural designs for solar-heated homes, as well as “advanced wind
turbine designs,”181 among other advances. Finally, ongoing direct funding for
the adoption of renewable technologies has been provided to cities through
programs like the Department of Energy’s “Solar America Cities.”182
Programs like Solar America Cities, in addition to their financial stimulus
for renewables, also represent “soft” efforts by the federal government to
influence local land-energy laws in order to increase opportunities for the
installation of renewables technologies. The Department of Energy views
current local laws that fail to adequately address issues such as solar
permitting, “solar rights ordinances,” and “infrastructure planning,” as some of
the “key barriers” to the acceleration of the solar market.183 In this way, the
federal government influences local land-energy policies by doling out funds
to municipalities and suggesting changes in local laws to reduce these barriers.
With the exception of programs like Solar America Cities, however, the federal
government has had little direct influence in local land-energy rules.

177

I.R.C. § 25D(a).
See generally id. § 38(a)–(b)(1) (2006) (providing a business credit, to include an “investment credit
determined under section 46”); id. § 46 (including an “energy credit” within the “investment credit”); id.
§ 48 (a)(1)–(2)(A) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (defining the energy credit).
179 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1603 (a), (d), 123 Stat. 115,
364–65 (providing a grant in lieu of a tax credit for geothermal and solar property as defined in § 48(a)(3)(A)
of the Internal Revenue Code and small wind energy property in § 48(c)(4) of the Code).
180 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 176, at 7.
181 Klass, supra note 62, at 365.
182 SOLAR AM. COMMUNITIES, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SOLAR POWERING YOUR COMMUNITY: A GUIDE
FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 1–2 (2d ed. 2011), available at http://solaramericacommunities.energy.gov/pdfs/
Solar-Powering-Your-Community-Guide-For-Local-Governments.pdf.
183 Hannah Muller, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Accelerating Solar Energy at the Local Level (June 11, 2009)
(PowerPoint presentation), available at http://www.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/documents/pdf/6_solar_america_
hannah_muller.pdf; see also SOLAR AM. COMMUNITIES, supra note 182, at 60, 64.
178
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b. State Directives
States have been forceful drivers of the recent rise in renewable innovation.
Like the federal government, they have influenced distributed renewables
innovation through financial incentives, but they have also enacted important
land-energy rules. On the financial side, New York and California provide
cash incentives for the installation of solar technologies on buildings;184
Illinois pays thirty percent of the cost when individual residents and businesses
install wind and solar technology;185 and Pennsylvania has given free solar
technology systems to twenty municipalities that committed to consuming
twenty percent of their energy from “clean” sources by 2010.186 More than
twenty-four states also offer indirect financial incentives for renewables
through a variety of tax schemes,187 and more than thirty states have passed
renewable portfolio standards, which require utilities to generate or purchase
renewable energy.188 At least three states (Arizona, Colorado, and New
Mexico) require a portion of this percentage to come from distributed
renewables,189 and several give more credit—through the use of multipliers—
to electricity produced through distributed generation.190
States have also effected innovation in distributed renewable technology
through land-energy rule making. State laws in this area do not typically
require the installation of distributed renewables and the infrastructure
necessary to support them; only New Jersey comes close by requiring that a

184 Compare The California Solar Initiative—CSI, GO SOLAR CAL., http://www.gosolarcalifornia.ca.gov/
csi/index.html (last visited May 1, 2011), and California’s Renewable Energy Programs, CAL. ENERGY
COMM’N, http://www.energy.ca.gov/renewables/index.html (last updated Nov. 10, 2010), with PV Incentives,
POWER NATURALLY, http://www.powernaturally.org/programs/solar/incentives.asp (last visited May 1, 2011).
185 Solar and Wind Energy Rebate Program, ILL. DEP’T OF COMMERCE & ECON. OPPORTUNITY,
http://www.commerce.state.il.us/dceo/Bureaus/Energy_Recycling/Energy/Clean+Energy/01-RERP.htm (last
visited May 1, 2011).
186 Pennsylvania Clean Energy Communities Program, THE REINVESTMENT FUND, http://communities.
trfund.com (last visited May 1, 2011).
187 Bronin, supra note 167, at 883.
188 McCauley et al., supra note 99, at 175, 184–87 tbl.3.2.
189 ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R14-2-1804(A)–(B) (2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-124(1)(c)(I) (2010); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 62-16-4(A)(1) (LexisNexis 2010) (requiring that twenty percent of retail electricity sales come
from renewables by January 1, 2020); N.M. CODE R. § 17.9.572.7 G (LexisNexis 2010) (requiring, for 2011
through 2014, that at least one-half percent of the electricity from renewables come from distributed
generation and that this percentage rise to three percent beginning in 2015).
190 See Ryan Wiser & Galen Barbose, Lawrence Berkeley Nat’l Lab., State of the States: Update on RPS
Policies and Progress 13 (Nov. 18, 2009) (PowerPoint presentation), http://www.cleanenergystates.org/
Meetings/RPS_Summit_09/WISER_RPS_Summit2009.pdf (showing that Washington and Nevada have
multipliers for distributed generation).
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developer of a new home offer to install or have someone else install a solar
energy system for a prospective owner.191 Instead, the few state land-energy
policies that address distributed renewables clarify that municipalities have
authority to regulate renewables, require the accommodation of renewables
through local codes, or, in some cases, direct the content of local renewable
energy regulation. Wisconsin’s approach, for example, is aggressive: it
prohibits any political subdivision from placing “any restriction, either directly
or in effect, on the installation or use of a wind energy system that is more
restrictive than the rules promulgated” by the state.192 New York, more
moderately, delegates discretionary authority to cities to pass regulations
designed for “the accommodation of solar energy systems and equipment and
access to sunlight necessary therefor.”193 This is important because the
traditional understanding of local government zoning authority characterizes
local governments as arms of the state that derive all of their powers from their
state “parent.”194 Although all states have provided their local governments
with some zoning authority through State Zoning Enabling Acts,195 those
statutes may not clearly confer municipal authority to regulate renewable
energy technologies.196
A few states have begun to clarify local zoning powers regarding the
installation of distributed renewables. California, for example, provides that if
municipalities require approval of a solar energy system installation, they must
follow the process that they apply to an “architectural modification of the
property,” and that the solar approval “shall not be willfully avoided or
delayed.”197 The regulation also subjects solar energy systems to state and
federal standards, requiring, for example, that they meet applicable state and
local “health and safety standards and requirements” and national safety and
performance standards within model codes, and that certain solar energy

191

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-141.4(a) (West 2010).
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0401(1m) (West Supp. 2010).
193 N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20 (McKinney 2003).
194 Richard Briffault, Our Localism: The Structure of Local Government Law (pt. 1), 90 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 7–9 (1990) (describing how conventional theory sees the local government as “a creature of the state” and
how under Dillon’s Rule, which only allows local governments to exercise expressly granted powers, “[t]he
scope of local power is further affected”).
195 Francesca Ortiz, Zoning the Voyeur Dorm: Regulating the Home-Based Voyeur Web Sites Through
Land Use Laws, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 929, 939 n.44 (2001) (“All states have adopted enabling acts modeled
after the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act . . . .”).
196 See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2346 (2003) (describing the
limits of zoning enabling acts).
197 CAL. CIV. CODE § 714(e)(1) (West Supp. 2010).
192
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systems be certified by national rating corporations.198 The state adds teeth to
these rules by prohibiting municipalities who fail to comply from receiving
state-funded solar grants or loans.199
California, unlike the few states that have addressed distributed renewables
and have focused primarily on solar permitting, also dictates a wind turbine
permitting process for counties. It allows counties to adopt ordinances
“provid[ing] for the installation of small wind energy systems located outside
an urbanized area, but within the county’s jurisdiction,”200 and it requires the
counties, in approving applications under the ordinance, to follow streamlined
County ordinances may establish specific
permitting procedures.201
requirements for the distance between the turbine and the property line, turbine
height, and “view protection, aesthetics, aviation, and design-safety
requirements,”202 but the state also partially restricts counties’ powers.
Counties may only allow turbines of a certain height (conditioned upon the
acreage of the property), minimum setback distances may generally only match
the height of the tower, the system “shall not substantially obstruct views of
adjacent property owners,” and turbine noise shall not exceed 60 decibel
levels, or a lower decibel level required within a general zoning plan.203
Through these regulations, California has granted a good deal of authority over
the installation of distributed generation to counties operating outside of city
and town lines but has cabined these powers within state land-energy
standards.
Arizona does not address permitting for wind turbines but does specify
standards for municipal issuance of solar permits.204 It directs cities and towns
to require that construction plans show the location of the solar energy system,
for example, and to require that installation plans show how the panel will be
attached to the structure.205 It also limits the standards that municipalities may
impose—preventing them from requiring official approval of a solar energy
system from a professional engineer unless “necessary,” for instance.206

198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206

Id. § 714(c)(1)–(3).
Id. § 714(h)(1).
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65896(a) (Deering 2010).
Id. § 65896(b).
Id.
Id.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-468 (Supp. 2009).
Id. § 9-468.A.1(a)–(b).
Id. § 9-468.A.1(e).
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Further, a municipality in Arizona may only assess building or permit fees for
any solar permits required to defray the cost of issuing the permit.207
In sum, several states have either inserted themselves into the land-energy
rule-making process or have directed municipalities to enable distributed
renewables through their own land-energy rules. Just as much or more action,
however, has occurred at the local level.
c. Local Initiatives and Barriers
Local governments, perhaps more than their federal and state counterparts,
have represented the extremes in land-energy rules. Some have banned
distributed renewables, and others have actively encouraged them. Many cities
are acting as their own renewables pioneers. Chicago,208 Houston,209
Phoenix,210 Dallas,211 San Diego,212 and San Jose,213 for example, have all
installed or are in the process of installing solar panels on city buildings and
structures. Phoenix wants fifteen percent “of the energy used by the city [to]
come from renewable energy sources” by 2025 and aims to achieve this goal
“through city-owned and city-sponsored projects, primarily through publicprivate projects.”214 And in 2009, the City of San Jose declared that it would
“[r]eceive 100 percent” of its electrical power “from clean renewable sources”

207

Id. § 9-468.B.
Future Initiatives, CHI. CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, http://www.chicagoclimateaction.org/pages/future_
initiatives/51.php (last visited May 1, 2011).
209 Sustainability Projects—Energy Sources, GREEN HOUS., http://www.greenhoustontx.gov/eprenergysources.html (last visited May 1, 2011).
210 Solar and Other Renewable Energy Projects, CITY OF PHX., http://phoenix.gov/greenphoenix/
sustainability/solarproj.html (last visited May 1, 2011).
211 Dallas City Hall, Toward a Sustainable Dallas 24 (Oct. 17, 2007) (PowerPoint presentation),
http://www.greendallas.net/pdfs/SustainableDallas_101707.pdf.
212 In 2006, “[t]hree new solar panel systems were commissioned”—one on a recreation center, and two
on city libraries. City Energy Accomplishments 2006, CITY OF SAN DIEGO, http://www.sandiego.gov/
environmental-services/energy/programsprojects/accomplishments/2006.shtml (last visited May 1, 2011). In
2005, the city produced a total of 153,000 megawatt-hours of renewable electricity annually. City Energy
Accomplishments 2005, CITY OF SAN DIEGO, http://www.sandiego.gov/environmental-services/energy/
programsprojects/accomplishments/2005.shtml (last visited May 1, 2011). Some of this was from photovoltaic
panels on eleven city buildings. Id.
213 Memorandum from John Stufflebean, Dir., Envtl. Servs., to Transp. & Env’t Comm., City of San Jose
3 (Aug. 17, 2007), available at http://www.sanjoseca.gov/clerk/CommitteeAgenda/TE/082707/TE082707_
4.pdf.
214 CITY OF PHX., PHOENIX: LIVING LIKE IT MATTERS! ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY PROGRAM 28
(2008),
available
at
http://phoenix.gov/webcms/groups/internet/@inter/@env/@sustain/documents/
web_content/021142.pdf.
208
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within fifteen years by working “in tandem with its residents and
businesses.”215
In zoning and building codes, cities and towns are also slowly moving
toward rules that enable a smooth permitting and installation process for
distributed renewables. Woodbury, Minnesota, includes residential wind
turbines as a “permitted accessory use” in several zoning districts and clearly
outlines safety standards and aesthetic requirements for the turbines.216
Winnebago County, Illinois, recently passed an ordinance “designating wind
farms in the county as a permitted use,” meaning that individuals and
developers wishing to install one or more wind turbines will not need to obtain
individualized special-use approval for their projects.217 Wayne, New Jersey,
has established “minimum standards to which a small wind energy system is to
be installed.”218 On the distributed solar front, Austin, Texas, includes “solar
collectors” as a permitted “accessory use” in residential districts219 and adds its
own construction- and safety-related requirements220 to the Uniform Solar
Energy Code,221 which it adopts in large part.222 Despite these encouraging
efforts, a search through large cities’ municipal codes demonstrates that most
barely acknowledge the existence of distributed renewables. Their building
codes do not contain minimum standards for the construction or installation of
these technologies. They do not describe how solar panels are to be mounted
on roofs, for example, or minimum cable strengths required to secure wind
turbines. Their zoning codes also generally fail to include wind turbines or
solar panels within permitted accessory uses or to place minimum setback or
maximum height requirements on wind turbines. This leaves renewables
pioneers in the difficult position of guessing, only to be rebuffed by the
planning board and courts,223 often after having invested a substantial sum of
money in a renewables project.224
215

CITY OF SAN JOSE, supra note 102, at 2.
WOODBURY, MINN., MUN. CODE § 24-405 (2010), available at http://library1.municode.com/defaultnow/home.htm?infobase=14365&doc_action=whatsnew.
217 Illinois Board Passes Ordinance, 6 N. AM. WIND POWER 47 (2009).
218 TOWNSHIP OF WAYNE, N.J., MUN. CODE § 211-126(2) (2009), available at http://ecode360.com/
?custId=WA0473.
219 AUSTIN, TEX., MUN. CODE § 25-2-893 (2010), available at http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/
Texas/austin/thecodeofthecityofaustintexas?f=templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:austin_tx$anc=.
220 Id. § 25-12-191.
221 INT’L ASS’N OF PLUMBING & MECH. OFFICIALS, UNIFORM SOLAR ENERGY CODE (2009).
222 AUSTIN, TEX., MUN. CODE § 25-12-193.
223 See, e.g., Goodnough, supra note 115, and accompanying text.
224 See Goodnough, supra note 115. The landowner had spent about $30,000 in preparatory construction
work for the wind turbine project, which was denied by the town planning commission. Id.
216
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Although many municipalities have failed to address the distributed
renewables issue at all—thus leaving a void for the renewables pioneers—
others have approached the issue from opposite extremes, either providing
clear standards for how and where renewable technologies may be constructed,
or, alternatively, banning the technologies or severely limiting their use.225
Given the current landscape of land-energy rules, the important theoretical
question that follows is about what should be done to move forward: Which
level of government, regardless of its current approach to renewable energy, is
best suited to encourage innovation in distributed renewables technology and
should therefore be empowered to regulate it? We take up this question in the
next Part.
II. INSTITUTIONS
Increasing total distributed renewable energy generation and the adoption
rate of distributed technologies—which we have argued is essential to
America’s future energy infrastructure—requires a substantial policy shift to
encourage promulgation of renewables-supporting land-energy rules. Yet the
substantive benefits of a policy proposal seldom provide sufficient independent
justification for adoption. Implementation must also be considered, and we
turn to implementation questions now. The complexities of America’s
multilayered federal system raise two categories of questions. First, there are
questions about which level of government—federal, state, local, or some
combination of these—will be, as a matter of relative institutional competence,
most likely to facilitate the operation of energy entrepreneurs, spur innovation
in distributed renewable technologies, and promote increased use of distributed
renewables if given authority for implementing energy policy. Second, there
are constitutional and other legal questions about the permissibility of actually
allocating implementation authority and costs in the way that comparative
institutional analysis suggests would be optimal. We address both sets of
questions in this Part.
A. Theoretical Dilemmas
The ideal level of governance for land-energy rules that support the
implementation of distributed renewables is best determined by looking to the

225 Patricia E. Salkin, New York Climate Change Report Card: Improvement Needed for More Effective
Leadership and Overall Coordination with Local Government, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 921, 946 (2009)
(explaining that some New York municipalities are banning wind turbines through their zoning codes).
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broader literature of environmental regulation. Renewables are, after all,
inherently connected to pressing natural resource issues. Siting renewable
production devices impacts scarce land resources,226 and the use of renewable
fuels reduces the quantities of greenhouse gases and other pollutants emitted in
the production of energy.227
Analysis of the intergovernmental dynamics of environmental regulation
has gained nuance since the push for centralized federal pollution control
legislation in the 1970s and 1980s.228 A natural reaction to a salient
environmental crisis like global climate change may be to demand direct
intervention from the highest level of government, and the importance of
federal leadership in environmental regulation cannot be overstated. But a
moment’s reflection reveals that environmental problems are everyone’s
problems; it therefore makes sense that all levels of government should be
involved in solving them. As Daniel Rodriguez has noted, “The necessity of
inter-governmental collaboration is a settled principle in the emerging
literature on biodiversity protection,”229 and, increasingly, the broader
environmental literature recognizes the importance of cooperative
intergovernmental solutions, including regimes of federal–local government
cooperation.230 Existing law reflects this trend, as many major federal
226 See, e.g., Theocharis Tsoutsos et al., Environmental Impacts from the Solar Energy Technologies, 33
ENERGY POL’Y 289, 291 tbl.2 (2005) (summarizing some of the land use impacts of solar technologies, such as
“[r]eduction of cultivable land” and “[i]mpact on ecosystems”). But see Denholm & Margolis, supra note 88,
at 3541 (estimating that for the United States to supply all of its electricity using solar generation, only 0.6% of
total U.S. land area would be required).
227 See, e.g., Tsoutsos et al., supra note 226, at 290 (summarizing the carbon dioxide emissions savings of
solar compared to combined-cycle and coal-fired power plants).
228 See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 13 (setting out seminal economic arguments for centralized federal
environmental regulation); Richard B. Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional
Law in Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 62 IOWA L. REV.
713, 747 (1977) (summarizing similar arguments). But see Revesz, supra note 15, at 1210 (critiquing
Stewart).
229
Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Role of Legal Innovation in Ecosystem Management: Perspectives from
American Local Government Law, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 745, 747–48 (1997).
230 See, e.g., David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Reorienting State Climate Change Policies to Induce
Technological Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 835, 840 (2008) (arguing for both a federal and state role in
regulating to reduce greenhouse gas emissions); Buzbee, supra note 22, at 108 (emphasizing “the benefits of
regulatory overlap, cooperative federalism structures, and redundant enforcement mechanisms” in
environmental regulation); Carlson, supra note 17, at 1106–08 (noting “cooperative federalism” regimes
operate in a number of substantive environmental areas and a turn in the literature toward more “contextual” or
“dynamic” conceptions of intergovernmental relations); Robert L. Glicksman, Climate Change Adaptation: A
Collective Action Perspective on Federalism Considerations, 41 ENVTL. L. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at
6–10), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1667533 (analyzing several models for
intergovernmental collaboration in regulatory efforts to foster adaptation to climate change); John R. Nolon, In

PURSLEY&WISEMAN GALLEYSFINAL

918

6/10/2011 11:11 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60

environmental statutes—the federal Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, for
example—require the cooperation of state and local governments for
implementation.231 But the best specific allocation of regulatory roles among
the levels of government in the distributed renewable energy context has not
been explored. We seek to fill that gap in this Part.
We begin in this section with an examination of central debates in two
relevant, but abstract, fields: the economic analysis of law and positive
political theory. Working through these debates does not yield a clear answer
to the question of the optimal allocation of regulatory authority over distributed
renewable energy issues. Both strands of theory suggest, at most, that a mixed
regime involving more than a single level of government likely will be more
effective than unilateral action. However, and importantly, examining the
relevant theses in these literatures yields critical insight into the kinds of
considerations that must be addressed in the project of constructing a
potentially fruitful allocation of authority in this context. In the next section,
we consider additional factors, unique to the distributed renewables context,
which also impact the proper allocation of distributed renewable authority.
1. The Efficiency Debate
One challenge in determining an optimal level of land-energy governance
for distributed renewables arises from the ongoing centralization versus
decentralization debate in the law and economics literature on environmental
regulation.232 A familiar argument for centralized environmental regulation is
Praise of Parochialism: The Advent of Local Environmental Law, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 372–77,
410–13 (2002) (canvassing local environmental initiatives, arguing for collaboration among federal, state, and
local environmental policymakers); Patricia E. Salkin, Smart Growth and Sustainable Development: Threads
of a National Land Use Policy, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 381, 392 (2002) (noting federal-local cooperation in
brownfield redevelopment); A. Dan Tarlock, Local Government Protection of Biodiversity: What Is Its Niche?,
60 U. CHI. L. REV. 555, 581–82 (1993) [hereinafter Tarlock, Biodiversity] (federal-local collaboration in
management of sensitive wetlands); A. Dan Tarlock, The Potential Role of Local Governments in Watershed
Management, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 149, 149 (2002) (similar); see also Timothy F. Malloy, The Social
Construction of Regulation: Lessons from the War Against Command and Control, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 267, 269
(2010) (arguing that even academic commentary on the proper allocation of regulatory authority among the
levels of government is insufficiently attentive to context-dependent considerations).
231 See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409–
7410 (2006); Buzbee, supra note 16, at 1565–66; Carlson, supra note 17, at 1106–07.
232 See generally Stewart, supra note 13 (setting out the classical race to the bottom argument for
centralized environmental standard-setting); Stewart, supra note 228 (similar); Revesz, supra note 15
(mounting a seminal critique of classical law and economics justifications for federal, rather than state,
authority in environmental regulation); Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a
“Race” and Is It “to the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997) (critiquing Revesz’s work); Daniel C. Esty,
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the risk that absent federal control, state regulation will generate negative
interstate externalities. Environmentally harmful activities often have effects
that cross state lines, and individual states will have incentives to regulate only
to the extent that in-state benefits captured offset the costs of regulation—
political capital costs, remediation costs, jobs and other economic benefits lost
when tough environmental laws drive away industry.233 In other words,
individual states with discretion over environmental regulation will lack
sufficient incentive to regulate optimally to reduce harm to their own citizens
as well as to the citizens of “downwind states.”234 This argument is
particularly salient—and correct, we believe—for regulations addressing air
pollutants (including greenhouse gases) and water pollutants that harm
transboundary aquifers, rivers, or other water bodies. In these cases, the
physical pollutants and their effects are unconstrained by geographic
boundaries and are, at least with respect to providing a regulatory floor to
prevent harm to the natural resources and human health, best addressed at a
federal level. Another traditional argument for federal control is a version of

Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996) (same); Scott R. Saleska & Kirsten H.
Engel, “Facts Are Stubborn Things”: An Empirical Reality Check in the Theoretical Debate over the Race-tothe-Bottom in State Environmental Standard-Setting, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 55 (1998) (same); Daniel
A. Farber, Environmental Federalism in a Global Economy, 83 VA. L. REV. 1283 (1997) (defending
decentralization); Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case
for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23 (1996) (same); Richard B.
Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039 (1993) (critiquing
Revesz’s rationale for decentralization).
233 Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 23, 29 (1983)
(“One of the common justifications for federal air pollution legislation is that, because no one state’s residents
can collect all the benefits of cleaner air (which, after all, drifts east, while dirty air comes in with the breeze),
the states lack the proper incentives to legislate.”); Stewart, supra note 13, at 1211–16 (“Given the mobility of
industry and commerce, any individual state or community may rationally decline unilaterally to adopt high
environmental standards that entail substantial costs for industry . . . for fear that the resulting environmental
gains will be more than offset by movement of capital to other areas with lower standards. If each locality
reasons in the same way, all will adopt lower standards of environmental quality than they would prefer if
there were some binding mechanism that enabled them simultaneously to enact higher standards, thus
eliminating the threatened loss of industry or development.” (footnote omitted)).
234 See HENRY N. BUTLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY 17 (1996) (arguing against the significance of these phenomena and advocating decentralization);
Carlson, supra note 17, at 1104 (summarizing the race to the bottom argument); Revesz, supra note 15, at
1222 (noting, but critiquing, the economic assumptions supporting the environmental race to the bottom
scenario); Stewart, supra note 13, at 1211–16 (providing the canonical formulation of economic-theory-based
concerns about autonomous state environmental policy making); Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the
Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 67, 99–100 (1996) (reviewing these arguments).
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the prisoner’s dilemma from noncooperative game theory.235 The claim is that,
absent federal regulation, failures in the national market for “industrial firm
location” provide economic incentives for state governments to “race to the
bottom”—competing to attract industry by decreasing the stringency of
environmental requirements.236
One response supporting decentralizing environmental regulatory authority
draws on Charles Tiebout’s argument that competition among jurisdictions for
residents through the provision of varying packages of regulation and taxation
resembles competition in private markets.237 Wallace Oates and Robert
Schwab, for example, argue that states’ or municipalities’ potential loss of
residents could in some circumstances offset industrial gains from laxer
environmental standards, reducing the risk of races to the bottom.238 Indeed,
Oates and Schwab concluded, when modeled on a particular set of
assumptions, that intergovernmental competition might produce socially
optimal levels of environmental regulation.239 Richard Revesz has argued that
this analysis supports a default rule of decentralized rather than centralized
environmental authority.240
Theoretical projections about efficiency in environmental regulation
purport to predict which level of government will, in fact, be most efficient in
providing regulatory goods.241 Some base normative claims on such
predictions—Revesz, for example, argues that we should redistribute primary
regulatory authority to the level of government that will regulate most
efficiently.242 He predicts that, most of the time, this will be the state
But claims about the efficiency of decentralizing
governments.243

235 Saleska & Engel, supra note 232, at 55–56. On the prisoner’s dilemma, see generally ROBERT
AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 7–11 (1984), and SHAUN P. HARGREAVES HEAP & YANIS
VAROUFAKIS, GAME THEORY 146–66 (1995).
236 See Revesz, supra note 15, at 1213–20; Stewart, supra note 13, at 1210–12.
237
See Carlson, supra note 17, at 1104–05 (drawing on Tiebout’s theorem to argue for state
environmental authority); Revesz, supra note 15 (same). See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of
Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
238 Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency
Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35 J. PUB. ECON. 333, 335–42 (1988).
239 Id. at 342.
240 See Revesz, supra note 15, at 1253 (“[F]orces of interstate competition, far from being conclusively
undesirable, are at least presumptively beneficial.”).
241 See Saleska & Engel, supra note 232, at 60 (noting that the question of whether races to the bottom in
fact occur “is, at bottom, an empirical question”).
242 See Revesz, supra note 15, at 1211–12; Saleska & Engel, supra note 232, at 58–59.
243 See Revesz, supra note 15, at 1253–54.
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environmental regulatory power have met with stiff criticism.244 Aside from
methodological critiques, the day-to-day uncertainties and information deficits
that policymakers face render the “assumptions of perfect measurement” made
in the underlying economic model on which Revesz relies contestable and thus
not supportive of a general normative claim.245
Beyond the theory, an empirical study addressing the race to the bottom
suggests that, although substantial evidence shows that relaxing environmental
standards does little or nothing to enhance a state’s economic performance or
attract new industry,246 state policymakers nevertheless appear to erroneously
believe that lowering environmental standards will yield such benefits; some
risk of races to the bottom therefore remains.247 It is common to regard cities
as economic “growth engines”—they have perhaps the strongest set of
incentives of any level of government to pursue policies aimed at enhancing
the local economy248—so the risk of races to the bottom driven by the desire to
attract industry seems real, perhaps even heightened, at the local government
level. Nevertheless, the broader empirical question of which option—
centralization or decentralization of environmental regulation (including landenergy rules)—is generally most efficient remains unresolved.249 And the
emerging scholarly consensus appears to be that these broad questions are
simply the wrong questions.
Instead, perhaps, we should assess
interjurisdictional regulatory competition in different environmental policy

244 See, e.g., Engel, supra note 232; Esty, supra note 232; Saleska & Engel, supra note 232, at 57 (noting
that Revesz’s arguments are rooted in neoclassical economic theory, while the race to the bottom argument
rests in noncooperative game theory).
245 The contestable assumptions include assumptions that state regulators know how much new business
they may attract by lowering environmental standards, how many jobs will be created or wages increased, how
much environmental harm will result, and the preferences of their constituents. See Swire, supra note 234, at
95–96; see also Carlson, supra note 17, at 1106 (calling Swire’s critique of Revesz “[a]mong the most
cogent”).
246 Saleska & Engel, supra note 232, at 66–69 & tbl.1 (competitive environmental standard-setting does
not enhance state economic performance); id. at 74 (industry mobility unaffected by relaxation of state
environmental standards); see also Engel, supra note 232, at 346 (same).
247 Saleska & Engel, supra note 232, at 74–76; see also Engel, supra note 232, at 340 (noting potential
political reasons why state officials might overstate the risk of industry relocation in standard-relaxation
deliberations).
248 See PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 22–38 (1981).
249 See Carlson, supra note 17, at 1105; Barry G. Rabe et al., State Competition as a Source Driving
Climate Change Mitigation, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 6 (2005) (“[I]t has been easy for federal policy
advocates to show that state policy is often ineffective and/or ill-advised, but more difficult to show that its
irrationality would skew state policy in one direction (toward deregulation) . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
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areas to better understand the level of government that would most efficiently
regulate various types of environmentally harmful activity.250
In the end, then, the efficiency debate leaves us with no general answer to
the institutional-choice question in the context of distributed renewables.
Leaving aside the observation that efficiency in the “provision of
environmental goods” may not be the best criterion for evaluating
environmental policy,251 there simply is no economic justification for lodging
all environmental regulatory power at any one level of government. At best,
the literature shows that the question of efficiency in the allocation of
regulatory power is complex, that the proper allocation likely varies from one
environmental policy area to another—air and water pollutants with effects
beyond state boundaries clearly merit federal regulation, for example—and
that races to the bottom remain a risk at the subnational level. Although there
is no empirical evidence to suggest that the economic dynamics differ
substantially from the general field of environmental regulation to the specific
subject of distributed renewables policy, differences in the nature of
technologies and business interests may raise distinct issues.252 For now, we
assume relative similarity between environmental and distributed renewables
regulation and that decentralizing regulatory authority to the state or local
government level risks a race to the bottom. We address remedies for that risk
in Part II.B, below.
2. The Politics Debate
A second theoretical dilemma in identifying an optimal level of landenergy governance cautions against too hasty a leap toward vesting primary
regulatory authority in state or local governments. This dilemma arises from
the literature applying public choice theory to environmental regulation.253
Public choice theory holds that government policy is disproportionately shaped

250 See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 22, at 112–13; Carlson, supra note 17, at 1107; Kirsten H. Engel,
Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 163–64 (2006)
(contrasting “static economic models used to justify a preferred allocation of regulatory authority between the
states and the federal government” with “the modern scholarly debate over environmental federalism[, which]
seeks to determine the proper allocation of regulatory authority . . . with respect to specific environmental
problems”); Rodriguez, supra note 229, at 746.
251 See Carlson, supra note 17, at 1106–07 (criticizing the emphasis on efficiency in light of a more
contextual framework); Swire, supra note 234, at 75–76 (criticizing the use of efficiency as the measure of
sound environmental policy).
252 We will take up this question again in later work.
253 See Carlson, supra note 17, at 1104.
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by the preferences of concentrated interest groups that provide significant
electoral support for representatives and thereby secure access and influence
over those representatives’ decisions.254 It thus highlights the importance of
understanding the alignment and actions of relevant interest groups in
describing the causes of past policy outcomes and predicting future
outcomes.255 The classical objection is that interest groups that favor lax
environmental regulation and have high individual stakes in regulatory
outcomes—paradigmatically industry groups—tend to be small and cohesive,
but groups favoring stricter environmental regulation tend to be more diffuse
and less organized.256 This disparity in political power, from the perspective of
economies of scale in political organization and advocacy of the two camps, is
exacerbated at the state and local government levels.257 Diffuse environmental
interests may muster the resources to organize and act within a single political
forum, but organizing at multiple state or government locations would be too
taxing upon their relatively undisciplined and typically underfunded
infrastructures.258 Interests favoring laxer regulation, by contrast, are thought
to possess relatively greater capacity to organize and advocate in multiple

254

See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991).
Some think that interest group influence is the dominant force in shaping legislative outcomes
generally. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 229 (1986). But this view has its detractors,
too. See, e.g., FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 254, at 22–23.
256 See, e.g., Esty, supra note 232, at 597–98 (“[T]he costs of environmental regulation are generally more
concentrated and tangible than the benefits. Costs are often borne by particular industries or enterprises, and
are translated readily into monetary terms. Benefits, however, accrue to the general public in ways that are
hard to discern and monetize.” (footnote omitted)); Saleska & Engel, supra note 232, at 64 (“According to the
economic theory of regulation, laws tend to respond to the wants of small, cohesive special interest groups,
such as industry, at the expense of the wants of the larger, more diffuse public. The public, which is the
intended beneficiary of stringent regulation, is often in a weaker political position than industry, which is the
primary beneficiary of less regulation.” (footnote omitted)); Stewart, supra note 13, at 1213 (similar); Swire,
supra note 234, at 101.
257 See Esty, supra note 232, at 598; Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A
Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 559–61 (2001) (describing this as the “dominant claim
among supporters of federal regulation on public choice grounds”); Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing
Imperative (but Only from a National Perspective) for Federal Environmental Protection, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L.
& POL’Y F. 225, 285–86 (1997).
258 See, e.g., Sarnoff, supra note 257, at 285–86 (arguing that interests seeking stricter environmental
protection, because of their nature and composition, “may be more successful than ‘concentrated’ compliance
interests in affecting legislative and bureaucratic policy at the federal level than at the state level” due to
“economies of scale and reduced transaction costs for organizing and lobbying” (footnote omitted)); Esty,
supra note 232, at 650–51 & n.302 (similar); Stewart, supra note 13, at 1213 (similar).
255
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government forums and thus enjoy a comparative advantage.259 Comparative
institutional analysis thus suggests that federal environmental authority is
preferable to state or local authority because the federal level is the most
efficient receiver of broadly shared but often under-organized public interests
in environmental protection, which are needed to counterbalance industrial
interests that would otherwise dominate the political process and impose their
narrow interests on the unwitting public.260
The public choice claim is a sophisticated version of the traditional
“tragedy of the commons” argument,261 and it is typically tied to Mancur
Olson’s work on collective action problems. Olson suggested that individuals
generally will prefer to pursue their own interests where they conflict with
common goals of the group, that cohesive interest groups—industry groups,
for example—will push their own agendas as far as their influence allows even
where doing so diminishes the public good, and that disparities in interest
group influence explain many policy outcomes.262 As with general claims
from the law and economics literature, the emerging consensus among scholars
is that the complexities of interjurisdictional environmental policy require
more nuanced analysis.263 For one thing, Olson’s account does not directly
suggest that federal regulatory power is the solution to the disparity in
259 See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 13, at 1213–14 (“Centralized decisionmaking may imply similar scale
economies for industrial firms, but these are likely to be of lesser magnitude—particularly if such firms are
already national in scope.”).
260 See Revesz, supra note 257, at 560–61.
261 As Dan Rodriguez summarizes it, “[T]he ‘tragedy of the commons[]’ . . . is[] basically the idea that
individual landowners have incentives to exploit natural resources to fulfill their own private interests at the
expense of the long-term interests of the commonwealth.” Rodriguez, supra note 229, at 748–49. See
generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE
ACTION 1–8 (James E. Alt & Douglass C. North eds., 1990); Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons,
162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). In the context of comparative organizational capacity among interests, the laxregulation-seeking industry groups influence the political process in a manner designed to facilitate their
exploitation of natural resources at the expense of the public interest which is too diffuse and intangible to
serve as an effective rallying point for opposing interest-group mobilization.
262 See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY
OF GROUPS (1971) [hereinafter OLSON, GROUPS] (providing an account of the factors that cause individual
group members to act in their own interests even when such action hampers the promotion of interests
common to the group); MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH,
STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES (1982) [hereinafter OLSON, NATIONS] (developing his account of group
dynamics to posit an explanation for economic decline in developed countries as attributable in part to the
growth of politically powerful interest groups with diverging interests). See also Glicksman, supra note 230
(manuscript at 14–18) (discussing the implications of Olson’s and related work for allocating climate
regulatory authority among levels of American government).
263 See Carlson, supra note 17, at 1104 (noting that the public choice case for or against centralized
federal regulatory power is unsettled); Revesz, supra note 257, at 576–77; sources cited supra note 250.
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influence between industry and environmental groups.264 Several factors
suggest that subnational governments may in fact constitute forums in which
industry and environmental interests might be more evenly matched than at the
federal level. First, advocacy groups at the subnational level are likely to be
smaller in size, and smaller groups will have fewer free riders; cost-bearing
members of the group may be more likely to have sufficient incentives to
counterbalance the costs of acting and maintaining the organization.265
Second, action by smaller groups in subnational governmental proceedings
presents lower organizational and political entry costs, making it cheaper for
interest groups to coalesce and achieve initial policy victories that can enhance
cohesion and lower organizational costs over time.266 And third, smaller
groups representing a geographically discrete set of interests are likely to have
greater interest-homogeneity among members, which may also enhance group
cohesiveness, reduce the number of free riders, and channel group resources
into clear policy initiatives.267 These factors suggest that the best forum for
advocates of stricter environmental regulation (including regulation that
encourages distributed renewables) is the state or local level, not the federal
level.268 They mesh well with the traditional hypothesis, found in the technical
literature on social movements, that individual policy entrepreneurs alter the
264

See Revesz, supra note 257, at 560–71.
See OLSON, GROUPS, supra note 262, at 21–22 (describing the free-rider problems endemic to all
groups, regardless of size, but suggesting that they may be less detrimental in smaller groups); Revesz, supra
note 257, at 560–61.
266 See Revesz, supra note 257, at 561–62; see also OLSON, GROUPS, supra note 262, at 22 (discussing the
unusually high cost of obtaining a group’s first unit of shared benefit).
267 See Revesz, supra note 257, at 563 (“[N]ational aggregation of environmental interests results in the
loss of homogeneity of interests . . . . [E]nvironmentalists in Massachusetts may care primarily about air
quality, whereas environmentalists in Colorado may care more about limitations on logging on public lands.
[All else] equal, state-based environmental groups seeking, respectively, better air quality in Massachusetts
and more protection of public lands in Colorado are likely to be more effective than a national environmental
group seeking both improvements at the federal level.”); see also OLSON, NATIONS, supra note 262, at 24
(arguing that “socially heterogeneous groups . . . are less likely to agree on the exact nature of whatever
collective good is at issue or on how much of it is worth buying,” so that, in such groups, “collective action
can become still less likely”); William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Problem of
Institutional Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 132 (1999) (highlighting the importance of policy wins to
interest groups, whose “ongoing existence depends on success in furthering their agenda”); Daniel A. Farber,
Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 70–75 (1992) (noting that
environmental interest groups benefit from policy success since “the passage of environmental legislation
creates a new set of environmental entitlements,” which, when under-implemented or otherwise threatened,
provide groups with additional means to “spark increased organizational involvement”).
268 See Revesz, supra note 257, at 578–626 (highlighting progressive state government environmental
regulatory efforts as evidence suggesting environmental interests do succeed at the state government level and
that the public choice justification for any particular allocation of regulatory power will be substantially more
complicated than the standard, pro-centralization claim).
265
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social and political dynamics surrounding certain issues.269 We return to this
point in the next section.
Despite these theoretical contentions, empirical analysis of the attitudes of
state regulators and legislators, aimed at explaining the continuing risk of races
to the bottom, appears to support the initial public choice critique of
decentralization.270 State environmental regulators—bureaucrats—tend to
come closer to correctly approximating the low relative value of relaxing
environmental standards to attract industry and enhance economic
performance271 than do state legislators, who tend to overvalue lax
environmental standards.272 The dominant influence of state legislators in state
environmental policy means that incorrect beliefs in the statehouses may
explain why race to the bottom dynamics persist despite the absence of any
real economic benefit.273 Legislative misperception of the economic benefits
of under-regulation may result from ignorance, but it may also represent a
rational calculation; state legislators have incentives to deliver policy benefits
to their supporters, and concessions in the form of relaxed environmental
standards, like monetary subsidies, constitute visible “deliverables” that
legislators are motivated to provide.274 In addition, even if the industryattracting potential is uncertain, the opportunity to claim a visible policy win if
industry does decide to move into the state—and to avoid the blame that would
flow from having declined to relax environmental standards if industry stays
away—provides powerful motivation for legislators to relax environmental
standards.275 For example, in 2003 the Ohio legislature rejected bills that
would have required utilities to gradually increase the portion of electricity
generated from renewable sources.276 The concern, according to the chair of
269

See infra Part II.B.2.a.
On the continuing risk of races to the bottom, see supra notes 246–49 and accompanying text.
271 Saleska & Engel, supra note 232, at 76–77.
272 Id. at 78–79.
273
Id. at 78; Scott P. Hays et al., Environmental Commitment Among the States: Integrating Alternative
Approaches to State Environmental Policy, PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM, Spring 1996, at 41 (highlighting state
legislative influence in environmental policy making).
274 See Saleska & Engel, supra note 232, at 79, 83.
275 Id. at 79–80 (comparing relaxation of environmental standards to relocation subsidies and arguing that
“a politician is better off providing industry with a location subsidy than not providing such a subsidy since, by
offering the subsidy, she can claim credit for the siting of new industry if a new plant does in fact choose to
site locally, and can avoid blame if industry ends up siting somewhere else”); id. at 80 (“The relaxation of
environmental standards may reduce a state’s overall social welfare, yet, at the same time, it may accrue
sizable political benefits to the politician who claims credit for industry siting within the state.”).
276 See Tom Henry, New Sources of Power: Proposals Seek to Tap Ohio’s Renewable Energy Potential,
TOLEDO BLADE, Nov. 14, 2004, at B1.
270
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the committee in which the bills died, was that “driv[ing] the cost of energy
higher [would] make it less likely that industries will locate in Ohio.”277
The same kinds of incentives likely motivate local policymakers, since
they, too, may accrue substantial political benefits from industrial siting and
economic development.
Although national legislators also have
geographically bounded constituencies to whom they might “sell” industrial
siting as a political win, the necessity of building coalitions among
representatives of a variety of different areas to pass legislation makes such
motivations less likely to succeed in shaping enactments at the national
level.278
These observations weaken the claim that recent state environmental
decisions show that state legislative forums provide better access to
environmental interests than does Congress.279 The “receptiveness” of a
governmental forum to environmental interests is in part a function of where
those interests choose to concentrate their political resources, and that choice
may vary with the political valence of various levels of government:
Recent state enforcement activism proves little about inherent state
environmentalism but instead reflects political opportunities opened
up by a more anti-environmental shift in federal policy. As long as
our country at all levels is ruled by a system of elected government,
then the degree of environmental fervor at each level will inevitably
280
fluctuate.

And such events do not undermine the broader observation that most real
environmental progress in the United States has required some form of federal
leadership.281
277 Id. (quoting then-Ohio Representative Lynn Olman) (internal quotation mark omitted); see also
Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, The Hidden Costs of State Renewable Portfolio Standards
(RPS), 15 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 10 (2007–2008) (discussing the Ohio proposals).
278
See Saleska & Engel, supra note 232, at 83–84 (noting that the perverse incentives generated by
industrial siting politics at the state level “are less likely to exist in federal environmental standard setting”
because “[t]he uniform nature of most federal standards provides less opportunity for state representatives at
the national level to use environmental standards to attract industry to particular states or localities”).
279 See Revesz, supra note 257, at 583–626, 630–41; see also infra notes 382–89 and accompanying text.
280 Buzbee, supra note 22, at 113. This dynamic is just what modern federalism theory predicts in more
general terms. See Engel, supra note 250, at 180–81; Ernest A. Young, Just Blowing Smoke? Politics,
Doctrine, and the Federalist Revival After Gonzales v Raich, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 33.
281 See Rodriguez, supra note 229, at 749 (“As hopeful as we might be about the prospects of ‘bottom-up’
local initiatives, the modern history of environmental regulation suggests that any real progress has taken place
only where federal and state decisionmakers have pursued strategies either in tandem with local efforts or else
as regulatory ushers of some sort.”).
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Specific public choice dynamics from the environmental realm, however,
suggest that environmental groups may benefit from operating at the local
level; these dynamics are therefore relevant to evaluating the benefits of
allocating authority over distributed renewables regulation to local
governments. First, local governments, compared to the state and federal
governments, appear less likely to be targeted by the influential utility and
carbon fuel lobbies that might vehemently resist a push for more renewable
energy.282 These groups, although well established, entrenched, and influential
at the federal and state government levels, nevertheless are limited in their
capacity.283 They cannot be everywhere all of the time. As a result, like any
other organization, they must rely to some degree on “fire alarm” rather than
“police patrol” monitoring of regulatory activity to alert them to initiatives on
which their interests require intervention.284 Local government actions,
because of their lower political profile, seem less likely to capture these
lobbies’ attention as often as would state or federal actions.285 And given the
small scale of the effects of local government actions, such groups may view
losses at the local level as less consequential than higher level actions and
accordingly allocate fewer resources to resisting local initiatives.286

282 See Santiago Bañales-López & Vicki Norberg-Bohm, Public Policy for Energy Technology
Innovation: A Historical Analysis of Fluidized Bed Combustion Development in the USA, 30 ENERGY POL’Y
1173, 1176 (2002) (“Several sources suggest the conservatism of the traditional utility business works against
taking risks with new technologies . . . .”); Bronin, supra note 11, at 568–70 (discussing utility resistance to
renewable energy initiatives generally, noting that utilities are likely to resist microgrid programs—which
allow individuals to supply energy to others—more strongly than laws that enhance individuals’ capacity to
use distributed renewable devices for personal energy consumption); Heiman & Solomon, supra note 6, at 101
(“[E]arly dedication [to renewable energy was] unraveled by the mid-1980s during an era of cheaper fossil
fuels and overt hostility to renewable energy from the utility and energy industries.”); cf. Robert R.M.
Verchick, Why the Global Environment Needs Local Government: Lessons from the Johannesburg Summit, 35
URB. LAW. 471, 476 n.24 (2003) (“[O]ne imagines that even those forces [that are powerful at the local level]
can be unseated more easily by concentrated local opposition than is possible with, say, the aerospace or
petroleum lobbies at the national level.”).
283
Oil lobby influence in federal and state politics is well documented. See, e.g., Benjamin K. Sovacool
& Kelly E. Sovacool, Preventing National Electricity-Water Crisis Areas in the United States, 34 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 333, 385–86 & nn.294–95 (2009) (“During important elections . . . [Greenpeace estimated that] oil
and gas companies contributed about $255 million to political campaigns and electric utilities an additional
$20 million for the 2004 election cycle. From 2003 to 2006, fossil fuel lobbyists contributed about $58 million
to state-level campaigns alone. Over the same period, renewable energy lobbyists spent just over $500,000.”).
284 See generally Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984).
285 Cf. Bronin, supra note 107 (manuscript at 28–29) (suggesting that while utilities constitute a major
source of political opposition to alternative energy programs at the state government level, the primary source
of such opposition in local government settings is “neighbors”).
286 See supra notes 113–17 and accompanying text.
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Incidents like the “Seaweed Rebellion” suggest that political interests
contrary to those of carbon fuel groups may succeed at the local government
level even if they are blocked at the federal and state levels.287 The Seaweed
Rebellion involved citizens in a number of California cities who, dissatisfied
with federal and state regulation of offshore drilling, overwhelmingly and
successfully backed local zoning measures that prohibited the placement of
Less frequent and intense
necessary onshore processing facilities.288
adversarial lobbying efforts by the hostile industries at the local level, then, is
one comparative advantage to allocating regulatory authority over renewablesrelated land-energy decisions to local governments.
Second, there is a sort of structural endowment effect that arises from the
connection between deploying distributed renewable devices and land use
regulation, which favors local authority. The fact that local governments have
exercised authority over land use issues for most of our history aids existing
local groups.
[It] ensures that there are durable interest groups in the form of both
property owners and local decisionmakers who have a stake in
preserving existing patterns of land use regulation and management.
Even where property owners find themselves on the short end of the
regulatory stick, their investment in relationships and patterns of
influence in the processes of land management makes preservation of
289
the status quo regulatory arrangements in their long-term interest.

Where private property owners are also environmental advocates, their
interests will be more readily advanced if they can align their environmental
goals with local governments’ and property owners’ interests in the stability of
local land use regulatory authority. Fostering distributed renewable energy
technology in a community inevitably requires modification of land-energy
rules. Accordingly, property-owning advocates will have incentives to pursue
strategies that maintain local government decision-making authority on the
land use questions even if they wish to alter the substantive outcomes of those

287 See EDWARD A. FITZGERALD, THE SEAWEED REBELLION: FEDERAL-STATE CONFLICTS OVER
OFFSHORE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 1–2, 28 (2001) (giving the history of the conflict).
288 ROBERT SOLLEN, AN OCEAN OF OIL: A CENTURY OF POLITICAL STRUGGLE OVER PETROLEUM OFF THE
CALIFORNIA COAST 12, 169–71 (1998); see also Edward A. Fitzgerald, California Coastal Commission v.
Norton: A Coastal State Victory in the Seaweed Rebellion, 22 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 155, 155 (2004)
(describing how local resistance to offshore drilling has affected the extent to which statutes, regulations, and
judicial decisions create roles for state or local governments in regulating offshore activities).
289 Rodriguez, supra note 229, at 751.
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decisions.290 The potential for these sets of interests to converge on shared
policy outcomes also suggests that distributed renewable technology advocates
may be most effective if they concentrate their efforts at the local, rather than
federal, level.
But the connection between distributed-renewables implementation and
land use rules raises a particular worry, too, that cuts back against the case for
local government authority. In local governments, our hypothetically
progressive, distributed-renewables-favoring property owner will face
opposition from a set of influential and entrenched interests with incentives to
maintain the substance of status quo land-energy rules.291 Opponents likely
will include developers and transportation- and utility-related businesses, who
tend to exercise significant influence in local land use decision making and
favor policies that grant them flexibility in carrying out their operations.292
These groups may be predisposed to resist changes to land-energy rules
designed to foster distributed renewables, since such changes likely will be
viewed as disruptive alterations to business as usual, requiring large up-front
investments.293 Powerful “homevoters,” in turn, will make aesthetic arguments
against land-energy rules that accommodate the installation of distributed
renewable generation.294 If renewable energy interests face entrenched

290 See id. at 751–52 (“[T]he municipality/property owner relationship is one of mutual interdependence.
To the extent that private property owners’ and public officials’ interests converge, there is a combination
formed that has very strong incentives to resist relinquishing control to other, more central authorities.”).
291 See Hannah J. Wiseman, Public Communities, Private Rules, 98 GEO. L.J. 697, 726, 734–36 (2010)
(discussing the influence of developers and other business interests in local land use decision making).
292 See id. at 726 (discussing developers’ incentives to favor land use policies that enhance their own
discretion); Buzbee, supra note 267, at 81–82.
293 See Wiseman, supra note 291, at 726, 735–36; Buzbee, supra note 267, at 81–82. This kind of
political dynamic seems likely to be at work in those cities that have gone nowhere, or even backward, on the
renewable energy front. See Sara C. Bronin, The Quiet Revolution Revived: Sustainable Design, Land Use
Regulation, and the States, 93 MINN. L. REV. 231, 249–55 (2008) (discussing examples of local inaction on
and resistance to green building initiatives, suggesting “homevoter” resistance as one causal factor); supra
notes 223–27 and accompanying text (noting local resistance to, or inaction on, renewable energy initiatives).
294 See, e.g., Goodnough, supra note 115 (describing how some homeowners object to the aesthetics of
backyard wind turbines); Bronin, supra note 11, at 570–72 (discussing the political influence of neighbors and
their tendency to resist alternative energy initiatives). Professor Bronin suggests that, together, utility and
homevoter opposition may be insurmountable and that reform at the state level may be most capacious for
fostering microgrid development. See id. at 574–84. We do not disagree that these sources of political
opposition are powerful; we argue, however, that political opposition at the local level may be somewhat
diffused by the possibility of interest convergence and that the costs of overcoming local opposition are largely
offset by the benefits that local governments provide in the form of access for renewables entrepreneurs. In
any event, Professor Bronin’s suggestions for state-level reforms are additional, welcome correctives to the
conventional thinking about energy regulation.
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political opposition at the local level, a public choice analysis might favor
action at the state or federal level instead.295
The discussion thus far reveals few if any general justifications for
claiming that one level of government is a preferable administrator of
environmental policy. The efficiency debate yielded mixed conclusions:
Although decentralized control may efficiently distribute environmental
protection, the risk of a race to the bottom persists and may be heightened
where authority is allocated to local governments rather than states. The
politics debate is similarly murky. Environmental interests may fare better at
the federal level, but the literature on small-group dynamics suggests that they
may also succeed in local government settings. State governments appear to
be the least favorable forum, based on the large influence of carbon-fuel
interests in state government decision making and the organizational
advantages that these industry interests enjoy relative to more diffuse
environmental interests. On the whole, these broad theoretical debates are
unresolved and fail to support any normative claim that there is a clear firstbest level of government to which we should allocate environmental regulatory
(and hence land-energy) authority.296 It appears that each level of government
offers certain benefits and costs, which suggests that the best solution may
involve a combination of governmental institutions wielding land-energy rulemaking authority. We consider additional factors that may point more clearly
to an answer in the next section.
B. Allocating Authority for Distributed Renewables
Our conclusions in the previous section are consistent with the emerging
consensus in the modern environmental regulation and environmental
federalism literatures that, most often, a cooperative interjurisdictional strategy
will be the optimal approach to allocating regulatory authority for distributed

295 See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 267, at 81 (noting the possibility of corrupt over-influence of business
interests in city planning as a possible factor in the growth of urban sprawl); Paul H. Sedway, Commentary,
Plan-Based Administrative Review: A Planning and Zoning Debate, in LAND USE LAW: ISSUES FOR THE 80S, at
95 (Edith Netter ed., 1981) (describing zoning as “corrupt, and usually subject to derision,” as well as
“unfair[,] . . . self-serving[,] . . . [and] poorly administered”). On industry capture of regulatory institutions,
see generally Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667,
1684–88 (1975).
296 See Carlson, supra note 17, at 1107; Revesz, supra note 257, at 578–626; Rodriguez, supra note 229,
at 746–47.
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renewables.297 Cooperative regulatory regimes may capture the benefits of
decentralization while avoiding the theoretical problems—imposing a federal
minimum standard may offset some public choice pathologies and prevent
subnational governments from racing to the bottom.298 A concomitant
delegation of regulatory discretion to state or local governments to experiment
“above the federal floor” can leverage their familiarity with local problems and
resources into tailored standards that avoid the problems of a uniform national
rule.299 This reflects a general trend in current federalism theory toward more
“interactive” or “dynamic” accounts of the relationship and proper allocation
of power between the federal and state governments.300 And it better reflects
the reality of environmental regulatory practice.301 For something as sprawling
and multifaceted as the distributed renewable energy problem, the best strategy
will involve action by multiple levels of government,302 but the optimal mix of
actors may vary from that for other environmental issues. Drawing from the
297 See, e.g., Randall S. Abate, Kyoto or Not, Here We Come: The Promise and Perils of the Piecemeal
Approach to Climate Change Regulation in the United States, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 369 (2006);
Donald A. Brown, Thinking Globally and Acting Locally: The Emergence of Global Environmental Problems
and the Critical Need to Develop Sustainable Development Programs at State and Local Levels in the United
States, 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 175 (1996); Ann E. Carlson, Implementing Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Caps: A Case Study of the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1479 (2008);
Engel, supra note 18; Engel, supra note 250; Alice Kaswan, Climate Change, Consumption, and Cities, 36
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 253 (2009); Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”? Litigation’s Diagonal
Regulatory Role, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 585 (2009); Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Laboratories for Local Solutions for
Global Problems: State, Local, and Private Leadership in Developing Strategies to Mitigate the Causes and
Effects of Climate Change, 12 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 15 (2004); Rodriguez, supra note 229; Richard B.
Stewart, States and Cities as Actors in Global Climate Change Regulation: Unitary vs. Plural Architectures,
50 ARIZ. L. REV. 681 (2008); sources cited supra note 230.
298 Cf. Glicksman, supra note 230 (manuscript at 18–23) (arguing that race to the bottom and collectiveaction problems justify federal “floor” regulation in the related field of climate change adaptation).
299 See supra notes 230–33 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Carlson, supra note 17, at 1102;
Rodriguez, supra note 229, at 757–58.
300 See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, General Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in Legal Systems:
Applications to Climate Change Adaptation Law, 89 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 22–23),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1694187 (noting that “the emerging theory of
dynamic federalism has captured the attention of environmental law scholars . . . . [and] calls for overlapping
federal and state (and through states, local) jurisdictions” and canvassing the “dynamic federalism” literature
(footnote omitted)); Heather Gerken, The Supreme Court 2009 Term Foreword: Federalism All the Way
Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 18–20 (2010) (canvassing the literature on cooperative federalism, which Gerken
calls “federalism all the way down”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States: The Need to Limit Federal
Preemption, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 69 (2005); Engel, supra note 250, at 176; Robert A. Schapiro, Justice Stevens’s
Theory of Interactive Federalism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2133 (2006); Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic
Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1409 (1999).
301 See Carlson, supra note 17, at 1106–07; Engel, supra note 250, at 166.
302 As we observed, every level of government currently engages distributed renewables in some way.
See supra, Part I.C.2.a–c. The problem, we think, is that the current approach lacks coherence and amounts to
a counterproductive patchwork.
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literature on interjurisdictional cooperation and the “microanalysis of
institutions,”303 we discuss in more detail the ideal allocation of land-energy
law-making authority for distributed renewables in this section.
Our analysis departs from the literature in two important ways. First, most
of the cooperative strategies that have been suggested involve federal–state
cooperation and suggest ways to enhance state government decision-making
authority.304 This appears to be an intellectual leftover from the now-defunct
“dual federalism” account of the American governmental structure as
comprising two distinct, sovereign “spheres” of authority, federal and state.305
Many analysts of intergovernmental relations continue to view the federal
structure this way, despite the now nearly complete overlap of state and federal
authority on most subjects.306 We instead emphasize the importance of
federal–local cooperation and argue that state authority regarding land-energy
rules is detrimental to the goal of fostering distributed renewables.
Second, the classic “policy laboratories” argument for empowering
subnational governments typically trumpets the potential for regulatory
pluralism to generate, through trial and error over time, first-best solutions that
may then be imposed uniformly from the national level.307 While we do

303 See Buzbee, supra note 22, at 113; Edward L. Rubin, Commentary, The New Legal Process, the
Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1433–37 (1996).
304 See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 22; Carlson, supra note 17; Engel, supra note 250. While some
commentators explicitly address local governments, see, e.g., Michael Burger, Empowering Local Autonomy
and Encouraging Experimentation in Climate Change Governance: The Case for a Layered Regime, 39
ENVTL. L. REP.: NEWS & ANALYSIS 11,161 (2009), most treat the role of municipalities as less significant than
that of both the federal and state governments.
305 See Gerken, supra note 300, at 11–14 (discussing the “ghost” of the dual-federalism idea of state
“sovereignty” that haunts modern federalism scholarship). For the canonical discussion of “dual federalism”
and its “death” with the Supreme Court’s expansive New Deal-era interpretation of the Commerce Clause,
which entailed the view that national and state regulatory power are largely concurrent (extending dualism, by
contrast, would mean that the state “sphere” had shrunk to nothing), see generally Edward S. Corwin, The
Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950).
306 See Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of State
Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 965–66 (2007). Even those who argue for increased local government power
tend to conflate the state and local governments in debates about federalism. See Clayton P. Gillette, The
Exercise of Trumps by Decentralized Governments, 83 VA. L. REV. 1347, 1351–52 (1997) (arguing that
current scholarship pays insufficient attention to distinctions between state and local governments in
federalism).
307 The “laboratories” argument is traced back to Justice Brandeis’s famous statement that “a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). For arguments that decentralization is justified on the laboratories rationale because
it can eventually lead to better national policy making, see, for example, Robert R. Kuehn, The Limits of
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advance a version of the “laboratories” justification to support empowering
local governments in the distributed renewables field, we advocate regulatory
diversity for certain instrumental reasons other than the possibility of
discovering one “correct” or “optimal” national solution. While we think that
local variation may be beneficial in raising the profile of distributed
renewables issues and sparking debate at the state and national levels,308 we
view diversity primarily as valuable to the goal of fostering broader adoption
of distributed renewables, owing to the variety of different kinds of landenergy rules that will be needed to develop these technologies in different
locations. Allowing local governments to create various regulatory strategies
for the renewables industry to grapple with will also drive innovation in
distributed renewables technology, although wholly unconstrained variation
will be cumbersome and impede progress. Scholars argue that creating a
meaningful role for state and local authority within environmental regulatory
structures may enhance those structures’ capacity to adapt to changing
circumstances309 and to avoid potentially disastrous regulatory failures.310
While we do not discuss these important additional benefits at length, our
suggestion is consistent with, and supported by, these observations as well as
the benefits of local institutional competence, increased opportunity and
motivation for energy entrepreneurship, and the potential for faster
technological innovation.
Our suggestion, then, is that the federal government should first establish
some minimum standard—most likely a simple prohibition on state and local
regulations that impede renewables siting—for fostering the adoption of
distributed renewable energy technologies and should allocate primary

Devolving Enforcement of Federal Environmental Laws, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2373, 2383 (1996), and McKinstry,
supra note 297, at 16.
308 See Gerken, supra note 300, at 10, 17 (noting that local policy-making efforts may “serve as staging
grounds for national debates” as local decisions “feed back into national policymaking” in the integrated
system of regulatory federalism).
309 See Ruhl, supra note 300 (manuscript at 13–26) (discussing the concept of “adaptive capacity”—a
system’s capacity to absorb changed circumstances without collapsing—as applied to legal systems and
deriving principles of regulatory design to foster adaptive capacity; noting that collaborative intergovernmental
climate change regulation is desirable for fostering adaptability).
310 See William W. Buzbee, Climate Change as an Innovation Imperative: Federalism, Institutional
Pluralism and Incentive Effects 10–12 (Emory Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper
Series, Paper No. 10-125, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1694166
(discussing the relatively greater resistance of cooperative intergovernmental regulatory regimes to common
causes of regulatory failure; noting, for example, that “a diffused regulatory environment is akin to a fabric
with many different threads providing strength[; t]o destroy that web of laws would require many successful
political attacks, not just intense federal lobbying or a sympathetic president”).
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authority for implementation and regulation, with substantial discretion, to
local governments.311 Since land-energy regulations enabling the use of
distributed renewable energy may raise business costs in the short term and
may at least appear capable of deterring industrial siting, we contend that a
federal minimum standard is necessary to prevent local governments from
engaging in races to the bottom.312 A federal minimum requirement for
implementing policies designed to promote the adoption of distributed
renewables also should offset the local-level public choice problems that we
have mentioned313 and thereby help to avoid “negative experiments” in which
cities empowered with land-energy rule-making authority respond
disproportionately to anti-renewables interests and stifle the adoption of
distributed renewables.314
In one sense, this is similar to other “federal leadership with subnational
government implementation” regimes that are characteristic of environmental
federalism.315 But there is one crucial difference. To truly empower local
governments to exercise regulatory authority and discretion in the manner that
will be most beneficial, the traditional power of state governments to preempt
local government authority must be eliminated in this regulatory context.
Perhaps paradoxically, then, establishing a stable regime of decentralized local
regulatory authority requires, in addition to a federal minimum standard,
federal preemption of state power to interfere with local decision making. Our
analysis is context dependent; we do not suggest that this form of federal–local
cooperation is optimal in every environmental regulatory context. Our
argument is rooted in the particular dynamics of the regulation of distributed
renewable energy technology. We first explain our reasons for preferring to
lodge primary regulatory authority over distributed renewables with local
rather than state governments and then briefly discuss theoretical and doctrinal
issues concerning the legality of our proposed cooperative regulatory scheme.

311 A recent version of the stalled federal climate change legislation would establish a national renewable
energy portfolio standard that expressly preserves from preemption stricter state renewable energy
requirements. See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §§ 101, 610(i)
(as passed by House, June 26, 2009); Burger, supra note 304, at 11,168 (discussing these provisions). We
would argue for the addition of specific distributed renewables targets, language empowering local
governments to pursue those targets via land-energy rule making, and a similar prohibition on both federal and
state preemption of local efforts.
312 See supra notes 249–52, 270–80, and accompanying text.
313 See supra notes 291–97 and accompanying text.
314 See supra notes 223–27 and accompanying text.
315 See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
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1. Local Institutional Advantages
The nature of environmental problems and the costs associated with their
remediation varies greatly from place to place, and regulatory solutions must
be adapted accordingly.316 As James Krier noted three decades ago in the
context of pollution control, “[A]esthetic costs and materials losses will be
functions of the varying resource endowments, degrees of development, and
human attitudes that exist in different regions. Even health costs . . . vary from
place to place.”317 This variability of local conditions cautions against
uniform, one-size-fits-all programs that are characteristic of federal action,318
and it highlights the important role for state or local governments, whose
greater familiarity with and expertise regarding local conditions can improve
regulation.319
Sensitivity to differing local conditions is particularly important in
strategies to promote the adoption of distributed renewable energy
technologies. Variables including the nature of cities’ primary energy sources,
local climate and weather patterns, the nature of the built environment, zoning
plans, growth plans, population, and local economic conditions are all directly
relevant to the choice of one or more distributed renewable technologies and

316

See James E. Krier, supra note 15, at 326–27; Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal
Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535, 536–37, 547–48 (1997) (highlighting
local variation in the goals and costs of environmental regulation as an independent justification for
decentralized regulatory power).
317 Krier, supra note 15, at 327 (footnote omitted).
318 See Krier, supra note 316, at 327; James E. Krier, On the Topology of Uniform Environmental
Standards in a Federal System—And Why It Matters, 54 MD. L. REV. 1226 (1995); Jonathan H. Adler,
Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 133, 158–60 (2005); Butler
& Macey, supra note 232, at 25.
319 Revesz, of course, argues that devolving regulatory authority to state governments is independently
justifiable, all else equal, because of the variable quality of environmental harms and remediation costs. See
Revesz, supra note 316, at 547–48. In a sense though, as we will argue more fully below, this may simply
replicate the problem if there is sufficient variation in environmental problems and costs at the sub-state level,
which suggests that local government control is preferable over federal or state authority. Biodiversity
protection initiatives, for example, seek to deal with environmental problems that are incredibly local in
character and thus would seem to be best suited to the expertise of local governments. See, e.g., Tarlock,
Biodiversity, supra note 230, at 574–83. Promotion of distributed renewables, in large part because of its
similar linkage to local land law in the form of land-energy rules, may present similar sub-state variation
problems. See generally Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1124 (1996) (championing local governments’ capacity to provide regulatory goods
that “match distinctive local conditions and preferences”); Verchick, supra note 282, at 475 (emphasizing the
local nature of many environmental problems).
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the means of deployment.320 For example, revising local land-energy rules to
enable deployment of small wind turbines requires consideration of a variety of
site-specific conditions, including wind-shadowing; local wind and gust
patterns; size and layout of the surrounding built environment; turbines’ noise
output and neighbors’ tolerance for it; the location of potential obstructions
like utility poles, power lines, and trees; and local aesthetic preferences, among
other things.321 So, too, with considering distributed solar energy technologies:
typical roof sizes, slopes, composition, and load-bearing capacities, along with
shade patterns created by surrounding trees or buildings, local weather
conditions, sizes of yards if panels are to be installed on poles separate from
the main building structure, the availability of porch or garage roofs as
alternative locations, and, again, local aesthetic preferences are all relevant to
deployment decisions.322 Similarly, variable local conditions affect the
deployment and productivity of distributed renewable energy technologies.323
These devices are intended to mesh with residential and commercial buildings
and neighborhoods; by design, they are meant to be adopted by reference to
what is appropriate in the particular circumstances of the location. On the city
or community planning level, differences in wind or shade patterns, the size
and shape of buildings, and aesthetic preferences from neighborhood to
neighborhood or even block to block will require communities to adopt
carefully tailored land-energy rules to promote various different “packages” of
renewable technologies that fit the local conditions. And efforts to integrate
renewable energy technologies into broader “green” or “zero emissions”
320

See JON CREYTS ET AL., MCKINSEY & CO., REDUCING U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: HOW MUCH
WHAT COST? 22, 67–68 (2007), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/en/Client_Service/Sustainability/
Latest_thinking/~/media/McKinsey/dotcom/client_service/Sustainability/PDFs/Reducing US Greenhouse Gas
Emissions/US_ghg_final_report.ashx (emphasizing the substantially different costs of various greenhouse gas
reduction strategies stemming from “regional differences in population growth and/or density, carbon intensity
of local power generation portfolios, energy productivity, climate, availability of renewable energy sources,
forest cover, agricultural orientation, concentration of industrial activities, and other factors”); Kaswan, supra
note 297, at 284–85 (arguing for local government decision-making authority over energy demand reduction
strategies, in part, based on the way that local variation makes proper solutions location specific); Rodriguez,
supra note 229, at 750–51 (arguing that traditional local authority over land use decision making is justified in
part by local governments’ comparatively greater familiarity with local conditions and comparatively greater
capacity to leverage local knowledge in regulatory decision making); Buzbee, supra note 267, at 83 (same).
321 See, e.g., Christopher W. Fry, Comment, Harvesting the Sky: An Analysis of National and
International Wind Power, 19 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 427, 437, 449–50 (2008); Jim Green, Nat’l
Renewable Energy Lab., Installer Issues: Integrating Distributed Wind into Local Communities (June 4–7,
2006) (PowerPoint presentation), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy06osti/40096.pdf.
322 See, e.g., CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, A GUIDE TO PHOTOVOLTAIC (PV) SYSTEM DESIGN AND
INSTALLATION (2001), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/reports/2001-09-04_500-01-020.PDF.
323 See, e.g., Trainer, supra note 87, at 1011–12 (explaining that “performance in the field . . . is some 10–
30% below rated capacity” for some solar panels).
AT
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residential and commercial building projects introduce a host of additional
issues that will vary dramatically with local conditions.324
The familiar idea that empowering subnational governments allows for a
greater influence of state or local preferences in policy and enhances the
democratic responsiveness of the federal system is also relevant here.325 In
federalism scholarship, it is commonly claimed that state governments are
“closer”—that is, more accessible and accountable—to citizens than the
federal government.326 The characteristics of state governments that support
this claim—their smaller electorates, greater transparency and access to elected
officials, and greater opportunities for citizen participation in governance—
suggest that local governments are closest to the people.327 Local “elected
officials tend to be more responsive to voter demands because it is easier . . . to
monitor politicians and it is easier for new politicians to challenge unpopular
incumbents[,] . . . smaller political units allow for more deliberation and
consensus building among members,” and “[p]olitics on a small
scale . . . enables less affluent grassroots organizations to promote their
interests through marches, speeches, and creative forms of activism that would
not work on a national or regional scale.”328 In the distributed renewables area,
this means that yet another argument against primarily federal-level action is
that people in different locations may have different ideas about how much and
what kind of renewable energy they want, and, as far as our broad energy

324 See, e.g., P. TORCELLINI ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., LESSONS LEARNED FROM CASE
STUDIES OF SIX HIGH-PERFORMANCE BUILDINGS, at vii–viii (2006), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/
fy06osti/37542.pdf (emphasizing that “the six commercial buildings we studied [have] a unique purpose and
function, but all have commonalities,” and that whole-building energy efficient design projects are ownerdriven and develop according to owner design preferences, many of which “are not motivated by cost”);
Buildings Research: Residential Building Design and Performance, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB.,
http://www.nrel.gov/buildings/res_building_design.html (last updated Oct. 3, 2010) (noting that energyefficient building design packages must be designed “for specific savings levels in various climate zones,” and
that relevant considerations include “energy savings, but also . . . non-energy issues important to builders, such
as cost, code issues, occupant comfort, and marketability of energy features”).
325 See generally Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 53–58
(2004).
326 See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM 91–92 (1995) (“[T]o the extent the electorate is small, and
elected representatives are thus more immediately accountable to individuals and their concerns, government
is brought closer to the people, and democratic ideals are more fully realized.”); Young, supra note 325, at 58–
59.
327 Shapiro’s arguments, for example, are not limited to state governments in particular. See SHAPIRO,
supra note 326, at 91–92.
328 Verchick, supra note 282, at 475–76; see also Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State
Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1988).
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transition goals and the need to encourage citizens to do their part will allow,
we should do what we can to honor those preferences.329
Local governments may also have unique expertise in the renewables area,
particularly at the deployment stage. Typically cited institutional advantages
of federal administrative agencies include economies of scale in regulation and
federal regulators’ access to high-quality information, which allows for rapid
accumulation of expertise, relevant research, and informed decision making.330
Federal agencies have been and remain essential authorities with respect to
development-stage technological issues; the National Renewable Energy
Laboratory (NREL) in particular has been instrumental in producing cuttingedge renewable technologies.331 But when distributed renewable devices are
actually installed, the substantial variance in local conditions must generally
drive deployment-stage regulatory strategy. Federal agencies thus seem to lose
the institutional advantage at deployment stage.332 Local governments have
long held primary land use rule-making authority, and their expertise in that
field is directly relevant to the modification of land-energy rules to foster
distributed renewables.333 And cities are rapidly building relevant technical
and regulatory expertise in dealing with varied local conditions through
participation in cooperative initiatives like the U.S. Mayor’s Climate
Protection Agreement, in which over 350 cities have agreed to pursue
greenhouse gas reduction goals.334 “The number of communities involved
promises a diversity of strategies and a steep learning curve as communities
learn from one another what works, and what doesn’t work.”335
Internationally, approximately 850 cities cooperate to achieve climate goals

329 See Carlson, supra note 17, at 1106; Kaswan, supra note 297, at 285; Krier, supra note 15, at 327–28;
Revesz, supra note 316, at 547–48.
330 See Carlson, supra note 17, at 1104; Esty, supra note 232, at 573.
331 See generally NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., FY 2009 ANNUAL REPORT: A YEAR OF ENERGY
TRANSFORMATION (2009), available at http://www.nrel.gov/about/pdfs/annual_report_fy09_45629.pdf
(describing technological advances made in 2009).
332 Federal support is still imperative to the deployment of renewable technology. Once again, the NREL
is currently a pivotal actor here. See Applying Technologies, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., http://www.
nrel.gov/applying_technologies (last updated Nov. 15, 2010) (explaining the laboratory’s “clean energy
technology deployment projects”).
333 See Alexandra B. Klass, Property Rights on the New Frontier: Climate Change, Natural Resource
Development, and Renewable Energy, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 10–23), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1690564 (surveying the historical relationship between
resources and property rights, and emphasizing the key role of local property law in the development of a
sustainable energy infrastructure); supra notes 289–97 and accompanying text.
334 See BAILEY, supra note 20, at 4.
335 See id.
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and share information through the Large Cities Climate Leadership Group and
the Cities for Climate Protection Campaign.336 With respect to expertise,
capacity to generate expertise, and knowledge of conditions relevant to
regulatory strategies, then, local governments possess important resources that
federal institutions lack.
To the extent that state governments generally possess advantages in
administrative capacity relative to local governments, local government
competence on the specific local issues relating to deploying distributed
renewables nevertheless makes municipal control the superior choice. State
governments are “closer” to the facts on the ground than the federal
government, to be sure, and they will have greater familiarity with some of the
geographic, economic, social, and political particularities of their polities. But
state government initiatives by nature answer to statewide preferences and thus
often will reflect compromises among geographically dispersed local interests.
The “scale” or “matching” problem associated with federal control exists for
state governments, too, and cuts against their institutional suitability to address
local land-energy decisions.337 Local governments appear to possess the most
relevant experience, likely will incur the lowest costs in accessing relevant
information and gaining needed expertise, and are generally the bestpositioned institutions to exercise the primary regulatory role in distributed
renewables promotion.338
2. Local Political and Technological Dynamics
There are two additional reasons to prefer local government authority rather
than state or federal control in the distributed renewables context. First, local
governments provide the best political forum for critical energy entrepreneurs
to successfully express their interests and secure regulation consistent with
their distributed renewables goals. Large energy interests that tend to oppose

336 See Michele M. Betsill & Harriet Bulkeley, Cities and the Multilevel Governance of Global Climate
Change, 12 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 141 (2006); C40 CITIES CLIMATE LEADERSHIP GRP., http://www.c40cities.
org (last visited May 1, 2011) (“C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group” is an alternate name for the Large
Cities Climate Leadership Group); Climate, ICLEI–LOCAL GOV’TS FOR SUSTAINABILITY, http://www.iclei.org/
index.php?id=800 (last visited May 1, 2011).
337 The “matching” principle is the idea that comparative institutional analysis and suggestions for
allocating regulatory authority should attempt to “match” the level of government with the relative “size” of
the regulatory subject. See generally Butler & Macey, supra note 232.
338 See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, EVALUATING PROGRESS OF THE U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE
PROGRAM 5 (2007) (“Information at regional and local scales is most relevant for state and local resource
managers and policy makers, as well as for the general population . . . .”).
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renewables for fear of competition will invest less in lobbying efforts at the
local government level. Second, the great degree of variation that we expect to
see from discretionary local decision making about land-energy rules and
distributed renewables will, we think, stimulate innovation in renewable
energy technologies, expanding their applicability and furthering the goal of
increased adoption—provided, of course, that local rules are not so diverse as
to impede the economies of scale offered by uniform technology production or
to make installation economically infeasible.
a. Entrepreneurs
A general concern about implementation of distributed renewables
programs—regardless of the level of government to which the task is
assigned—is the need to overcome individuals’ initial hesitation, fear, and
resistance and motivate them to make the investments in time, money, and
lifestyle changes that are required to integrate distributed renewables into
everyday life.339 We have said that overcoming these barriers of individuals’
unwillingness to embrace renewable technologies requires the intervention of
“energy entrepreneurs.”340 Rembrandt Peale overcame individual fears about
gas lighting first at the level of Baltimore’s city government; consumers of air
conditioning similarly initiated technological deployment that sparked
widespread adoption at the local government level.341 So too, local
government action paved the way for the transition from local to centralized
electricity production.342 These changes in individual preferences in response
to the actions of motivated energy entrepreneurs resemble social
movements,343 and the technical literature on social movements both

339 See WILLIAM ANDREEN ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND
CLIMATE
CHANGE
11
(2008),
available
at
http://www.progressiveregulation.org/articles/
federalismClimateChange.pdf (arguing that the question of allocating implementing authority for climate
change remediation initiatives generally must determine which institutions are “better suited to motivate the
lifestyle changes among their citizens that will prove essential to an effective climate change policy over the
long run”); Nicholas Lutsey & Daniel Sperling, America’s Bottom-Up Climate Change Mitigation Policy, 36
ENERGY POL’Y 673, 674 (2008) (effective climate change mitigation requires “local commitment, down to
individuals, to accomplish the type of economic and societal transformations that will be necessary to achieve
very large reductions in carbon”); supra notes 112–17, 136–44, and accompanying text.
340 See supra Part I.C.1.
341 See supra notes 127–37, 143–50, and accompanying text.
342 See supra notes 150–59 and accompanying text.
343 See Glenn R. Carroll, Long-term Evolutionary Change in Organizational Populations: Theory,
Models, and Empirical Findings from Industrial Demography, 6 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 119 (1997);
Michael V. Russo, The Emergence of Sustainable Industries: Building on Natural Capital, 24 STRATEGIC
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substantiates the dynamic represented by our historical anecdotes and provides
a causal account.344 Here again, theory suggests that local governments should
possess primary authority to make land-energy rules that promote distributed
renewables. The characteristics of local governments make them particularly
likely forums for energy pioneers—this time installing wind turbines and solar
panels rather than gas lamps—to achieve critical early successes.345
Legal rules and structures can be designed to facilitate the formation,
growth, and success of movements primarily by providing opportunities for
access and the chance to secure the critical initial policy “deliverables” that can
spark widespread acceptance.346 The building of organizational resources
proceeds incrementally, and entrepreneurs are required to get organizations off
the ground initially347: “A policy entrepreneur needs some sort of
organizational structure to solicit funds or obtain voluntary efforts. . . . But the
more money and funds and effort she obtains, the greater her ability to solicit
further money and effort.”348 Resources need not flow solely from members of
the organization, though
the interactive nature of government in the United States . . . provides
innumerable opportunities for organized groups to influence
elections, lobby elected officials between elections, and lobby
appointed officials. Any impact upon elections or public decision

MGMT. J. 317, 318 (2002) (noting that the “strong social and institutional elements to the push toward
greening” result in “green” industries beginning to look “like social movements”).
344 See generally OLSON, GROUPS, supra note 262; DONATELLA DELLA PORTA & MARIO DIANI, SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS (2d ed. 2006); Bert Klandermans, The Formation and Mobilization of Consensus, in 1
INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENT RESEARCH: FROM STRUCTURE TO ACTION 173 (Bert Klandermans et al.
eds., 1988); John D. McCarthy & Mark Wolfson, Consensus Movements, Conflict Movements, and the
Cooptation of Civic and State Infrastructures, in FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 273 (Aldon D.
Morris & Carol McClurg Mueller eds., 1992); John D. McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald, The Trend of Social
Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AN
ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY 337, 377–79 (Mayer N. Zald & John D. McCarthy eds., 1987); Edward L. Rubin,
Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 29
(2001).
345 Cf. Gerken, supra note 300, at 17 (“[P]olitical entrepreneurs . . . routinely use local sites as staging
grounds for national debates.”) (citing Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent
Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006)).
346 See John D. McCarthy et al., The Institutional Channeling of Social Movements by the State in the
United States, in 13 RESEARCH IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, CONFLICTS AND CHANGE 45 (Louis Kriesberg &
Metta Spencer eds., 1991); Rubin, supra note 344, at 30.
347 Jose Goldemberg et al., Energy for the New Millennium, 30 AMBIO 330, 336 (2001) (stressing the
importance of energy entrepreneurs); Klandermans, supra note 344, at 184; McCarthy & Zald, supra note 344,
at 22; Rubin, supra note 344, at 28.
348 Rubin, supra note 344, at 29 (footnote omitted).
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making becomes a “deliverable” that policy entrepreneurs can use to
349
increase the number of commitment level of their membership.

Local governments are the forum in which the transaction costs entrepreneurs
have to pay for political entry are lowest—both because the campaigns are
smaller in scale and because the institutions already possess land-energy rulemaking authority, allowing for direct changes to promote distributed
renewables. And the theory of group dynamics suggests that small-scale
organization and action are more conducive to member cohesiveness,
dedication, and group longevity, all of which are critical to success.350
The flexibility of local governments’ internal institutional structures also
enhances opportunities for access by renewables pioneers and their supporters.
Public and private interests cooperate on an ad hoc basis at the local
government level and partner in more permanent advisory bodies within local
governments.351 Such cooperative local government structures have been used
to “bring public and private interests together to consider pollution-control or
land-management decisions made pursuant to statutory or regulatory law.”352
These characteristics of local governments—which make them particularly
conducive to the influence of newly formed, local social movements and
political groups with local goals—provide the tools that energy entrepreneurs
need to overcome both the problems of deficient public understanding of
renewable energy technology and the public choice worries that flow from the
Local governments’
adverse political interests at the local level.353
endorsement of renewables may help overcome individuals’ worries about and
distrust of new energy technologies by adding a “stamp of approval” that
And emerging renewable energy businesses, through
people trust.354
cooperation with local governments, may gain access to resources and

349 Id. at 30; see also Russo, supra note 343, at 328–29 (noting the importance of conducive government
institutional environments to the development of renewable energy and other “green” industries).
350 See supra notes 264–71 and accompanying text.
351 See Verchick, supra note 282, at 476; infra notes 354–61 and accompanying text.
352 Verchick, supra note 282, at 476.
353 See supra notes 291–97 and accompanying text.
354 MERRIAN C. FULLER ET AL., RENEWABLE & APPROPRIATE ENERGY LAB., UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY,
GUIDE TO ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY FINANCING DISTRICTS FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 7
(2009), available at http://erg.berkeley.edu/news/2009news/FullerKunkelKammen-MunicipalEnergyFinancing
2009.pdf (“Local governments are an objective source of information, providing tools and resources to enable
residents and businesses to take action. For example, local governments can offer a single source of
information on how to get started with clean energy upgrades, and many local governments provide
educational workshops about the options available to their constituents.”).
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information about local conditions and preferences that could prove essential
to their economic success.355
An example of a cooperative structure in which local government and
renewable energy businesses partner to share local information and to plan for
renewables deployment is found in Sebastopol, California. The “Solar
Sebastopol” program is “a co-operative agreement between the city, private
photovoltaic . . . vendors, the energy technology program at Sonoma State
University, and individual citizens” that “provides a database of rooftops in
Sebastopol that are good candidates for PV installation and free appraisal by
the PV companies.”356 Larger cities also have implemented cooperative
renewable energy advisory and deployment structures. Chicago’s Green
Ribbon Committee, for example, advises the city on progress under its Climate
Action Plan, which includes a substantial renewable energy installation
component and involves representatives of a variety of business and
community interests.357 Local government experiments with Energy Financing
Districts (EFDs)—like those that have been initiated in Berkeley and Palm
Desert, California; Boulder, Colorado; and Babylon, New York—are another
kind of example of local cooperation in the renewables field.358 EFDs
appropriate extant local institutional processes to fund renewables—they “tap
into existing mechanisms that local governments are already familiar with,
such as special tax districts or assessment districts . . . to support clean energy
projects.”359 This approach leverages local familiarity with and control over
land use rules to foster renewable adoption while maximizing individual
choice. For example, city financing for a renewable device may be “repaid

355 See Russo, supra note 343, at 320–21 (emphasizing the importance of “site-specific” information
about relevant “natural capital,” like wind patterns, shade patterns, etc., to the viability of newly formed
renewable energy concerns).
356 Jennifer Bresee & David Room, Powering Down America: Local Government’s Role in the Transition
to a Post-Petroleum World, ENERGY BULL. (Oct. 20, 2005), available at http://www.energybulletin.net/node/
9999; see also SOLAR SEBASTOPOL, http://www.solarsebastopol.com (last visited May 1, 2011). The program
was successful enough to receive a grant funding its expansion to a countywide effort. See Solar News: Solar
Sebastopol Wins Grant to Expand Countrywide, SOLAR SEBASTOPOL, http://www.solarsebastopol.com/
news.html (last visited May 1, 2011).
357 See Clean & Renewable Energy Sources, CHI. CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, http://www.
chicagoclimateaction.org/pages/renewable_energy_sources/13.php (last visited May 1, 2011); Green Ribbon
Committee, CHI. CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, http://www.chicagoclimateaction.org/pages/partners__green_ribbon_
commitee/60.php (last visited May 1, 2011); supra note 208 and accompanying text.
358 See generally FULLER ET AL., supra note 354, at 16–18 (describing the Berkeley Financing Initiative
for Renewable and Solar Technology; the Palm Desert Energy Independence Program; Boulder’s
ClimateSmart Loan Program; and Babylon’s Long Island Green Homes Program).
359 Id. at 6.
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over a set number of years through a ‘special tax’ or ‘assessment’ on the
property tax bill of only those property owners who choose to participate in the
program” with “little or no up-front cost to the property owner.”360
A system of regulatory authority that promotes site-specific, locally chosen
distributed renewable energy technologies seems likely to maximize energy
entrepreneurs’ access to social capital, which only enhances the odds that the
technologies that they advocate will be adopted. Local interpersonal
communication networks—social groups, neighborhoods, community
organizations, and the like—have their own internal norms that encourage
uniformity in certain kinds of member behavior. Accumulating social capital
by accessing these networks is recognized as an important strategy for
innovative sustainable businesses.361 Individuals who are satisfied by locationspecific technical solutions will share information about their success with new
technologies through these informal communication networks, helping
overcome consumers’ uncertainties and motivate broader adoption.362 And, in
many cases, interpersonal norms operating in these networks will encourage
adoption even by those who remain skeptical about new devices by punishing
outliers in various ways.363
Since local government discretion seems to be the interjurisdictional
allocation strategy most likely to foster location-specific renewable
technology, it also likely will enhance energy entrepreneurs’ chances of
gaining currency with important local networks of interpersonal influence.
Opportunities to match energy technologies and policies with the preferences
of individuals and communities through local government processes will
increase renewable energy advocates’ chances to find political and economic
common ground with developers and landowners—groups traditionally
opposed to progressive changes in land-energy rules.364 They, too, must
answer to local preferences, and the potential payoff from “greening”

360

Id.
See Russo, supra note 343, at 321–22.
362 Id.
363 See DEBIKA SHOME & SABINE MARX, CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON ENVTL. DECISIONS, THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF CLIMATE CHANGE COMMUNICATION 30–32 (2009), available at http://www.cred.columbia.edu/guide/pdfs/
CREDguide_low-res.pdf (advising climate change advocates to tie sustainability goals to individuals’ group
affiliations because “[g]roup affiliation can activate social goals (i.e., concern for others, maximizing the good
of the group),” and “[p]articipating in a group allows group norms to exert a stronger influence on
individuals”); Jason F. Shogren, Micromotives in Global Environmental Policy, INTERFACES, Sept.–Oct. 2002,
at 47, 53.
364 See supra notes 293–99 and accompanying text.
361
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businesses, homes, and commercial buildings in a manner that fits with
community values may bring these powerful local interests into the renewables
camp, or at least dilute their opposition.365
b. Innovation
Alongside the actions of energy entrepreneurs, a second important
mechanism to promote renewable adoption is to foster innovation in
distributed renewables technology. The basic reason is clear: Widespread
adoption of these technologies requires that they be modified to function under
different sets of local conditions. Making local governments the primary
regulators will increase the number of different sets of regulatory environments
to which renewable technologies will need to adapt in order to capture market
share and will naturally promote this sort of low-level, “learn by doing”
innovation. In the state context, scholars have similarly noted that innovation
in energy technology may be enhanced by decentralizing regulatory power
over energy to the state governments:
State programs can generate a diversity of approaches by virtue of
their multiplicity and differing mixes of socioeconomic,
environmental, and political factors. For example, within the field of
renewable energy, some states require that solar power constitute a
specific share of an electricity provider’s portfolio, while others
366
emphasize wind or geothermal resources.

The local level, of course, promises even greater diversity. A variety of
regulatory packages creates a variety of geographic “clusters” in which
renewable technologies must be deployed. This enhances the likelihood of
innovation because “technological change occurs most readily at small
geographic scales,”367 and, more importantly:

365
Some call this the “Baptists and Bootleggers” dynamic: where public interests converge with business
interests, not substantively, but because a public-spirited policy proposal presents local business with the
chance to disadvantage the competition. See Revesz, supra note 257, at 577–78; Jonathan B. Wiener, Think
Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1966 (2007).
Renewable energy entrepreneurs may ally themselves with industry groups that want to take advantage of state
or local subsidies for renewables installation, green building programs, or the increasing competitive
advantages that flow from consumer perception that a business is “green.” Palm Desert’s EFD program, for
example, is jointly funded by the city, the Southern California Gas Company, and Southern California Edison.
FULLER ET AL., supra note 354, at 16; see also Burger, supra note 304, at 11,164–66 (discussing the increasing
significance of “green” branding for businesses).
366 Adelman & Engel, supra note 230, at 851.
367 Id. at 852.
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[I]nnovation is enhanced in geographic clusters (e.g. the Silicon
Valley phenomenon) because spatial concentrations allow inventors
to access knowledge externalities that reduce the costs of research,
development, and commercialization.
These externalities are
dominated by “tacit knowledge,” which is “vague, difficult to codify
and often only serendipitously recognized,” and thus by definition
cannot be formalized or written down. These characteristics . . . limit
the spread of tacit knowledge to the kinds of frequent face-to-face
368
interactions that occur most efficiently in small geographic areas.

In short, technological innovation will be enhanced by a regulatory allocation
scheme that enables the kinds of small-group dynamics and informal
communication networks that we have argued are best accommodated in local
government settings.369
The reasons for favoring state over federal authority with respect to
spurring innovation suggest that local authority, which adds thousands of
additional variations in policy to the landscape and requires renewable energy
firms to adapt their technologies to local conditions, would be better still.370
Economists have found that, in general, “diversity across complementary
economic activities sharing a common science base is more conducive to
innovation than is specialization.”371 Furthermore, it is recognized that
“adoption (or diffusion) of existing technologies,” even without increased
investment in research and development, can “produce innovation through
‘learning by doing’ as experience is gained with the use and production of a
technology.”372 Government policies that engage the renewables industry
cooperatively, toward the end of facilitating community acceptance of new
technologies, can provide location-specific information to guide this sort of
innovation.373 To the extent that such innovation will expand the range of
possible applications for existing technologies and drive down costs, this factor
may further reduce consumer uncertainty and facilitate broad adoption.374 And
368
Id. (quoting David B. Audretsch & Maryann P. Feldman, Knowledge Spillovers and the Geography of
Innovation, in 4 HANDBOOK OF REGIONAL AND URBAN ECONOMICS 2713, 2718 (Handbooks in Econ., Vol. 7,
J. Vernon Henderson & Jacques-François Thisse eds., 2004)).
369 See supra notes 316–31, 339–65, and accompanying text.
370 See supra notes 318–28 and accompanying text.
371 Audretsch & Feldman, supra note 368, at 2726.
372 Adelman & Engel, supra note 230, at 847 (citing Richard G. Newell et al., The Effects of Economic
and Policy Incentives on Carbon Mitigation Technologies, 28 ENERGY ECON. 563, 564–66 (2006)).
373 See Russo, supra note 343, at 321.
374 Increasing the applicability of distributed renewable devices under different conditions—along with
overcoming consumers’ “lack of information about costs and benefits” and “high implicit consumer discount
rates (potential benefits tend to be strongly discounted by individuals who have to invest time and money up
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decreasing costs, of course, stimulates demand. If this sort of innovation
dynamic is desirable, as we think it is, then local government authority seems
optimal.375
3. Local–State Dynamics
The argument for empowering local governments to inspire innovation and
support pioneers in the distributed renewables field requires a consideration of
the states, to which all local governments are ultimately accountable. The
politics of climate change regulation are a useful place to start, as they have
inverted the usual situation in environmental regulation. Rather than federal
leadership to initiate state implementation, the federal government has
notoriously refused to lead on climate change.376 Instead, in the shadow of
federal refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol377 and subsequent inaction, state
governments have been the primary sources of regulation aimed at mitigating
the causes and effects of climate change.378 These are important proactive
efforts, but our concerns about state implementation and our preference for
local authority in the distributed renewables context flow from potential public
choice problems at the state level; these public choice concerns arise in part
from observing the ongoing, intense efforts of carbon fuel, private utility, and
business interests to influence state policy making, which might undermine
optimal implementation.379 Regulatory scaling issues that arise from state
governments’ relative insensitivity to the local considerations involved in the
promotion of distributed renewables also contribute to our preference for local
authority over land-energy rules.380
Currently, many states have chosen to adopt policies that empower local
governments to experiment with a variety of different approaches to increase
front in order to realize long-term savings),” will eventually drive down real costs of these devices.
Goldemberg et al., supra note 347, at 336; see also supra notes 109–13, 136–44, and accompanying text. See
generally Shogren, supra note 363 (discussing the economic considerations affecting individuals’ decisionmaking processes regarding climate change).
375 See Goldemberg et al., supra note 347, at 336 (“Strong government-private sector collaboration has
been a key feature of many successful market development programs” for energy technology.); Verchick,
supra note 282, at 476; supra notes 347–53 and accompanying text.
376 Engel, supra note 18, at 1021.
377 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 18.
378 ANDREEN ET AL., supra note 339, at 3–4; Engel, supra note 18, at 1015–16.
379 See Heiman & Solomon, supra note 6, at 105–08 (describing private utilities’ successful attempts to
influence state legislatures to prevent the establishment of local public utilities); supra notes 270–89 and
accompanying text.
380 See supra notes 330–40 and accompanying text.
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the use of renewable energy. But they need not adopt such policies, and they
may change course in the future.381 State-level efforts like the New York,
California, and Illinois incentive programs that complement local efforts and
empower local governments through subsidies and other programs are
laudable.382 Existing statewide programs, however, present problems of scale
and generally are not designed to foster distributed renewables in particular.383
State renewable portfolio standards represent significant steps toward
reforming the energy infrastructure but aim mainly to change the sources of
power that large-scale utilities send to consumers over centralized grids.384
Consumer-generated renewable power sold back to utilities may count toward
the requirement, but distributed generation currently is insufficient to provide
utilities with all of the power that they need to comply.385 That, and the
tendency for utilities and other influential interests to prefer centralized over
distributed generation, make it likely that state RPS programs will drive
growth in large scale renewable “farms” that can satisfy utilities’ power
requirements soon, and in large chunks.386 This is an important step, but it
does not directly aid the cause of distributed renewables, which we argue are a
necessary component of a move toward a more sustainable energy future.

381 See supra notes 184–207 and accompanying text (describing state distributed renewables/climate
change efforts).
382 See supra notes 184–88 and accompanying text.
383 See supra notes 184–207, 330–40, and accompanying text.
384 See ELIZABETH DORIS ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., STATE OF THE STATES 2009:
RENEWABLE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AND THE ROLE OF POLICY 92 (2009), available at http://www.nrel.gov/
docs/fy10osti/46667.pdf (“RPS[] policies require utilities to own or acquire renewable energy or renewable
energy certificates to account for a certain percentage of their retail electricity sales, or a certain amount of
generating capacity[—that is, they must make renewable sources part of the sources of electricity they send out
to their consumers over the grid—]within a specified timeframe.”).
385 See supra text accompanying note 60 (showing that renewables as a whole—including renewable
farms—currently make up less than one percent of U.S. energy production); supra text accompanying notes
100–03 (describing how more than thirty states require from eight percent to more than thirty percent of
electricity come from renewable sources).
386 See, e.g., ERIC WANLESS ET AL., NAT’L RES. DEF. COUNCIL, A GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY: CALIFORNIA’S
SOLUTION FOR GLOBAL WARMING 9 (2007), available at http://www.nrdc.org/globalwarming/ca/ca.pdf
(“California’s Renewable Portfolio Standard has helped to grow the market for and interest in large-scale wind
farms.”); Douglas A. Codiga, Hawaii Clean Energy Law and Policy, HAW. B.J., Sept. 2009, at 4, 6 (describing
an agreement between the state government and utility companies seeking to, among other things, “integrate
up to 400 MW of wind power into the Oahu electrical system from one or more wind farms on Lanai or
Molokai and transmitted to Oahu via an undersea cable system”). On utilities’ propensity to favor “large,
centralized plants” over “small, decentralized units,” see Benjamin K. Sovacool, Distributed Generation (DG)
and the American Electric Utility System: What Is Stopping It?, 130 J. ENERGY RESOURCES TECH. 012001-1,
012001-6 (2008).
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To maximize the degree of location-specific variation that is so important
to distributed renewables, future state actions that would diminish local
discretion or, worse, contravene local decisions about distributed renewables in
State
favor of uniform state-level solutions should be precluded.387
governments have a somewhat sordid history when it comes to allowing local
policy preferences to stand over time. In the field of environmental regulation,
states have repeatedly legislated out statewide policies that preempt more
environmentally protective local rules.388 Examples include the Massachusetts
Pesticide Control Act’s preemption of stricter local pesticide restrictions;389 the
California Water Equipment and Control Act’s preemption of stricter local
restrictions on the use of water-softening devices that increase the salinity of
wastewater;390 and multiple states’ preemption of local hazardous waste rules
Even ignoring
that are more restrictive than statewide standards.391
preemption, seemingly progressive energy policies initiated at the state level
nevertheless may end up being counterproductive if they generate strong local
opposition based on their failure to account for local concerns.392 These
factors also bolster our worry that existing state-granted local autonomy in the
renewable energy area may be withdrawn, making the implementation regime
unstable.393
The possibility of preemptive state action makes local authority contingent
and, ultimately, subordinate to state-level political dynamics. Such instability
387

See Paul S. Weiland, Preemption of Local Efforts to Protect the Environment: Implications for Local
Government Officials, 18 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 467, 497–98 (1999) (“[T]he arguments made in favor of state action
to protect the environment may extend to local governments. Thousands of local government entities may
adopt alternative and innovative policies to address environmental challenges and problems. To the extent that
local government efforts are preempted, innovation is stifled.” (footnote omitted)).
388 See id. at 488–96 (discussing examples).
389 See Town of Wendell v. Attorney Gen., 476 N.E.2d 585, 592 (Mass. 1985).
390 See Water Quality Ass’n v. City of Escondido, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 878, 886–87 (Ct. App. 1997); Water
Quality Ass’n v. Cnty. of Santa Barbara, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 194 (Ct. App. 1996).
391 See Envirosafe Servs. of Idaho, Inc. v. Cnty. of Owyhee, 735 P.2d 998 (Idaho 1987); Twp. of Cascade
v. Cascade Res. Recovery, Inc., 325 N.W.2d 500 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Stablex Corp. v. Town of Hooksett,
456 A.2d 94 (N.H. 1982); Rollins Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Twp. of Logan, 508 A.2d 271 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1986).
392 Local resistance to transmission required for the Texas wind power initiative is one case in point. See,
e.g., Initial Brief of Tom and Melissa Duren at 2, No. 37464 (Mass. State Office of Admin. Hearings Jan. 26,
2010), available at http://interchange.puc.state.tx.us/WebApp/Interchange/Documents/37464_730_640083.
PDF (challenging the “preferred route” designated for the transmission line because it would run 288 feet from
the residents’ “dream home”). Local resistance to state implementation of a uniform, streamlined zoning
process for wind energy facilities in Massachusetts is another. See, e.g., Peter Murkett, Op-Ed., A Sacrifice
Worth Making, BOS. GLOBE, July 13, 2009, at A11 (writing in support of wind turbines in the Berkshires);
Eleanor Tillinghast, Op-Ed., Turbines Are a Costly Blight, BOS. GLOBE, July 13, 2009, at A11.
393 See supra notes 315–84 and accompanying text.
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is detrimental to the goal of fostering truly local regulatory experimentation,
and potential state preemption of local distributed renewables regulation and
renewables-related land-energy rule making is thus undesirable. Therefore, a
federal effort to empower local government regulation of distributed
renewables is important, and federal displacement of state government
authority to diminish local government autonomy in this area is also needed.
We briefly address legal objections to this approach in the next subsection.
4. The Permissibility of a Federal–Local Approach
Regardless of the interjurisdictional strategy for distributed renewables
suggested by careful comparative institutional analysis, there remains the
question of legal permissibility. A program of local control over land-energy
regulations, bolstered by a minimum federal standard, would fall squarely
within Congress’s affirmative legislative powers under the modern, expansive
interpretation of the Commerce Clause. The question is whether any
independent constitutional impediments remain. Perhaps the most obvious
objection to proposals for direct federal–local cooperation of the kind we
suggest for distributed renewables—including federal action to displace
counterproductive state government assertions of control over local
governments—is an objection based on constitutional federalism requirements.
The last twenty years have seen the Supreme Court’s “federalist revival”
reestablish aggressive judicial protections for state government prerogatives in
a variety of contexts.394 These decisions have reinvigorated the idea that the
Constitution secures to state governments a characteristic of “sovereignty” or
“autonomy” that serves as an external limitation on the powers of the federal
government.395 That is, they suggest a broad norm that courts should
invalidate federal legislation, even if it is clearly permissible under one of
Congress’s enumerated powers, if it overly diminishes state government

394 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,
47 (1996); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 549 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149
(1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 456 (1991). The term “federalist revival” was coined by Vicki
Jackson. See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 2180, 2213 (1998). For detailed discussions of these decisions, see generally Young, supra note 280,
and Young, supra note 325.
395 See Young, supra note 325, at 23 (emphasizing that the federalist revival decisions “have opted for
federalism doctrines that aggressively protect state sovereignty”).
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prerogatives.396 And there are cases suggesting that states’ control over their
internal governmental structures, including control over the existence and
authority of local governments, is one aspect of state sovereignty that the
federalist revival seeks to protect.397 Thus, the federalism objection appears
front and center: Constitutional federalism norms demand that state
governments retain authority to either permit local governments to exercise
discretion or to impose uniform statewide standards that preempt local rules.
Federal action displacing any aspect of this “traditional” state power, on this
view, would be an unconstitutional invasion of state “autonomy” or
“sovereignty.”398
For our purposes, a few brief observations suffice to dispel most of the
force of this objection. First, as others have ably argued, state sovereignty is
not as clear a concept as it might seem.399 The Court’s own doctrine is far
396 Professor Gerken argues that federalism scholars, who tend to discuss state “autonomy” and criticize
the Court’s continuing focus on state “sovereignty,” nevertheless continue to make arguments that depend on a
protected zone of state policy-making freedom that amounts to something very similar to “sovereignty.”
Gerken, supra note 300, at 12–13.
397 See Davidson, supra note 306, at 984–90 (giving examples). Davidson suggests that judicial
affirmations of state power over local governments typically come in the form of “intimat[ions] that internal
political ordering is a fundamental attribute of state sovereignty.” Id. at 986; see also, e.g., Nixon v. Mo. Mun.
League, 541 U.S. 125, 140 (2004) (invoking the “working assumption that federal legislation threatening to
trench on the States’ arrangements for conducting their own governments should be treated with great
skepticism, and read in a way that preserves a State’s chosen disposition of its own power, in the absence of
the plain statement Gregory requires”); Alden, 527 U.S. at 749 (denying federal power to “turn the State
against itself and ultimately to commandeer the entire political machinery of the State against its will”);
Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460 (“Through the structure of its government, and the character of those who exercise
government authority, a State defines itself as a sovereign.”). State control over local governments
traditionally has been regarded as plenary. See, e.g., Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907)
(“The number, nature and duration of the powers conferred upon [municipal governments] and the territory
over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the State.”); Davidson, supra note 306, at
976–84 (discussing the traditional conception of localities as “powerless,” lacking meaningful constitutional
status, and subject to “plenary” state authority). For an introduction to the literature on local government
“powerlessness,” see generally Richard Briffault, Our Localism (pts. 1 & 2), 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 346
(1990), and Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980).
398 Davidson, supra note 306, at 1018 (“It is true that states are generally the primary institution in our
federal system charged with overseeing local governments.”). On federalism-based objections to federal
preemption, see generally Garrick B. Pursley, Preemption in Congress, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 511 (2010); Young,
supra note 325, at 52, 63; Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349,
1369–70 (2001).
399 See generally Gerken, supra note 300, at 13; Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the
Court’s “Unsteady Path”: A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447 (1995);
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Listening to the “Sounds of Sovereignty” but Missing the Beat: Does the New
Federalism Really Matter?, 32 IND. L. REV. 11 (1998); Calvin Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court,
53 HASTINGS L.J. 431 (2002); Todd E. Pettys, Competing for the People’s Affection: Federalism’s Forgotten
Marketplace, 56 VAND. L. REV. 329 (2003).
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from settled or uniform with respect to the permissibility of federal
interference with states’ internal political ordering—the Court has upheld, after
all, Congress’s application of federal wage and hour requirements400 and the
federal Family and Medical Leave Act to state government employees.401
More specifically, as Nestor Davidson observes, it is unclear whether
constitutionally enshrined state sovereignty precludes direct federal–local
cooperation even over state government resistance.402 Federal courts have in
fact upheld federal legislation that empowers local governments to take actions
that state governments might wish to prohibit.403 Indeed, the Court in Nixon v.
Missouri Municipal League, even while articulating a strong presumption
against federal derogation of state control over local governments, allowed that
such action might be permissible if Congress made its intentions plain in
statutory text.404
Accordingly, federal empowerment of and cooperation with local
governments does not seem straightforwardly unconstitutional on grounds of
inconsistency with concepts of state “sovereignty,”405 even where the
cooperation interferes with state control over local governments. The Court’s
federalism jurisprudence, including the decisions comprising the “federalist
revival,”406 confirms that the Court has not applied a clearly defined concept of
state sovereignty, but instead has been “engaged in a fundamentally
functionalist enterprise” in which “pragmatic and normative concerns about the

400

Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 530–31 (1985).
Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 724–25, 733–35 (2003).
402 See Davidson, supra note 306, at 995–98; Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of
Federal Law to Free State and Local Officials from State Legislatures’ Control, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201,
1207–16 (1999).
403 See Davidson, supra note 306, at 996–99; see, e.g., Lawrence Cnty. v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No.
40-1, 469 U.S. 256, 257–61 (1985) (holding that federal Payment in Lieu of Taxes statute authorizing local
governments to use federal funding for “any” governmental purpose preempted state statute purporting to
require local governments to distribute federal funds under the program similarly to distribution of general tax
revenue); City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320, 324–26, 341 (1958) (affirming Tacoma’s
claim of power to exercise eminent domain over state-owned fish hatcheries adjacent to dam project, despite
state objection that state law granted Tacoma no such power, in reliance on Ninth Circuit’s upholding of the
federal license’s validity); Wash. Dep’t of Game v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 207 F.2d 391, 396 (9th Cir. 1953)
(upholding validity of Federal Power Act license issued to Tacoma to build a dam despite state government
argument that state law prohibited the dam).
404 541 U.S. 125, 140 (2004).
405 See Davidson, supra note 306, at 1000 (“[F]ederal empowerment jurisprudence and other instances of
federal intervention in state internal political ordering undermine any robust view of the constitutional
necessity of state control over local governments.”).
406 See Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and
Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1735–36, 1755–56 (2005).
401
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appropriate allocation of power in a federal system have largely driven the
jurisprudence.”407 Federalism doctrine must be justified instrumentally
because there is no textual constitutional commitment to any particular
arrangement or constellation of state government powers within the
constitutional system.408 All that we know is that the Constitution commits us
to have federalism—there must be both federal and state governments—and
we cannot tell very much from the text about how much power the states must,
or should, retain against federal usurpation.409
In response to the lack of a firm textual basis, federalism doctrine
traditionally has been designed to promote the familiar benefits that are
thought to justify entrenching a federalist system in the first instance: the
capacity of subnational governments to tailor policies to diverse citizen
preferences; the value of regulatory diversity and experimentation; the capacity
for decentralized governmental authority to prevent tyrannical accumulation of
power at any one level of government; and the potential for multiple,
differentiated governmental forums in which citizens may participate to
enhance basic values of democratic engagement and popular sovereignty.410
Doctrines limiting federal power in the name of federalism find their sturdiest
constitutional justification in their tendency to promote one or more of these
values.411 The “values of federalism,” however, are not inextricably connected
with the preservation of state authority. It is not necessarily state policy
407

Davidson, supra note 306, at 1006 (emphasis added); see also Gerken, supra note 300, at 18–23
(noting that courts have shifted, in making federalism decisions, to “functional accounts that are keyed to the
role states play in preserving a well-functioning democracy”).
408 See ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS 96, 109 (2009) (arguing that the lack of specific constitutional text on federalism requirements makes
it necessary to derive our federalism norms by “structural inference,” and that a variety of different inferences
are consistent with the textual evidence that does exist); Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the
Future of Federalism, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 36 (observing that there is no “federalism clause” in the
Constitution); Garrick B. Pursley, Federalism Compatibilists, 89 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript
at 17) [hereinafter Pursley, Federalism Compatibilists] (reviewing SCHAPIRO, supra, and noting the absence of
textual support for specific federalism requirements); Garrick B. Pursley, Dormancy, 100 GEO. L.J.
(forthcoming 2012) (arguing that the lack of textual specificity on federalism requirements permits the
inference of only very basic, and broad, preclusions of government actions that undermine the constitutional
structure).
409 See SCHAPIRO, supra note 408, at 96; Gerken, supra note 300, at 23 (“[N]either the Constitution’s text
nor its structure offers definitive guidance on how to referee federal-state interactions.”); Pursley, Federalism
Compatibilists, supra note 408, at 13–17; Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of
Federalism, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 36 (observing that the Constitution contains “several clauses with important
federalism implications, but no central ‘Federalism Clause’”).
410 See Davidson, supra note 306, at 1006–08; Gerken, supra note 300, at 18–23; Young, supra note 325,
at 52–65; supra notes 306, 317–21, 325–31, and accompanying text.
411 Young, supra note 325, at 50–52.
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experimentation that we value, just policy experimentation; it is not necessarily
state government responsiveness to localized concerns that we value, just a
tailored response from some governmental institution; and it is not statewide
forums for civic participation that we must preserve, it is a broad spectrum of
opportunities to participate in government somewhere.412 There is no reason in
principle why the instrumental considerations that justify protecting state
governments against federal intrusion should not also frame a strong normative
case for empowering and protecting local governments, even if doing that
requires that the federal government take action that intrudes into state
government authority.413 Accordingly, if local empowerment would better
serve the underlying ends of the system, then there seems to be a persuasive
case for constitutional permissibility.
In the renewables context, we think that the reasons we have given here for
preferring a system of federal–local collaboration in promoting distributed
renewable energy technologies show that, in this context, federalism’s
underlying values are best promoted by enhancing local government power.414
The values that provide the very justification for federalism, in other words,
make a persuasive normative case for local energy.

412 See Pursley, Federalism Compatibilists, supra note 408 (manuscript at 14–15) (arguing that the
traditional “values of federalism” are instrumental values that may be promoted through a variety of different
governmental structures).
413 See Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary
Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1305–06 (1994); Davidson, supra note 306, at 1010; Gerken, supra note
300, at 23–24.
414 This may seem paradoxical because local governments possess only the power that state governments
grant to them through legislation. Some commentators argue that there are—or should be—some
constitutional protections for local government autonomy, particularly as it relates to protecting individual
rights and liberties, that operate independently from state law. See, e.g., David J. Barron, The Promise of
Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 560–95 (1999); Heather K. Gerken,
Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1748 (2005); Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in
the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810 (2004) (discussing the role of local
governments in the context of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses). Since we are here concerned
with environmental regulatory authority, we will assume that local governments must derive their power from
either state or federal positive law. Given that, the process of “freeing” local governments from state control
does not merely involve federal invalidation of state law restrictions; the federal government must also confer
regulatory authority on local governments in many cases. This creates complexities that we do not explore
here. One problem is that even a federal grant of local power over renewable energy must operate against the
backdrop of local governments’ general powers delegated by the state. State control over the contours of city
power generally means that state governments may find ways to change the “default conditions” under which
federally delegated authority must be exercised, perhaps to the detriment of federal goals. See Davidson,
supra note 306, at 978. Additional federal prohibitions may be needed to prevent such state tinkering, but this
wrinkle requires separate analysis that is beyond the scope of this Article.
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CONCLUSION
The deployment of distributed renewable generation systems is an essential
component of America’s sustainable future. Wind turbines in backyards and
solar panels on roofs are quick to install and are likely to attract lower levels of
political attention from adversaries. The individual impacts of these twentyfirst-century renewable gardens are small, but in the aggregate they may make
an enormous difference in reducing demand for electricity during peak hours,
empowering individuals and communities, and producing locally grown
electricity, jobs, and profits. America’s ability to shed its antiquated energy
infrastructure and move toward the essential distributed renewable component
of a twenty-first-century energy system, however, depends on upending
traditional governance structures in this area. Widespread distributed
renewable energy generation, and the larger transformation that it potentiates,
is best facilitated by an unusual cooperative federal–local regulatory structure.
Local governments must have the power to shape land-energy rules to enable
broader adoption of distributed devices in a manner tailored to unique,
localized physical, social, and political conditions. The great moves from
candles to provision of gas for centralized home lighting began with local
innovation. Individual entrepreneurs—early energy pioneers—persuaded
citizens of their home towns that the change was worthwhile and safe, that
their homes would no longer be smoky and dark, and that new forms of energy
were convenient and accessible; then they persuaded local governments to
adopt policies that enabled the change. Additional pioneering efforts, again
initially with local governmental support, helped to make electricity a
nationwide good delivered through a massive centralized infrastructure.
The next necessary transition—away from this centralized system—will
require the same kinds of bottom-up actions of pioneers and innovation that
arise from energy entrepreneurs’ responses to varied local challenges. Solar
panels and wind turbines must physically appear in yards; neighbors must
discuss their experiences with these new technologies; and the word must
spread beyond the neighborhood level. For that to happen, land-energy laws
must be retooled to maximize opportunities for promotion and adoption of
these technologies. Empowering local governments in this area will generate
clusters of differing regulatory packages crafted to reflect unique geographical,
social, and political circumstances, to which renewables pioneers will have to
creatively respond. The innovation inspired by these differences will create
thousands of approaches to renewables deployment from which other localities
can pick and choose.
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In addition to local governments that are empowered to write and enact
local land-energy rules, a federal minimum standard is needed to prevent
negative, anti-renewables regulatory variation. And to ensure that local
governments are able to implement a variety of land-energy rules, we have
argued that states must not intervene; the federal government must therefore
preempt state laws that unacceptably constrain municipal land-energy laws.
The underlying values of federalism are best promoted by local governments in
the distributed renewables land-energy context, and there seems to be no
constitutional barrier to this type of federal–local cooperative system.
This Article is only an initial step toward a broader vision of a new energy
future. Local governments, even though not yet fully empowered to enact
local land-energy laws, have already begun to move aggressively toward this
future—with some even declaring that one-hundred percent of their electricity
will come from renewable sources.415 The production of vast quantities of
electricity from clean, distributed renewable generation is currently a fragile
vision that is part of an energy future shrouded in uncertainty. This Article has
suggested the ideal governmental levels at which sustainable energy, grown
from the bottom up, will become more than a vision. From this partial
foundation, we hope that much will emerge. Indeed, for a prosperous future, it
must.

415

See supra text accompanying note 102 (describing San Jose’s initiative).
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ADDENDUM
Authors’ note: This table is not comprehensive. It does not include, for
example, many local and state financial incentives for renewables, such as tax
credits. It also tends to focus on efforts toward distributed generation, not
renewables farms. Its purpose is to begin to suggest the impressive level of
renewables-based activity that is occurring at the state and particularly the
local level in some of the major population centers.

Los Angeles Department of
Water and Power (LADWP):
LADWP’s Solar Incentive
Program “has enable[ed] nearly
29 megawatts (MW) of clean,
renewable solar power.”xxiii
Provides payments to residential
and commercial customers that
“purchase or lease solar
photovoltaic (PV) systems to
offset traditional energy

•

Los Angeles
3,833,995

2005 renewable energy target: Aimed for
generating 20% of electricity with
renewables by 2010; generation is now
close to 12%.xxvii LA will purchase some
renewable power from a Baja geothermal
facility and Pine Tree, its municipally
owned wind farm currently being
constructed.xxviii
o
Action by mayor.xxix
GREEN LA: Aims to increase “the city’s
use of renewable energy to 40 percent by

•

•

•

•

Executive Order S-14-08: Thirty-three percent of all retail
electricity shall be served by renewable sources by 2020.xxxix
o
Action by governor following 2002 and 2006
legislatively-enacted Renewables Portfolio
Standards. xl
o
Aims to encourage “technically and economically
feasible distributed renewable energy
opportunities.”xli
California Solar Initiative: Beginning in 2007, provides
$3.3 billion over ten years for solar equipment installed on
existing and new structures.xlii

LOCAL ENERGY

•

•

•

•

•

Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS): Twenty-five
percent of electricity used by consumers must be produced
by renewable sources by 2013.xvi
o
Action by governor (in response to the New York
State Energy Planning Board’s 2002 State Energy
Plan) and the New York State Public Service
Commission.xvii
Solar Electric Incentive Program: Provides $20.6 million
in cash incentives to electricity customers who install new
solar electric or photovoltaic systems.xviii
o
Action by Public Service Commission; uses funding
allocated by RPS.xix
New York Energy Policy Institute: Formed to “help New
York continue to be a leader in the new economy by
building a clean energy economy.”xx
o
Action by governor.xxi
New York State Energy Research and Development
Authority (NYSERDA): Current goals include “reducing
energy consumption, promoting the use of renewable
energy sources, and protecting the environment.”xxii

State efforts and organizations
•

2011]

•

•

•

New York City Economic
Development Corporation: Is
“involved in planning for both
short and long-term energy
resource[s]” and “fostering the
market for renewable energy.”ii
o
Mayor formed the New
York City Energy Policy
Task Force, to be led by
NYEDC, in 2003.iii Task
Force generated a report
in 2004, which has since
guided City energy
policy.iv
New York City Energy Policy
Board: Submitted
recommendations to the Energy
Planning Board in December
2008.v Board will “review and
approve energy plans that
include supply and demand
strategies to meet the city’s
needs.”vi
o
Action by mayor.vii
Mayor’s Office of Long-Term
Planning and Sustainability:
Works “with City agencies and
the Mayor’s Advisory Board for
Sustainability” to help
implement PlaNYC and the
mayor’s vision of making New
York “sustainable” by 2030.viii

New York
8,363,710

Request for Expressions of Interest for
renewable energy projects: Asked “firms
with strong track records in producing
renewable energy” for project ideas
(“small- and large-scale”).ix
o
Action by mayor; implemented by
New York City Economic
Development Corporation.
PlaNYC: Aims to “increase the amount of
Clean DG [distributed generation] by 800
MW.”x Also aims to establish a New York
City Energy Planning Board.xi
o
Action by mayor.xii
Renewable Energy Rebate:
Administrative Code provides: “Owners
who demonstrate the production on a
zoning lot of five percent or more of the
annual energy consumption on the zoning
lot through renewable energy sources may
receive a fee rebate as established by
rule.”xiii
Mayor signedxiv The U.S. Mayors Climate
Protection Agreement, which, among
other things, commits the city to “strive to
meet or exceed Kyoto Protocol targets for
reducing global warming pollution by
taking actions . . . such as . . . [i]ncreas[ing]
the use of clean, alternative energy
by . . . advocating for the development of
renewable energy resources.”xv

Local efforts
•

Local commissions
•

City and populationi
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TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RENEWABLE GENERATION, 2009.

TABLE 1. SELECT LOCAL AND STATE ORGANIZATIONS AND EFFORTS RELATING

•

•

•

Green Ribbon Committee of
“business and community
leaders”l provides ongoing
guidance for Climate Action
Plan.
Chicago Center for Green
Technology: Offers seminars
and other educational resources
related to green buildings,
including buildings that
incorporate solar and wind
technologies.li
Chicago Department of
Environment: Has helped
prepare energy plans for the
citylii and helps to provide
energy grants, when available,
through its Director of Energy
Management.liii

Chicago Climate Action Plan: City in
2009 partnered with two corporations “for
the development of the nation’s largest
urban solar power plant,” which “will
produce an average of 14,000 megawatts
[MWh] of power.”liv The City also aims to
“[i]ncrease efficient power generated onsite
using distributed generation and combined
heat and power,” to “[d]ouble current
household-scale renewable electricity
generation,” and to “[p]rocure enough
renewable energy generation for
Chicagoans to reduce electricity emissions
by 20 percent.”lv
o
Action by mayorlvi
Solar Thermal Systems and Grant
Program: Grants were awarded prior to
2009, but the City continues to install solar
thermal systems on its facilities.lvii
o
Action by mayorlviii
Solar energy installations: “The

•

•

•

•

•

•

Renewable Portfolio Standard: Requires “at least” 25%
of a utility’s supply of electricity to eligible retail customers
to come from renewable energy resources by June 1, 2025,
and “each year thereafter.”lxv “To the extent available, at
least 75%” of this 25% must come from wind, and 6% of
the 25% must come from photovoltaics.lxvi
o
Action by legislature.lxvii
Renewable Energy Resources Program: Administered by
the Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic
Opportunity’s Division of Energy.lxviii Includes a Solar and
Wind Energy Rebate Program “to encourage utilization of
smaller-scale solar and wind energy systems in Illinois.”lxix
o
Action by legislature.lxx

Action by governor, the California Public Utilities
Commission, and the California Energy
Commission.xliii
Wind & Fuel Cell Rebates: Beginning in 2007, provides
cash rebates for small wind turbines and fuel cells powered
by renewable sources of hydrogen.xliv
Self-Generation Incentive Program: “[P]rovides
incentives to support existing, new, and emerging
distributed energy resources” including wind turbines and
fuel cells; administered by utilities.xlv
Renewable Energy Transmission Initiative: Will “help
identify the transmission projects needed to accommodate”
California’s renewable energy goals.xlvi
o
Action by coalition of public agencies and private
utilities.xlvii
Cal. Health and Safety Code: Emissions of greenhouse
gases in California must be reduced to 1990 levels by
2020.xlviii
o
California Public Utility Commission, which must
implement regulations to meet this target, describes
“mandates that increase California’s reliance on
renewable energy sources” as future “cornerstones”
of this effort.xlix
o
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•

•

•

•

•

2020.”xxx
o
Action by mayorxxxi (Note that neither
the renewable energy target nor
Green LA mentions distributed
sources).
The Los Angeles Solar Energy Plan:
Aims to incentivize homeowners to install
380 MW of solar power on the roofs of
electricity customers’ homes by 2020,xxxii to
install 400 MW of City-owned solar
equipment by 2014,xxxiii and to “procure 500
MW of utility-scale solar power projects”
by 2020.xxxiv
o
Action by mayor.xxxv Failed as a
ballot initiative, but mayor has
continued to push for its
implementation.xxxvi
Mayor signedxxxvii The U.S. Mayors
Climate Protection Agreement, which
includes renewable energy goals.xxxviii

960

Chicago
2,853,114

consumption at the installation
site.”xxiv LADWP also
implements the 2005 renewable
energy target as part of its own
Renewable Portfolio Standard.xxv
Has completed and is
developing multiple “renewable
energy generation projects,”
including rooftop solar
photovoltaics owned by
LADWP,xxvi to meet its standard.
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Environmental Quality
Commission: This group is a
“citizens’ commission” that has
been “instrumental in
recommending green building
practices for inclusion in the
General Plan” for the city,

•

•

Environmental Coordinating
Council: “coordinat[es]
environmental investigation and
enforcement work across
departments,” and “identif[ies]
and support[s] all departments to
access opportunities for external
funding for environmental
projects,”lxxi including renewable
energy programs.lxxii
Houston Code Enforcement’s
Green Building Resource
Center: Has a solar-power
pump for its rainwater collection
system; offers reviews of
residents’ building plans and
suggests “green strategies.”lxxiii

•

•

•

•

•

•

City renewable energy goal: The City has
a goal to ensure that by 2025, “15% of the
energy used by the city should come from
renewable energy sources” and aims to
achieve this goal “through city-owned and
city-sponsored projects, primarily through
public and private partnerships.”lxxxviii

Wind energy commitment: In July 2009,
the city committed to purchasing 32 percent
of its total electricity load from wind
energy.lxxiv
o
Action by mayor.lxxv
Solarized City equipment: The City has
installed solar-powered parking meters and
solar panels on top of several city facilities
(“produc[ing] approximately 24000 kWh
annually”).lxxvi
Consumer Choice Program: Utilities
participate in a program that offers
“variable and fixed pricing and ‘green’ and
conventional electricity” for consumers to
purchase, and the City operates a website
that allows customers to compare energy
prices.lxxvii
Comprehensive Renewable Energy Plan:
establishes a target for the city of
purchasing “438 million kilowatt-hours of
renewable energy.”lxxviii
•

•

•

•

•

•

Renewable Energy Standard and Tariff Rules: Require
utilities to “derive at least . . . [1.1%] of the total retail
energy solar from new solar resources or environmentallyfriendly renewable electricity technologies” from 2007 to
2012, either by generating the electricity or purchasing
it,xcviii and requires utilities to purchase “Renewable Energy
Credits from Eligible Renewable Energy Resources” and in

Renewable Portfolio Standard: Aims for 10,000 MW of
electricity in the state to be produced from renewable
sources by 2025 and requires that renewable sources
produce 5,880 MW of electricity by 2015.lxxix
o
Action by legislature.lxxx
Texas Solar for Schools Program: The State Energy
Conservation Office “has funded 31 small-scale solar
energy systems [in] school districts across the state.”lxxxi
Training solar photovoltaic installers: The State Energy
Conservation Office, along with the Texas Workforce
Commission, have provided grants to form a community
college program that trains students in advanced installation
of PV systems for commercial and residential buildings.lxxxii
Renewable Energy at Work: The State Energy
Conservation Office sponsors the installation of solar and
wind generation projects around the state.lxxxiii
Customer Choice: Texas provides, as part of its customer
safeguards in the deregulation (“customer choice”) process,
that a consumer is entitled “to have access to . . . on-site
distributed generation, and to providers of energy generated
by renewable energy resources.”lxxxiv
o
Action by legislature.lxxxv

2011]

Phoenix
1,567,924

Houston
2,242,193

•

•

Department of Water Management is
planning to install a 1 megawatt solar array
at the South Water Filtration Plant. In
addition, the Chicago Park District is
training their union employees on how to
install solar arrays.”lix
Chicago Energy Plan: Although written in
2001, this comprehensive strategy continues
to influence energy policy.lx It aimed for
25% of new electricity demand in Chicago
to be met with renewable sources by 2010.lxi
o
Action by mayor.lxii
Mayor signedlxiii The U.S. Mayors Climate
Protection Agreement, which includes
renewable energy goals.lxiv
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Municipal Energy Office:
Helped implement “City’s first
solar-electric energy system” on
the Police Forensic Science
Center roof.cvi Member of
Philadelphia Million Solar Roofs
Partnership, a “collaborative of
local organizations, businesses,
and government agencies
committed to helping the five
county region of Southeastern
Pennsylvania contribute over
500 new solar installations by
2010.”cvii

Local Action Plan for Climate Change:
“purchase or generate at least 15 percent of
electricity demand for City buildings from
renewable sources by 2015”;cviii purchase
wind energy to cover five percent of City
electricity use by 2010;cix “[e]valuate the
financial feasibility of installing solar and
other [non-greenhouse gas] producing
systems at City-owned facilities.”cx
o
Action by mayor.cxi
Environmental Stewardship Program:
City purchases “12,960 MWh of wind
energy annually” to power Philadelphia
International Airport.cxii
o
Action by city planners.cxiii
Mayor signedcxiv The U.S. Mayors Climate

o
Action by city council.lxxxix
Solar installations: Since 1990, the City
has installed a number of solar photovoltaic
systems and solar lights in local parks and
at transit stations and other facilities.xc The
City is currently planning to install a solar
generating plant at one of its landfills.xci
Green Phoenix: Aims, among other goals,
to “leverage current city efforts and
resources” and “sustain quality of life for
Phoenix residents” through projects such as
solar panel installation and “greenretrofitting of public housing.”xcii The City
has already implemented “[o]ver 80 current
sustainability programs in water, energy
and natural resource conservation” and has
created 250 megawatts of solar energy
production capacity.xciii As part of the
“Solar City” initiative under Green
Phoenix, the City aims to “[i]nstall solar PV
and solar water heaters in existing public
facilities, require [it] in public new
facilities, [and] incentivize [it] in residential
and commercial sectors.”xciv
o
Action by mayor.xcv
Mayor signedxcvi The U.S. Mayors Climate
Protection Agreement, which includes
renewable energy goals.xcvii

•

•

•

•

Renewable Portfolio Standard: Electricity from solar
photovoltaic technologies must comprise 0.0203% “of the
electric energy sold” to retail electric customers from June
1, 2010, through May 31, 2011, and by June 20, 2020 and
thereafter, the required percentage is 0.05000.cxvi By
compliance year 2020–2021,cxvii “at least 8% of the electric
energy sold” by a utility to retail electric customers must be
from “Tier I alternative energy resources,” which include
“solar photovoltaic and solar thermal energy” and “wind
power,”cxviii among others.cxix In total, 18% of the electric
energy sold by compliance year 2020–2021 must be
generated from renewable sources (Tier I and Tier II).cxx
Pennsylvania Clean Energy Communities Campaign: If
one of twenty communities (including Philadelphia) passes
an “official community resolution” and announces its
“commitment to 20% [clean energy] by 2010[],” it receives

so doing, by 2025, to ensure that 15% of the retail kilowatthours of electricity sold is renewably produced.xcix
o
Action by Arizona Corporation Commission.c
Prohibition on solar panel bans in private communities:
Arizona prohibits homeowners’ associations from banning
“the installation or use of a solar energy device” and
retroactively invalidates deeds to the contrary.ci
o
Action by legislature.cii
Arizona Climate Change Action Group: Generated the
Arizona Climate Change Action Plan, which includes
recommendations to “Encourage Distributed Generation of
Renewable Energy,”ciii “Reduce Barriers to Renewables and
Distributed Generation of Clean Energy,” and “Implement
Pricing Strategies to Promote . . . Use of Renewable
Energy.”civ
o
Action by governor.cv

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

•

•

•

•

•

•

962

Philadelphia
1,447,395

including recommendations
regarding renewables.lxxxvi
o
Action by mayor and city
council.lxxxvii
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Office of Environmental
Quality: The Dallas
Comprehensive Plan aims to
“[e]xpand the role of the City of
Dallas Office of Environmental
Quality to include an
interagency taskforce . . . to
educate and advocate for
environmentally sound
development practices,”
including green building
practices.cxxxv

•

•

Citizens Advisory Committee:
The City’s municipally owned
utility, CPS, has a Citizens
Advisory Committee with
fifteen members who provide
“community input directly to the
CPS Energy Board of Trustees
and staff.”cxxiii
Office of Environmental
Policy: Involved in
implementing the Mission Verde
Sustainability Plan.cxxiv
o
Sustainability Task
Force Executive
Committee: “[C]reated
to . . . integrate
sustainability principles
with municipal
operations.”cxxv Also a
resource for the Mission
Verde plan.cxxvi

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

City of Dallas Comprehensive Plan: Goal
6.3.4 aims to “reduce non-renewable energy
resource consumption and promote the use
of alternative energy,”cxxxvi and includes as
an implementation measure: “Promote . . .
use of solar power in residential,
commercial and industrial
development.”cxxxvii
o
Action by city council.cxxxviii
Green Building Program: Through this
program, the City has constructed twentytwo projects for which it is seeking

Mission Verde Sustainability Plan:
Initiative “#1” is to “[b]uild a 21st Century
urban energy infrastructure in San Antonio
with distributive energy” by generating
“energy from renewable energy sources
such as solar, wind, biomass and
geothermal, originated from buildings and
homes, stored until needed and connected
with a multi-directional grid.”cxxvii
o
Action by mayor.cxxviii
Solar Energy Solar Initiative Rebate
Program: Offers customers up to $3.00 per
watt produced by a solar photovoltaic
system installed on the customer’s
property.cxxix The municipal utility also
provides customers with a rebate for
installing solar water heaters.cxxx
CPS Energy’s Vision 2020: Lists as goal
for 2020 that installation of 1500 megawatts
of renewable generation.cxxxi
As part of its Strategic Energy Plan, CPS
energy plans to add 100 megawatts of
“solar-generated electricity” to complement
its existing 709 megawatts of purchased
wind power.cxxxii
Mayor signedcxxxiii The U.S. Mayors
Climate Protection Agreement, which
includes renewable energy goals.cxxxiv
•

•

See Houston, supra.

See Houston, supra.

a free 1kWh solar energy system.cxxi
o
Led by the Sustainable Development Fund of the
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission and
SmartPower.cxxii

2011]

Dallas
1,279,910

San Antonio
1,351,305

Protection Agreement, which includes
renewable energy goals.cxv
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Transportation and
Environment Committee:
Receives status reports on solar
energy initiativescli and other
proposed activities related to
renewables.clii
Interdepartmental Energy and
Solar Team: Helps to
coordinate installation of
renewables,cliii among other
projects.
Environmental Services
Department: Prepared a request
for qualifications package to
determine the optimal “size and
type of renewable energy

•

San Jose
948,279

•

•

•

•

San Jose Green Vision: This is a fifteenyear plan to “transform San José into the
world center of Clean Technology
innovation” and “promote cutting-edge
sustainable practices,” among other goals.clv
As part of this 10-point plan, the City
through a “60-Day Solar Challenge”clvi
“pushed numerous local solar companies to
offer no/low down-payment financing and
lease programs to residents interested in
installing solar on their homes.”clvii It has
also “installed solar power systems on city
facilities”clviii (approximately ten to dateclix).
In one project, the Housing Department
granted an apartment complex $300,000 to
“retrofit the complex with photovoltaics.”clx

Solar installations: City has installed solar
panel systems on many city facilities.cxlvi
Encourages renewables as part of its green
building requirement: Requires that “all
new buildings and major renovations over
5,000 square feet” achieve the Leadership
in Energy and Environmental Design
(LEED) “Silver” Level Certificationcxlvii and
additionally “encourages” “all newly
constructed facilities and major renovation
projects regardless of square footage” to
“[i]ncorporate self-generation using
renewable technologies.”cxlviii Requires
“[c]ity owned new construction and major
renovation projects [to] provide a minimum
of 15 percent of total building energy from
onsite self-generation.”cxlix
o
Action by city council.cl
•

•

See Los Angeles, supra.

See Los Angeles, supra.

964

•

Environmental Services
Department, Energy
Conservation and
Management Division: Formed
“to pursue the City of San
Diego’s long-term goal of
energy independence.”cxlv

•

San Diego
1,279,329

•

•

Leadership in Energy and Environmental
Design (LEED) Certification;cxxxix one of
these projects includes a solar panel array.cxl
o
Action by city council.cxli
Renewable power purchasing: The City
purchased “nearly 334 million kilowatthours” of renewable power in 2008.cxlii
Mayor signedcxliii The U.S. Mayors Climate
Protection Agreement, which includes
renewable energy goals.cxliv
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•

•

•

•

Actions by mayorclxi and city
council.clxii
City of San Jose Strategic Energy Plan:
“[S]eeks to identify the ways and means to
implement the energy and renewable goals
of the City’s adopted Green Vision.”clxiii
2009–2010 San Jose Clean Tech
Legislative Agenda: “Within 15 years,” the
City aims to “[r]eceive 100 percent of [its]
electrical power from clean renewable
sources.”clxiv Other goals include to
“[e]ncourage demonstration projects and
early public procurement of Clean Tech
products”clxv and to make “Clean Tech
products cost competitive with nonrenewable technologies.”clxvi The report also
concludes that “key [local] projects in 2009
should focus on urban utility-scale
renewable energy projects” and that
“[p]olicies should . . . be adopted to
promote . . . onsite renewable energy
generation.”clxvii
o
Action by mayor “following
discussions at the Clean Tech
Summit.”clxviii
Sustainable Energy Policy: This 2003
policy and “subsequent annual action plans”
aim to “[e]ncourage the development and
use of renewable energy sources.”clxix
o
Action by city council.clxx
With funding from the federal Smart Solar
Initiative, the City is working to install
solar on City-owned buildings and
“[c]oordinate public and private sector
resources . . . toward the increased use of
solar.”clxxi
o

2011]

Population numbers represent the city population in number of individuals as estimated by the U.S. Census Bureau for July 1, 2008. U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for Incorporated
Places over 100,000, Ranked by July 1, 2008 Population: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2008 (July 1, 2009), available at http://www.census.gov/popest/cities/tables/SUB-EST2008-01.xls.
ii
Department Overviews, N.Y.C. ECON. DEV. CORP., http://www.nycedc.com/AboutUs/WhoWeAre/DepartmentOverviews/Pages/DepartmentOverviews.aspx (last visited Feb. 17, 2011).
iii
N.Y.C. ENERGY POLICY TASK FORCE, NEW YORK CITY ENERGY POLICY: AN ELECTRICITY RESOURCE ROADMAP 6 (2004), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/energy_task_force.pdf.
iv
See generally id. (detailing the New York City Energy Policy Task Force’s recommendations for future action by the mayor).
v
CITY OF N.Y., PLANYC: PROGRESS REPORT 2010, at 58 (2010), available at http://nytelecom.vo.llnwd.net/o15/agencies/planyc2030/pdf/planyc_progress_report_2010.pdf.
vi
CITY OF N.Y., PLANYC: A GREENER, GREATER NEW YORK 105 (2007).
vii
Mayor’s Office of Operations, About, NYC.GOV, http://www.nyc.gov/html/ops/planyc/html/about/about.shtml (last visited May 1, 2011) (“On Earth Day 2007, Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, released PlaNYC . . . .”).

system” and “[e]stimated
output” of systems that would be
installed on City facilities.cliv
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ix

Mayor’s Office of Operations, Long-Term Planning and Sustainability, NYC.GOV, http://www.nyc.gov/html/ops/html/long_term/long_term.shtml (last visited May 1, 2011).
Press Release, City of N.Y., Mayor Bloomberg Announces New York City’s First Steps Toward Developing Off-Shore Windfarms and Other Sources of Renewable Energy at 2008 National Clean Energy Summit (Aug.
19, 2008), available at http://www.nyc.gov/cgi-bin/misc/pfprinter.cgi?action=print&sitename=OM&p=1304358927000.
x
CITY OF N.Y., supra note vi, at 111.
xi
Id. at 105.
xii
See supra note vii and accompanying text.
xiii
N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 28-112.6.3.1 (2009).
xiv
Climate Prot. Ctr., List of Participating Mayors, U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/list.asp (last visited May 1, 2011).
xv
CLIMATE PROT. CTR., U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, THE U.S. MAYORS CLIMATE PROTECTION AGREEMENT (2005), available at http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/documents/mcpAgreement.pdf.
xvi
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, State of N.Y., Order Regarding Retail Renewable Portfolio Standard 26, 83 (Sept. 24, 2004), available at http://documents.dps.state.ny.us/public/Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefId=
{B1830060-A43F-426D-8948-F60E6B754734}.
xvii
History of New York’s Renewable Portfolio Standard, N.Y. STATE ENERGY RESEARCH & DEV. AUTH., http://www.nyserda.org/rps/furtherreading.asp (last visited May 1, 2011).
xviii
See PV Incentives, supra note 184.
xix
Id.
xx
Press Release, N.Y. State, Governor Paterson Names Stony Brook to Lead New York State Energy Policy Institute (Dec. 14, 2009), http://www.nyserda.org/Press_Releases/2009/PressReleas20091214.asp (quoting
Governor David Patterson).
xxi
Id.
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About NYSERDA, N.Y. STATE ENERGY RESEARCH & DEV. AUTH., http://www.nyserda.org/About/default.asp (last visited May 1, 2011).
xxiii
Solar Power, L.A. DEP’T OF WATER & POWER, http://www.ladwp.com/ladwp/cms/ladwp000870.jsp (last visited May 1, 2011).
xxiv
Id.
xxv
Renewable Energy Policy, L.A. DEP’T OF WATER & POWER, http://www.ladwp.com/ladwp/cms/ladwp005864.jsp (last visited May 1, 2011) (explaining that the goal of providing twenty percent renewably produced
electricity to customers by 2010 is “part of the LADWP’s Renewable Portfolio Standard”).
xxvi
RPS Generation Projects, L.A. DEP’T OF WATER & POWER, http://www.ladwp.com/ladwp/cms/ladwp009507.jsp (last visited May 1, 2011).
xxvii
Climate, MAYOR OF THE CITY OF L.A., http://mayor.lacity.org/Issues/Environment/Climate/index.htm (last visited May 1, 2011).
xxviii
Id.; see also U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Los Angeles Breaks Ground on Nation’s Largest City-Owned Wind Farm, ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY (Feb. 11, 2008), http://www1.eere.energy.gov/
windandhydro/news_detail.html?news_id=11586.
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Climate, supra note 27.
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Id. (explaining that Mayor Villaraigosa “unveiled” the action plan in May 2007).
xxxii
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